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The purpose of this paper is to provide graduate students, researchers, governmental and independent agencies with an overview of technological disasters.

Technological disasters are subjects of concern to researchers, academicians, governmental and independent agencies. Disasters are classified into natural and man‐made disasters. For an incident to be classified as a disaster, the disaster criteria should be met. Several disaster criteria have been proposed defining the disasters in terms of casualties, economic loss and environmental impact. The disasters which involve major hazard installations (MHIs) are known as technological disasters. The technological disaster definition, stages, types, criteria, factors, models have been reviewed. This paper presents an overview of technological disaster definition, criteria, stages, models, factors, and prevention.

Although the technological disasters may occur at non‐MHIs, it has been noted that most of the technological disasters involved MHIs and that their impact is not limited to the plants but can extend to neighboring surroundings. The technological disaster consists of three stages: before, during, and after disaster. There are many factors contributing to the technological disasters, some of which are observed clearly while others are partially hidden. The main technological disaster factors were identified as human, organizational and technological errors. Few models have been drawn describing the sequence of development of the technological disaster.

This paper presents an overview on the technological disaster definition, criteria, types, stages, models, factors, and prevention and combines the scattered information on technological disaster into one record.

Major hazard organizations are dealing with hazardous material exceeding the threshold quantity. Major hazard organizations are relatively secure areas and cannot fail from single error. However, failure of an organization to control hazardous material usually results in a technological man‐made disaster. The conditions preceding the onset of technological man‐made disaster are collectively called the technological man‐made disaster precondition phase “incubation period”. A model has been developed representing the technological man‐made disaster pre‐condition phase where it focuses on the origin of the technological man‐made disaster. The model was based on detailed analysis of four technological man‐made disasters at major hazard installations in Malaysia.

This paper aims to provide graduate students, researchers, governmental and independent agencies with an overview on the stages and management of technological disasters.

The technological disasters are a subject of concern to the researchers, the academicians, the governmental and independent agencies. The disasters, which involve major hazard installations (MHIs), are known as technological disasters. The information has been collected from several sources such as the technical, and general articles, internet web sites, and internal reports. The technological disaster definition and stages have been reviewed. This paper presents an overview on the technological disaster management cycle.

Technological disasters consist of three stages. The stages are classified into pre‐, during and post‐disaster stages. Disaster management is a collective term encompassing all aspects of planning for and responding to disasters, including both pre‐disaster and post‐disaster activities. Disaster management cycle is an open‐ended process. The four phases comprising the cycle begin and end with mitigation. The stages are not mutually exclusive – there is an overlap. The stages of disaster management can be operative concurrently, because those stages are interrelated; they are not independent entities with one stopping and the next following.

This paper presents an overview on the technological disaster definition and stages. It provides the MHIs management and the related authority with a background on the technological disaster management cycle. It motivates the members of the MHIs, particularly managerial staff, and the emergency planners to continually improve the control of MHIs. It provides the background and basis for further research in disaster and disaster management.

The purpose of this article is to apply what social scientists have learned from decades of research on natural and technological disasters to better understand the short-term and potential long-term human impacts of the 9/11 attacks. The short-term response to the 9/11 attacks was similar to how people and communities typically respond to natural disasters. One year after the attacks, news reports suggest that factors identified in technological disaster research as causing collective trauma, rather than recovery, are beginning to surface. We identify three patterns typically present in (but not restricted to) the aftermath of technological disasters that contribute to slow recovery and ongoing collective trauma and evaluate the likelihood that these factors will impact the recovery process for those impacted by the 9/11 attacks. We conclude that due to perceptions of governmental failure, the likelihood of protracted litigation, and uncertainty regarding the mental and physical health of victims, the social and psychological impacts of the 9/11 attacks will likely be severe and long-term. As such, the concluding section recommends the implementation of a long-term clinical intervention program for mitigating these potential chronic impacts and facilitating the timely recovery of survivors.

Natural disasters such as earthquake, flood and hurricane always threaten human life and societies. A major challenge is technological hazards triggered by such disasters, especially in metropolises and urban areas. Thus, these hazards have been the focus of interest in many countries, and suitable crisis management plans have been made to address them. The purpose of this study was to cluster technological hazards caused by natural disasters in urban areas.

According to literature, a set of 15 technological hazards was identified whose magnificence and interrelations were analysed using interpretive structural modelling technique. DEMATEL technique was used to determine internal relations among the hazards and to draw a network relation map.

The results revealed that dam failing, water supply disruption and building collapse form the base of the structural model.

The authors developed a structural model representing the hierarchy and interrelations among various elements of technological hazards caused by natural disaster. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this was the first attempt to reveal internal relations of Natech factors. Finally, some recommendations were proposed for crisis management according to research findings.

To provide graduate students, researchers, and responsible personnel with an overview on the disaster types worldwide in general and disaster types in Malaysia.

The types of disasters by region for the period 1988‐1997 were obtained from recent published sources. The disasters which occurred in Malaysia have been collected from several sources such as the technical, general articles, internet web sites, and internal reports. The disasters which occurred during the period of 1968‐2004 have been reviewed. The disasters have been classified into natural disasters, man‐made disasters, and subsequent disasters. The man‐made disasters have been classified into technological disasters, transportation accidents, public places failure, and production failure.

Disasters have been classified into natural, man‐made disasters. The regions worldwide have experienced all kinds of natural disasters in last decade. It was pointed out that the occurrence of disasters from almost all kinds of hazards is among the highest in Asia and the Pacific. Malaysia experienced natural, man‐made and subsequent disasters. Malaysia has experienced 39 disasters during the period of 1968‐2004. The natural disasters were 49 percent of total disasters. Most of the natural disasters were resulted from the heavy rains. Malaysia has experienced 18 man‐made disasters. The man‐made disasters resulted in 282 fatalities, and 1,892 injuries.

This paper presents an overview on the disaster types by region worldwide. The paper also presents an overview on the disaster types in Malaysia. This paper combined the scattered disasters into one record. Therefore, there is a need for an authorized body to be responsible for the collecting, arranging, classifying, and storing of all type of the accidents in Malaysia. This experience can be benefited from/at any country.

To provide the graduate students, researchers, responsible personnel at major hazards installations (MHIs) with background on the technological emergencies, expert system (ES), and technological emergencies expert system (TEES) development.

The design and development of an ES is achieved through six recommended phases. The assessment phase represents the problem feasibility and justifications. In TEES, the problem was identified that Malaysia has experienced several technological disasters. The process of acquiring, organizing, and studying knowledge is known as the knowledge acquisition. The qualitative and quantitative knowledge are needed to build the TEES. A general knowledge was obtained from the literature sources. The quantitative knowledge was obtained through a field survey and domain expert interview. The information, which has been obtained from the field survey through the questionnaire, was arranged and coded into software called Statistical Package for Social Sciences. Regression models were derived. The regression models were incorporated into the TEES. wxCLIPs have been used as a medium for the development the ES.

It provides the background and basis for further research in disaster management in Malaysia. The TEES can be employed to control the major hazards at the MHIs through the identification, control, and mitigation programs. The knowledge, which has been put into the system, can be modified, updated, and reproduced.

The TEES is versatile, portable, reliable and applicable to other emergencies applications. The system can be saved on CD and distributed to MHIs managers and related authority. The system, therefore, can contribute to improve awareness through providing information and knowledge to end‐users. The ES also can be used for classroom instructions.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze public trust during the aftermath of technological and hybrid natural-technological/natech disasters – Hurricane Katrina (2005) and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown in Japan (2011). The work identifies common themes, actions and inactivity that can lead to citizens distrusting the government after disasters.

News reports from the two areas leading newspapers formed the body of the Hurricane Katrina and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown case studies. Of key interest were emerging themes of trust and/or distrust during the immediate impact phase of the disaster in addition to government failures and social breakdowns resulting in a loss of trust in government institutions and individual leaders.

The series of examples illustrate how specific action or in-action by local and federal governments served as a catalyst for a loss of trust in government institutions and individual leaders in government while proposing potential strategies to help public leaders reduce distrust during times of crisis.

The two limitations were the use of only newspapers and the passage of a new law in 2013, the “Specially Designated Secrets Protection Law,” designed to limit news reporting of the press in Japan on the issue of nuclear radiation exposure of the general public in Japan, some of the new data are not available.

The research concludes by offering specific ways to regain trust after a perception of failure during pre- and post-disaster management in the age of mega disasters. The paper lists several recommendations that can be practically implemented to develop a culture of transparent communication, civic engagement in planning processes and inspire trust among stakeholders.

While the paper identifies barriers to establishing trust among government agencies, the citizenry and private industry, it seeks to help inform policy frameworks regarding the importance of the government’s ability to sustain a strong sense of trust that engenders civic participation in preserving or regaining trust in the aftermath of disasters.

The purpose of this paper is to provide some definition and foundation principles regarding disaster management. The paper also tests the Malaysian major hazard installations through the awareness and application of the Malaysian National Security Council (MNSC) directive 20.

Questionnaire was circulated on 177 MHIs throughout Malaysia. Respondents of various demographic characteristics answered the questionnaires. It is believed that people of different age, sex, educational level, experience, and management levels are expected to have different perception and response to disaster management questions. A total of 65 completed questionnaires were answered.

The analysis of the disaster management questionnaire highlighted that more than half of the MHIs in Malaysia are multinational installations. The analysis revealed that 61 per cent of the Safety, Health and Environment Managers were aware of the MNSC directive 20 and 62 per cent said that the MNSC directive 20 is relevant to their facilities. The analysis further showed that 62 per cent of the respondents think the MNSC directive 20 is essential to their MHIs. However, 31 per cent of the respondents said that the emergency response plan (ERP) is used as an alternative to the MNSC directive 20. In the light of this, more than half of the MHIs are not local organizations; the Safety and Health Managers apparently are familiar with the safety guidelines of their parent organizations. Therefore, the authorities that are responsible for the enforcement of the MHIs' relevant regulations should be vigilant and follow up the MHIs to apply the relevant regulations, which suit the safety culture of Malaysia.

This paper presents an overview on technological disaster prevention. The paper also shows the results of testing of the Malaysian major hazard installations which are aware of the MNSC directive 20. The Malaysian experience can be beneficial.

This paper aims to provide graduate students, researchers, and government and independent agencies with an overview of disaster types.

Disaster types have been the subject of research by and concern to academicians and to government and independent agencies. The paper summarizes the views of researchers and agencies. Disaster types are collected from several sources such as technical, general articles, internet web sites, and internal reports. Disaster definitions, criteria and types are reviewed. Disasters are classified into natural disasters, man‐made disasters, and hybrid disasters. Man‐made disasters are classified into technological disasters, transportation accidents, public places failure, and production failure. The paper presents a comparison between the main types of disasters.

Disasters are classified into three types: naturals, man‐mades, and hybrid disasters. It is believed that the three disaster types cover all disastrous events. No definition of disaster is universally accepted. Several criteria are proposed to define disasters. Understanding of disaster definitions, criteria, and types aids researchers and agencies in the proper classification, good recording, and better analysis of disasters. Disasters have different characteristics and impact; however, disasters have a common element, which is their severity.

This paper presents a definition of and criteria for disasters. The paper also presents an overview of disaster types. The paper presents a comparison between the main types of disasters, and combines various disaster terms into one record.