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Sustainability performance of the global trade as well as of the traded products are affected by the trade policies and trade tariffs. Trade tariffs and policies can either encourage or discourage trade among the countries affecting feasibility of trade. In other words, the scope and amount of these trade tariffs have impact on the trade globally. Based on an in-depth literature review, this chapter aims to examine impacts of the trade policies and trade tariffs on the environmental footprint of the global trade. With this aim, recent trade policies and trade tariffs as well as roles of the trade policies, trade tariffs in reducing environmental footprint of the global trade are examined. It arrives at the conclusion that trade tariffs can affect environmental footprint of the global trade as well as of the traded products. They can have impact on the feasibility of the trading activities influencing their profit margins and costs. Based on these findings, recommendations for trade policies and trade tariffs are thereby provided to enhance sustainability performance of the global trade.

Most current modeling approaches identify very small gains from trade reform. In this chapter, we examine recent developments in the literature to assess whether standard modeling approaches are mis-specifying, understating, or overstating the gains from trade reform. Key areas where the impacts of trade barrier reduction appear to be understated include the measurement of barriers; the aggregation of these barriers; process productivity gains, particularly those resulting from reallocation of resources between firms; product quality improvements and expansion of product variety; factor supply; and investment of gains from trade.

Purpose – This chapter suggests that the value of the extension to free trade areas (FTAs) of the Kemp–Wan (KW) theorem on necessarily welfare-improving customs unions is undermined by its very rationale – the greater popularity of FTAs over customs unions for ‘political’ reasons.

Methodology/approach – We discuss some intuition supported by partial equilibrium diagrammatic analysis and then present simulations of a global CGE model.

Findings – We argue that this sort of FTA will likely be unattractive to potential member countries. We then observe that the external tariffs here and in KW will be identical for many goods but illustrate, in a partial equilibrium setting, a context in which there might be some difference between them. Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that there are reasons to expect some harmonisation of tariffs between member countries in this sort of FTA.

Originality/value – We are the first to question the practical value of the extension of KW to FTAs. We also provide one of the few computable general equilibrium analyses of KW customs unions.

The principle of tariffs dispersion, or differential tariffs depending on country of origin, is well known. For instance, Canada adapted a double column of tariffs after 1846, Spain in 1877, and Switzerland in the 1880–1890s. But there has never before been a comprehensive measure for any national economy, to our knowledge. This contribution proposes an original and exhaustive measure of customs tariffs dispersion depending on the origin of imported products for France between 1850 and 1913. Part of this dispersion arises indirectly as the result of compiling the nomenclature – or the schedule of categories – for France’s general trade chart. Our study nevertheless reveals the existence of direct discriminatory practices applied to certain countries for certain products. The creation of this measure yields important insights. First, tariff dispersion’s evolution completes the analysis of the chronology of trade policy. Second, it is possible to link tariff discrimination, imports in particular sectors, and national production. In our opinion, the paper should pave the way to work that reintroduces a country-specific dimension into the study of late 19th century commercial policy.

Purpose – This chapter examines how preferential liberalization between a pair of countries affects the terms of trade and welfare of the liberalizing countries and on the rest of the world (ROW). We adopt a model with symmetric countries that generalizes previous work by relaxing assumptions on functional forms, which allows for the possibility that exports of member countries are complements for exports of the ROW.

Methodology/approach – This chapter uses general equilibrium welfare analysis for a three-country trade model.

Findings – We show that Kemp–Wan tariff adjustments require a decrease (increase) in the external tariff of members in a preferential trade agreement to accompany internal liberalization in the neighborhood of internal free trade when member goods are substitutes (complements) for non-member goods. However, the adjustment path of the external tariff to reductions in the internal tariff could be non-monotonic when preferences are not of the CES type.

Practical implications – Our results are of interest for the design of rules for multilateral trade agreements with respect to preferential liberalization, since they indicate how tariffs must be adjusted to eliminate negative impacts on non-member countries.

With the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, Mexico entered a bilateral free trade agreement which not only lowered its own tariffs on imports but also lowered tariffs on its exports to the United States. We find that women’s relative wage increased, particularly during the period of liberalization. Both between and within-industry shifts also favored female workers. With regards to between-industry shifts, tariff reductions expanded sectors that were initially female intensive. With regards to within-industry shifts, we find a positive association between reductions in export tariffs (U.S. tariffs on Mexican goods) and hiring of women in skilled blue-collar occupations. Finally, we find suggestive evidence that household bargaining power shifted in favor of women. Expenditures shifted from goods associated with male preference, such as men’s clothing and tobacco and alcohol, to those associated with female preference such as women’s clothing and education.

There has recently been a flurry of interest in analysing trade policy regimes and their particular historical expressions among economists. This has been provoked in part by new developments in trade theory such as those based on the concepts of increasing returns and market structure, and in part by more awareness among the general public on development issues. For example a significant empirical study of the late nineteenth century concluded that a previously identified positive correlation between tariffs and growth was surprisingly robust (O’Rourke, 2000, p. 473). The previous study had concluded that: The reintroduction of protective tariffs (around 1880–1890) in the ‘less developed’ countries coincided in each case with a total reversal of the economic trends: growth accelerated and the pace of innovation and investment speeded up (Bairoch, 1972, p. 211).Hence protection was associated with high rates of economic growth at least for less developed states such as Germany and the USA in the period specified. This was in contrast to an identified negative correlation observed for much of the twentieth century, one predicted by the conventional neoclassical theory of free trade.

Taking global economic integration into consideration, this study investigates the effects of the imposition of the tariff. For every tariff increase, a percentage of the trade volume is reduced. This means, there is a tradeoff between globalization and restricted trade. This chapter presents empirical evidence from the European Union and the Sub-Saharan Africa region using annual times series for the period, 1980–2019. Result indicates that with coefficient of 4.31 percent, the tradeoff in European Union is higher than Sub-Saharan Africa region with coefficient of 2.66 percent. Implied is that developing countries are more likely to suffer more from the negative effect of globalization due to trade restrictions than the developed countries of the world. This is an indication that whether in developed or developing countries, a tradeoff exists between globalization and restricted trade. Hence, the imposition of tariffs and counter-tariffs is capable of shutting down globalization.

The open objective of liberalization or globalization for the developed nations is the expansion of market or the creation of opportunities to produce and sale more and more goods and/or services beyond the domestic market which ultimately lead the nation in the right path of development. On the other hand, this economic environment is a challenge for the developing or less developed or small nations with respect to share of world trade to compete with the developed or large nations with respect to the quality of the product, technology, skill of human resources, etc. There arise tariff impositions to protect the domestic economies to defend against the challenges. Under these circumstances, this chapter tries to investigate the impact of such tariff war measured by trade as a percentage of GDP on the per capita GDP of the nations. It finds that all the variables are cointegrated. The effect depends on how we measure world tariff, for example, the effect of tariff on trade is positive and significant when we measure the world tariff as simple mean of all products but the effect of tariff on trade is negative and statistically significant when we take tariff as weighted mean of all products. Similarly, the effect of tariff on per capita income is positive if tariff is measured with simple average of all products but this effect is negative and significant when it is measured with weighted mean of all products. In this case, imposition of world tariff (weighted mean of all products) declines world per capita income especially in short run.