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There are the interesting words of Myrdal in respect of the universality and commonness of what a scientific problem means:From then on more definitely I came to see that in reality there are no economic, sociological, psychological problems, but just problems and they are all mixed and composite. In research the only permissible demarcation is between relevant and irrelevant conditions. The problems are regularly also political and have moreover to be seen in historical perspective. (Myrdal, 1979, p. 106)

The economic, financial, social, and scientific reasoning in Occidentalism is a profound example of the reasoning dichotomy caused by the problem of heteronomy. The duality consequences of economic rationality and rationalism between the spiritual and material domains remain entrenched in all the sciences (Dampier, 1961).

Setting the field of economics as the study of value in exchange, Blaug (1968a, 1968b, p. 6) wrote:The problem that gave rise to economics in the first place, the “mystery” that fascinated Adam Smith as much as it does a modern economist, is that of market exchange: there is a sense of order in the economic universe, and this order is not imposed from above but is somehow the outcome of the exchange transactions between individuals, each seeking to maximize his own gain. The history of economic thought, therefore, is nothing but the history of our efforts to understand the workings of an economy based on market exchange.

To establish these definitions we revisit expression (5.3) of Chapter 5. Since this expression describes a phenomenological model of knowledge transmission from its epistemic origin to the world-system by learning processes, therefore, we first summarize the arguments on what can be the nature of (Ω,S) in this expression. Our arguments were centered on the contrasting nature of moral absolutism and the ethical meaning so derived. This axiomatic core of the arguments stood up against moral relativism of both the rationalist and religious types on which is premised a different meaning of ethics.

Oneness is the prime attribute of God. Divine oneness is the singular moral foundation of “everything” invoking socio-scientific intellection in the Islamic worldview. In this ontological sense, this concept of conscious oneness means that the ultimate and indivisible absoluteness and completeness of creatorship, knowledge, will and power over all things, rest with God alone.¹ Because God's oneness belongs to the domain of purity (Ikhlas), removed from the material and cognized worlds, it marks the topological domain of the fullness and purity of the knowledge stock. It exogenously by itself creates, governs, and acts upon the created universes of all kinds, abstract, and evident. By itself, the precept of oneness of God is not causally affected by anything. It creates all but is never created of itself, or by any other.²

The section in the main paper entitled, “What is the Idea of the Worldview of Epistemic Oneness versus the Contrasting Socio-Scientific Paradigm?” elaborate on the nature of the worldview. A comparative study of the theme is included.

In this book we consider the foundation of ethics to be the moral law. Contrarily, in mainstream terminology ethics is defined as values manifesting human behavior in congruence with certain civil conduct that are commonly agreed upon by society at large (Spencer, 1978). In reference to the social preference basis of ethics and morality we can adopt formalization by using two different approaches. One approach is to consider linear aggregation of preferences. The other is to treat morality and ethics within complex aggregation types.¹