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This paper aims to investigate the roles of corruption and tax allocation inefficiency in moderating the effect of tax aggressiveness on sustainable welfare.

This research uses a fixed-effect multiple regression analysis for 55,438 firm-year observations covering 22 countries from 2007 to 2017.

For less (more) tax-aggressive observations, corruption and tax allocation inefficiency strengthen the negative (positive) effect of tax aggressiveness on sustainable welfare. The results are in line with public choice and functionalism theories that suggest that private investments can increase welfare when governments are dysfunctional.

This paper shows that the effect of tax aggressiveness on sustainable welfare depends on tax aggressiveness, corruption and tax allocation inefficiency.

This paper implies that governments should reduce their corruption levels and increase tax allocation efficiency because private investments are ineffective in the long run.

Because of increasing awareness of sustainability issue, sustainable welfare is considered more relevant than traditional welfare. Hence, empirical studies on the effect of tax aggressiveness on sustainable welfare are crucial. This paper adds the literature by combining public choice and functionalism theories to investigate the moderating roles of corruption and tax allocation inefficiency in this issue.

This study investigates the behaviour of family firms, family management and family ownership regarding their socioemotional wealth (Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)) during the COVID-19 pandemic and according to their slack resources availability.

This study employs a multiple regression analysis to analyse 245 firm-year observations from 2020 to 2021.

Family firms have a negative effect on CSR, as do family management and family ownership. Slack resources (both absorbed and unabsorbed) reduce the negative effect of family firms (and family ownership) on CSR. Unabsorbed slack resources reduce the negative effect of family management on CSR and absorbed slack resources increase the negative effect of family management on CSR. The results are robust with various measurements of slack resources. Extra analyses reveal that family commissioner has no effect on CSR.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first empirical study to analyse the impact of COVID-19 on the preservation of socioemotional wealth in family firms. This study proves the theoretical argument of prior studies that the preservation of socioemotional wealth in family firms during the COVID-19 pandemic depends on their financial condition. The study also proves that there are different attitudes among family ownership, family management and family firms concerning the use of slack resources for socioemotional wealth preservation that have not been analysed by previous research.

The relative size of the State in industrialized economies has increased dramatically during the past century giving rise to legitimate fears that such a trend might end up having an adverse impact on growth. This chapter explores the relationship between the development of government activities and economic growth. It starts by evoking problems related to the measurement of the public sector before reviewing statistical evidence on the long-term growth of the share of the State in the economy. It then provides a number of explanations for this phenomenon including those pertaining to the functioning of the political system itself thereby pointing toward inefficiencies. The next step is to explore the principal avenues along which government interventions can positively or negatively interfere with the growth potential of the economy. It turns out that while public expenditures – especially those responding to market failures – tend to be favorable to growth, most taxes are growth-hindering. The final part of the chapter singles out some pitfalls in the empirical investigation of this relationship. The conjecture is that the nonlinear and possibly endogenous nature of the hypothesized nexus can explain the lack of consensus in empirical studies conducted so far.

It is documented that companies and government agencies in the USA invest more in the fourth fiscal quarter without having higher investment opportunities. While previous studies focus on the agency conflicts and information asymmetry within organizations, this study is motivated by Scharfstein and Stein's (2000) two-tiered agency model and aims to examine how firms' external business environment affects the “fourth quarter effect.”

The authors implement this study in a sample of 41 countries and observe similar seasonality in firm investment as documented in the US market.

More importantly, using country characteristics, this study finds that firms from countries with better investor rights and protection, and more developed financial markets show less severe over-investment in the fourth fiscal quarter.

This paper contributes to the literature of law and finance, and the internal capital market, by investigating the quarterly investment patterns of firms from 41 countries. The authors find that similar to the results in earlier studies on the US market, firms in the global market increase their capital expenditure in the fourth fiscal quarter, indicating that the internal agency conflicts between the headquarters and divisional managers are widespread across the world. The authors also find that firms that operate in countries with higher investor rights and protection, and more developed financial markets, tend to show less severe “fourth quarter effect”.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

The aim of this paper is to call the attention of public entities for the econometric frontier models which allows benchmarking the tax offices accurately. In the context of the European Maastricht, the European countries face public receipts shortage and to focus in the management of the tax agencies in order to maximize receipts. The procedure adopted in this paper allows benchmarking the tax agencies accurately.

The paper adopts the stochastic frontier model to benchmark the tax offices. This model is presently very popular in benchmarking exercises, based on its statistical framework.

The paper finds that the tax offices analysed vary along the sample and along the period.

The homogeneity of the tax offices and the short data set are the main limitations of the paper. Relative to the first, since they are managed by the same entity and perform the same task we can claim that they are similar, relative to the second critic, we cannot overcome it because of the secrecy related to this units.

The efficiency rankings are due to the way the tax offices handle costs and outputs. The way they handle the combination of output and inputs is explained in the literature by the principal‐agent relationship, by collective‐action problem, due to asymmetric information between different tax offices and X‐inefficiency. The public policy has to address these problems in order to upgrade the efficiency of the tax offices.

This is the first paper adopting the stochastic frontier model in tax offices.

Nature and landscape and the quality of soil, water and air are indicated as the environment. On the basis of exclusiveness and rivalry the environment is a public good. Modern mechanized and intensified agriculture has reduced qualities of this environment. These consequences are negative external effects of contemporary agriculture, and in this sense a typical example of market failure. Government intervention is, because of x‐inefficiency and allocation inefficiency, not without problems. An alternative would be to apply a decentralized decision‐making process. The “club” theory offers a theoretical basis from which it can be deduced that co‐operation by farmers in the shape of an environmental co‐operative is a Pareto efficient alternative to Government interventions. For legitimacy, effectiveness and efficiency it is important that covenants, transferable pollution rights or permits and management agreements are a coherent part of the instruments of an environmental co‐operative.

Purpose – We investigate the outcomes of public sector charity provision, which relies on income redistribution. Increasing the level of redistribution can result in an efficiency-equality tradeoff. We investigate whether the efficiency-equality tradeoff can be explained by lowered work incentives.

Methodology – The chapter uses the methodology of laboratory experiments. We remove the administration costs of redistribution to see if a significant source of the tradeoff can be explained by lower work incentives.

Findings – We find a significant efficiency-equality tradeoff between low- and high-tax groups explained by lowered work incentives. Labor supply decisions are motivated by strategic and cooperative preferences which vary the size of the tradeoff.

Limitations – Our analysis is limited to measuring the size and distribution of labor income. We discuss avenues such as allowing for crowding out and volunteerism, to further explore the impact of public sector charity provision.

Practical and social implications – Charity can be provided by the public, private, and independent sector. The public sector must redistribute income to provide charity, which leads to an efficiency-equality tradeoff. This calls for a reconsideration of increasing dependence on public sector charity provision.

Originality – The efficiency-equality tradeoff traditionally focuses on the labor supply response to taxation. We allow subjects to respond to how their taxes are being used as well. Subjects are also given feedback on whether they are net taxpayers into redistribution or net recipients from it.