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This chapter proposes a survey of the main results produced by the literature on licensing and some original insights, with a particular focus on globalization, North–South models of technology transfer, the issue of how the intellectual property rights influences international licensing, and asymmetric information.

Firms have typically tried to profit from their technical innovations by selling them indirectly, embedded in goods and services. Markets for technology, in which innovations are sold or licensed, have been much rarer. Yet, trade in technology has grown systematically over the past 20 years, as reflected in the growth of arrangements such as licensing agreements, R&D joint ventures, and contract R&D. Recent estimates indicate that royalties received by American corporations for industrial processes may amount to about a quarter of total U.S. R&D. A number of supporting institutions that facilitate effective dissemination of information, standardization, and contracting are vital to the rise and functioning of markets for technology. Intellectual property rights, and in particular patents, are one such institution. The main objectives of this survey are to review critically the literature on the relationship between trade in technology and patent protection, and to assess the contribution of stricter and better-defined patent protection to the emergence of technology markets. We start our survey by providing a tentative taxonomy of markets for technology and some recent evidence on their extent and evolution. We then explore several reasons why firms would be willing to act as suppliers in the market for technology. The core of the survey revolves around the idea that patents facilitate the development of markets for technology in several ways: They enhance the ability of the licensor to extract rents from its innovation; they reduce costs in technology trade by forcing an increased codification of knowledge; they reduce information asymmetries, opportunistic behaviors, and transaction costs. However, the literature also points to some potential costs of stronger patents, including litigation costs and the problem of “anti-commons.” Finally, we explore the implications of patents and markets for technology for entry, competition and industry dynamics.

Industry practice has shown that technology licensing has an important effect on the R&D cooperation between firms. Different licensing methods will significantly impact a supply chain member's cooperative and price R&D decisions. However, there is scant literature investigating the decision on technology licensing and its impact on a supply chain member's price and cooperative R&D decisions. To address this gap, the authors investigate the R&D cooperation and the technology licensing in a supply chain formed of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM), a contract manufacturer (CM), and a third-party manufacturer which will compete with the OEM when the technology licensing occurs.

The authors investigate two licensing patterns, royalty licensing, fixed fee licensing together with the no licensing, within the R&D cooperative supply chain by developing two three-stage and a two-stage Stackelberg models.

Compare to the no licensing strategy, technology licensing always benefits to the OEM and the society especially when the technology efficiency and the brand power of the third-party manufacturer are more significant; the royalty licensing benefits to the OEM more when the technology efficiency and the brand power of the third-party manufacturer are higher; the fixed fee licensing benefits to the OEM more when the technology efficiency and the brand power of the third-party manufacturer are lower.

The royalty licensing is more effective for mitigating price competition intensity and helping firms to maintain higher sales margins; the fixed fee licensing induces firms' lower sales margins but increases the firms' sales quantities; in most cases, the fixed fee licensing is optimal from the perspectives of consumer and society, however, the CM's investment intention to the R&D technology with the fixed fee licensing is lower.

So far, different licensing models under the R&D cooperation have not been investigated, and the authors propose two three-stage Stackelberg models with considering the competition caused by technology licensing under the R&D cooperation to deal with the cooperative R&D and technology licensing issues.

As the university–industry collaboration (UIC) gradually attracts the attention of various national governments, the number of studies on UIC has increased substantially. Past UIC studies have mostly focused on investigating the incentives and the motivation for UIC, forms of UIC and performance output of UIC. However, they have not actively identified the key technologies and technology distribution that are conductive to the commercialization of UIC outcomes. Therefore, this study aims to adopt the licensed UIC patents as the basis for analysis and to construct a patent licensing technology network.

This study focused on licensed patents because past studies have indicated that such patents usually have higher value. Moreover, patent licensing can be seen as the final step for the commercialization of UIC outcomes. Finally, past studies have rarely explored patent examiners’ views on key technologies. However, during the substantive examination of patents, patent examiners often use their background knowledge regarding the technology to include citations to other patented technologies that they consider valuable or indispensable. Therefore, this study focused on investigating the patents recognized and cited by patent examiners and conducted key technology identification.

The results indicated that past key technologies in UIC focused on surveying, medicine, biochemistry and electric digital data processing; these fields are crucial to the commercialization of key UIC technologies. Finally, the USA, Japan, Sweden and Germany play critical roles in the network of global university–industry cooperation and technology licensing.

Patent examiners’ perspectives were adopted to establish a patent licensing technology network, through which the key technologies that could promote UIC patent licensing were mined. This study can also serve as a reference for resource allocation in university research and development and for governments to promote new technologies.

This paper aims to study the validity of potential factors that might affect US information and communication technology (ICT) holders' choice of foreign licensing partners.

This study focuses on ICT industry. The sample firms for this study are drawn from the SDC by Thomson Financial and this sample was used to construct a data in which a unit of observation is the unique US licensor – foreign licensee pair, or a dyad. The hypotheses are tested using the random-effects logit model.

The important explanatory factors relate to the knowledge appropriability and the level of economics freedom of a licensee's country, and familiarity between partners through prior licensing agreements. Market similarity between partners, however, appears to be an insignificant factor.

The findings suggest that transaction cost, competition, and national absorb capacity considerations weigh in heavily in explaining firms' choice of foreign licensing partners.

The paper makes an important contribution to licensing literature as the understanding of what drives partner choice is still sparse. Especially, the paper makes a uniqueness of dealing with international technology licensing.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the trends and features of one of the most visible intellectual property (IP) management practices, IP licensing, in the context of start-ups, accessing external technology at the outset of their lifetime. In particular, it compares start-ups and incumbent firms, in terms of licensing strategy pursued, role of in-licensed technologies relative to the internal innovation process and successively implemented IP management strategies.

A mixed-method study is presented using quantitative data on licensing deals from the US Securities and Exchange Commission and cases on start-up companies involved in inbound technology licensing.

Evidence indicates start-ups have different IP licensing strategies than incumbents, and their successive IP management strategies are more flexible than for incumbents.

The authors shed light on IP licensing, which is gaining momentum in open innovation (OI) settings, in an understudied segment of SMEs, namely, start-ups. The authors display interesting evidence of the portion of start-ups that license-in from external companies, indicating that this practice is more widespread than literature would suggest; the authors demonstrate that licensing-in is a valuable strategy for start-up companies, possibly providing additional channels for acquiring know-how on the market. The authors therefore contribute to, and advance, entrepreneurship, IP and OI literature.

For many small firms, buying technology through licensing has long been regarded as a major route to successful new product development. However, little research aimed at comparing the attitudes of small firms towards buying technology through licensing has been conducted. Using both univariate and multivariate analysis, this article reports an empirical study comparing the characteristics and perceptions of 81 Australian licensee and 107 nonlicensee small firms towards buying technology from international nonaffliated firms. Surprisingly, small nonlicensee firms are found to scan international technology developments more than their licensee counterparts. In addition, whereas nonlicensee firms have higher perceptions of the costs of technology licensing than licensees, paradoxically they also appear to have higher perceived benefits than licensees. Based of this inconsistency between attitude and behavior four types of firms are proposed — active/satisfied licensees, passive/dissatisfied licensees, potential licensees and nonlicensee firms. Theoretical and managerial implications of the results are discussed.

The International Marketing of Technology: An Interaction Perspective More and more companies have resorted to a wide diversity of international operation forms in order to enter and develop foreign markets. This diversity has been one of the features of international marketing over the past decade. Even though it appears that the entry mode to internationalization is still via simple exporting, with perhaps a shift to foreign investment later on, alternative modes, with various patterns of sequential development have become stronger features of international business operations (Luostarinen, 1979). The variety has, as yet, not been adequately reflected in official statistics of trade, investment and service flows between countries.

The purpose of this paper is to study brand embedded licensing (technology licensing and brand licensing combined) and its theoretical difference from standard licensing (technology licensing only). The following research questions are asked: What makes embedded licensing theoretically different from standard licensing, and what determines a licensor's decision to select brand embedded licensing over standard licensing?

This paper compares brand embedded licensing to standard licensing and argues that brand embedded licensing is a quasi‐hierarchical organizational structure, while standard licensing is a market‐based structure. Brand embeddedness in licensing serves as a credible commitment from the licensor and induces the licensee to invest sufficiently in complementary assets. Drawing on the transaction cost perspective, the determinants of embedded licensing are examined.

Embedded licensing is determined by both the licensee's characteristics and the licensor's brand characteristics. The licensor is more likely to utilize embedded licensing or the licensee is more willing to demand embedded licensing when: the licensee's specific complementary investment is high; the licensee's complementary capacity is high; the market entry is at a late stage; the licensor uses separate branding; the extent of product differentiation is high; and the stage of brand globalization is advanced. A strong intellectual property rights regime and a fast pace of technology change enhance the effects of these six determining factors on the licensor's selection of embedded licensing.

This paper challenges the classical view that licensing is a market‐based relationship by revealing that embedded licensing is a quasi‐hierarchical organizational structure.

Investigates the relative effects of organizational and managerial factors on the firm′s propensity to acquire new technology through licensing from foreign non‐affiliated companies. Aims to contribute to the literature on the role of international licensing in the firm′s technology strategy by examining both licensee and non‐licensee firms. Finds that the two sets of factors make different but complementary contributions to the firm′s propensity to licence‐in foreign technology, with the managerial factors having far greater impact than the organizational factors. In addition, the individual factors have significantly different effects on the propensity to adopt licensing by licensee and non‐licensee firms in the sample. The results suggest that international licensors who look at both sets of factors in screening and selecting prospective licensees are more likely to be successful than those who look at one set of factors alone.