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1 – 10 of 73This paper aims to present the theoretical and conceptual framework of a new method in public finance called “participation based tax increment financing (P-TIF)” by combining…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to present the theoretical and conceptual framework of a new method in public finance called “participation based tax increment financing (P-TIF)” by combining conventional tax increment financing (TIF) within the Sharīʿah-compliance structure.
Design/methodology/approach
This study develops a benchmark model for P-TIF, which offers a participative contract between both lender and borrower. With the help of this model, a financing schema in P-TIF is established by incorporating stochastic modelling. Possible implications and alternative options of application are also explored with a discussion of challenges.
Findings
The results mainly indicate that P-TIF promises lenders to be a part of increment from tax earnings, in return for a reduced interest rate. They show how a rise in participation of the lender in a given contract lowers the interest rate. Under the base case scenario, the interest rate is reduced to zero when the participation of the lender in tax increment is set at 50%.
Practical implications
With the feature of being interest-free, P-TIF can be implied also within the Sharīʿah-compliance framework, thanks to the model it is based on. Additionally, as the model in this paper is parametric, it can be applicable to various cases in Islamic finance.
Originality/value
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper in the literature in the sense that it provides a conceptual idea and respective model for TIF method within a Sharīʿah-compliance framework.
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Bill LaFayette, Wayne Curtis, Denise Bedford and Seema Iyer
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Ge Yang and Shutian Cen
Over the past 20 years, China's infrastructure has developed at an extraordinary speed. The current literature mainly focuses on the effects of political incentives on the…
Abstract
Purpose
Over the past 20 years, China's infrastructure has developed at an extraordinary speed. The current literature mainly focuses on the effects of political incentives on the infrastructure. However, this paper indicates that the structural change of China's land regime is an important clue and that the supernormal development of China's infrastructure is an explicable result for that.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper theoretically proves that in a politically centralized and economically decentralized economic entity with a public land-ownership regime, the self-financing mechanism formed by local officials through regulation of the land-grant price is the primary factor that influences the optimal supply volume of infrastructure in a region, in addition to political and economic incentives, and whether the self-financing mechanism can be formed or not depends on the structure of a country's land regime, which can help to explain the difference between the development of infrastructure in China and that in other developing countries from a theoretical angle.
Findings
The paper suggests that the mode is facing an important transformation toward land reform and new-type urbanization construction, and the replication and promotion of China's experience in infrastructure construction are of further significance under the Belt and Road Initiative as it provides a method for helping developing countries to eliminate infrastructure bottlenecks.
Originality/value
Through the test of multinational panel data, the paper indicates that the structural change of China's land regime around 1990 had an overall effect on the supernormal development of infrastructure in China. The paper indicates that the “land-based development mode” of China's infrastructure indeed contributed to the supernormal development of infrastructure in China, but there are still some shortcomings in this mode.
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