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Based on dual information asymmetry, the two-stage segmented compensation mechanism for technological innovation of civilian enterprises’ participation in military (CEPIM) has been discussed.

On the basis of the traditional principal-agent problems, the incentive compatibility condition is introduced as well as the hybrid incentive compensation model is established, to solve optimal solution of the compensation parameters under the dynamic contract condition and the validity is verified by numerical simulation.

The results show that: (1) The two-stage segmented compensation mechanism has the functions of “self-selection” and “stimulus to the strong”, (2) It promotes the civilian enterprises to obtain more innovation benefit compensation through the second stage, (3) There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between government compensation effectiveness and the innovation ability of compensation objects and (4) The “compensable threshold” and “optimal compensation threshold” should be set, respectively, to assess the applicability and priority of compensation.

In this paper, through numerical simulation, the optimal solution for two-stage segmented compensation, segmented compensation coefficient, expected returns for all parties and excess expected returns have been verified under various information asymmetry. The results show that the mechanism of two-stage segmented compensation can improve the expected returns for both civilian enterprises and the government. However, under dual information asymmetry, for innovation ability of the intended compensation candidates, a “compensation threshold” should be set to determine whether the compensation should be carried out, furthermore an “optimal compensation threshold” should be set to determine the compensation priority.