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Now that debt has replaced equity as the preferred source of finance for many UK companies, the correct calculation of the cost of debt assumes even greater importance than it has done formerly. While financial management textbooks are in agreement on how to calculate the pre‐tax cost of debt, there is much less agreement on how to calculate the after tax cost of debt. The different approaches taken by different authors leave students and practitioners confused and unsure as to how they should proceed. This article explores the calculation of the after tax cost of debt in order to help both students and practitioners to understand the interaction of tax and debt in the current UK environment and to be aware of the limitations of the various simplifications which are made, explicitly or implicitly, in the textbooks.

The now‐famous work of Modigliani and Miller (MM) (1) asserted that firms should prefer to use debt over equity in financing assets. That prescription holds that there exists realisable value in the tax deductibility of interest payments. The deductibility benefit lowers the cost of debt with attendant favourable reduction in the cost of capital. The effect translates into greater firm value for several reasons. First, the economic margin above capital cost increases. Second, more projects are good and can be undertaken by the firm allowing the garnering of increments of value. The conception is logical. The supporting theory is rigorous. However, a practical problem complicates matters. Namely, debt usage raises the possibility that firm earnings will not be sufficient to meet promised debt obligations. In this case the firm must declare itself bankrupt. Thus, debt is a two‐edged sword.

Considerable debate centres around the use of debt finance as opposed to new equity and internally generated funds for the financing of new investment projects. The favourable corporate tax treatment of debt interest payments compared to equity returns appears to be a government incentive to debt finance. In addition, the differential tax treatment of financial institutions' income and individual investors' income under the tax code, all leads to the idea, that debt financing may increase the market value of a firm beyond the expected value of its operational cash flows.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the impact of wealth tax (zakat) and corporate tax (CT) on the firm's capital structure. The pioneering works of capital structure were introduced by Modgliani and Miller (1958). Subsequently, these studies were extended by other authors such as Elton and Gruber (1970), Miller (1977), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Mackie-Mason (1990), Harris and Raviv (1991), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth et al. (2001). The diversity of the study covers from the advantage of CT to the cost of debt financing. The empirical evidence has also been applied to different countries with a good data access and different legal and accounting environments. However, this study is still relevant especially on the advantages of wealth tax, and the utilization of Islamic debt and equity financing to the firm's capital structure.

The study uses the sample of Malaysian firms that are listed in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. The cross-sectional and time-series data covering 422 companies from 1996 to 2000 are compiled from the database published by the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. All the sample firms are listed as a syariah company that normally pays the wealth tax. These data, then, are used to examine the effects of several explanatory variables, i.e. wealth tax and CT, and several controlled variables on firm capital structure decisions.

The results showed that, first, the significance of wealth tax is consistent with the argument that firms that pay high wealth tax should be financed with relatively more debt. Second, as the CT rate is raised, firms are subjected to lower CT rates which would lead them to utilize more debt in their capital structures. Third, a significant relationship exists between age, size, return on assets, volatility, industry classification, tangible assets and bankruptcy with the capital structure.

This paper viewed the tax benefits and the zakat payments in isolation. However, the tax deductions and the zakat payments are both expected to influence the capital structure decisions. The paper will study this decision and reveal the determinants that influence the capital structure decisions in general and the specific choice of payments, i.e. tax and zakat payments.

The purpose of this paper is to show that distinguishing between gross and net tax shields arising from interest deductions is important to firm valuation. The distinction affects the interpretation but not valuation of tax shields for the famous Miller’s (1977) model with corporate and personal taxes. However, for the well-known Miles and Ezzell’s (1985) model, the authors show that the valuation of tax shields can be materially affected. Implications to the cost of equity and optimal capital structure are discussed.

This paper proposed a simple tax shield clarification that distinguishes between gross and net tax shields. Net tax shields equal gross tax shields minus personal taxes on debt. When an after-tax riskless rate is used to discount shareholders’ tax shields, this distinction affects the interpretation but not valuation results of the Miller’s model. However, when the after-tax unlevered equity rate is used to discount tax shields under the well-known Miles and Ezzell’s (1985) model, the difference between gross and net tax shields can materially affect valuation results. According to the traditional ME model, both gross tax shields and debt interest tax payments (i.e. net tax shields) are discounted at the after-tax unlevered equity rate. By contrast, the proposed revised ME model discounts gross tax shields at the unlevered equity rate but personal taxes on debt income at the riskless rate (like debt payments). Because personal taxes on debt are nontrivial, traditional ME valuation results can noticeably differ from the revised ME model to the extent that after-tax unlevered equity and debt rates differ from one another.

For comparative purposes, the authors provide numerical examples of the traditional and revised ME models. The following constant tax rates and market discount rates are assumed: T_c=0.30, T_pb=0.20, T_ps=0.10, r=0.06, and ρ=0.10. Table I compares these two models’ valuation results. Maximum firm value for the traditional ME model is 7.89 compared to 7.00 for the revised ME model. At a 50 percent leverage ratio, equity value is reduced from 3.71 to 3.49, respectively. Importantly, the traditional ME model suggests that firm value linearly increases with leverage and implies an all-debt capital structure, whereas firm value stays relatively constant as leverage increases in the revised ME model. These capital structure differences arise due to discounting debt tax payments with the unlevered equity rate (riskless rate) in the traditional ME (revised ME) model. Figure 1 graphically summarizes these results by comparing the traditional ME model (thin lines) to the revised ME model (bold lines).

Textbook treatments of leverage gains to firms or projects with corporate and personal taxes should be amended to take into account this previously unrecognized tradeoff. Also, empirical analyses of capital structure are recommended on the sensitivity of leverage ratios to the gross-tax-gain/debt-personal taxes tradeoff.

Financial managers need to understand how to value interest tax shields on debt in making capital structure decisions, computing the cost of capital, and valuing the firm.

The valuation of interest tax shields in finance is a long-standing controversy. Nobel prize winners Modigliani and Miller (MM) wrote numerous papers on this subject and gained fame from their ideas in this area. However, application of their ideas has changed over time due to the Miles and Ezzell’s (ME) model of firm valuation. The present paper adapts the pathbreaking ideas of MM to the valuation framework of ME. Students and practitioners in finance can benefit by the valuation results in the paper.

No previous studies have recognized the valuation issues resolved in the paper on the application of the popular and contemporary ME model of firm valuation to the MM valuation concepts. The new arguments in the paper are easy to understand and readily applied to firm valuation.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of capital structure using a dataset of firms in Malaysia.

This paper carries out a panel data analysis of 8,270 observations from 827 listed non-financial firms on the Malaysia stock market over the period 2008–2017. To estimate the model and analyse the data collected from the DataStream and World Bank databases, the authors use static panel estimation techniques as well as two-step difference and system dynamic GMM estimator.

The results show that profitability, growth opportunity, tax-shield, liquidity and cash flow volatility have a negative and significant impact on debt measures. However, the effects of collateral, non-debt tax and earnings volatility on measures of debt are positive and significant. In addition, firm size, firm age, inflation rate and interest rate are important determinants of the present value of debt. The results also show a significant inverse U-shaped relationship between the firm's age and its capital structure. In general, the results support the proposition advocated by the pecking order and trade-off theories.

The results of this study necessitate formulation of various policy measures that can counter the effects of debt on firms.

The present study is among the earliest to use both the book and market value measures of capital structure. It also uses three proxies for each: total debt, long-term debt and short-term debt. It incorporates earning volatility and cash flow volatility as new independent variables in the model. These variables have not previously been used together with both book and market value measures of capital structure. The study also examines the non-monotonic relationship between firm's age and capital structure using a quadratic regression method. It applies both static panel techniques and dynamic GMM estimation techniques to analyse the data.

This paper aims to examine whether the substitution of employee stock options (ESOs) for debt occurs for firms with different tax status classifications throughout the conditional distribution of interest expense before and after the implementation of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 123R (SFAS 123R).

This study uses Censored Quantile Regression (CQR) to assess whether the substitution effect is dependent on firms' position in the conditional distribution of interest expense. Our sample firms are categorized into two groups: one group (tax‐sensitive) that is sensitive to additional deductions due to a moderate income level and the other group (tax‐insatiable) that is not sensitive because of very high income level.

The substitution effect is not present for firms with below medium level of interest expense. Only tax‐sensitive firms substitute at medium levels of interest expense while both tax‐sensitive and tax‐insatiable firms substitute at high levels of interest expense. Tax‐insatiable firms with very high levels of interest expense also substitute; however, tax‐sensitive firms with very high levels of interest expense only substitute after SFAS 123R required firms to report ESO expense in financial statements. We attribute the substitution patterns revealed by the CQR analysis to a positive relationship between interest expense and cost of debt.

To the authors' knowledge, this is the first paper to analyze firms' tax status classification impact on the substitution of ESO expense for interest expense across different levels of interest expense. Our application of CQR should benefit researchers who are interested in examining explanatory variables' impact at various points in the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. This study also refines the conjecture that ESOs are substitutes for debt by demonstrating that such relationship is dependent on the level of interest expense and tax status. Furthermore, the finding of firms substituting ESOs for debt provides accounting standard setters a reason to begin requiring firms to re‐measure the value of ESOs after the grant date until the exercise date.

The purpose of this paper is to identify possible tax synergies from acquisitions when the acquiring firm gains a non‐debt tax shield (NDTS) not directly associated with its own past performance, or a windfall NDTS. One possible benefit of a windfall NDTS is reduced reliance on interest tax shields to lower the firm's marginal tax rate (MTR).

This paper tests the likelihood of issuing debt following acquisitions of windfall non‐debt tax attributes with logistic regressions. Both acquirers and targets are publicly held US firms. Acquisitions are completed from 1987 to 2003, and debt issues are observed following the deal. Target firm tax attributes are defined as the total tax spread, tax loss carryforward (TLCF), and the MTR.

Target firm tax spread and TLCFs are inconsequential to the acquirer's likelihood of issuing future debt, suggesting that tax synergies are relatively unimportant motives for acquisitions. As predicted, the target firm MTR is not significant to acquirer debt issues.

This paper makes several contributions. First, the notion of tax synergies from acquisitions is unresolved. This paper continues the search for tax synergies in acquisitions by examining the importance of acquired NDTS in the post‐acquisition period. Second, this paper examines the influence of NDTS on debt issuance in a post‐event framework. Third, this paper provides additional evidence that corporate managers have leverage targets.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of financial factors on firms’ financial and tax reporting decisions. Firms often face the difficulties of accomplishing both financial and reporting goals. The extent to which reporting they put more value depends on the differential weighting of firms’ financial reporting and tax costs. The authors incorporate various financial factors as a source of cross-sectional differences in the weighing of both financial reporting and tax costs.

To examine firms’ decisions when fulfilling both the purposes of financial and tax reporting is difficult, the authors use a large set of firms in Korea, where book-tax conformity is high and aggressive tax shelters are restricted. The authors develop a new measure that can specify firms’ decision making between financial and tax reporting by considering both earnings management and tax avoidance.

The findings show that debt ratio affects firms’ financial and tax reporting decisions non-monotonically depending on the level of the debt ratio. The authors also find that firms with more long-term debt financing are more likely to be aggressive in financial reporting, while firms with higher financing deficit or better access to the capital market are more likely to be aggressive in tax reporting.

Thus, the findings provide more compelling evidence of firms’ decision making between two conflicting strategies, particularly when fulfilling both the purposes of financial and tax reporting is difficult. The authors expect that the results provide practical implications to standard setters, auditors and financial statement users who are interested in the ongoing debate over book-tax tradeoffs.

This paper fulfills an identified need to study how firms’ decision making between two conflicting reporting strategies are affected by the various financial factors, which are closely linked to a firm’s financial reporting and tax costs.