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This paper examines policies of Abenomics and explains their ineffectiveness through historical comparisons. In conclusion, Abenomics raises serious concerns about Japanese economy. It offsets the effects of its aggressive monetary expansion by increasing consumption taxes. It has tilted the distribution of income in favor of financial speculation, but the returns have not benefitted the nonfinancial economy. It has enriched investors, corporate profits, and exporters but not Japan’s workers, households, and general economy. It ignores the structural problems. Specifically, its deregulation of labor markets reduced household income by raising the number of nonregular workers. Higher wages in general and providing more workers with stable, well-paid employment are among necessary reforms. It will be difficult to achieve a sustainable economic recovery in Japan without proceeding with these types of policy changes.

Using a sample of 466 grants of stock options to executives of Japanese firms over the years 1997–2001, this study tests the managerial power theory of compensation design developed by Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004). This theory argues that managers of firms with weak corporate governance will use their “power” to design executive compensation that is “manager-advantageous.” Using our option grants sample, we test to determine if any of the firm's governance mechanisms are able to limit managerial self-dealing with respect to executive stock options. We find that smaller boards and a higher percentage of independent directors are important governance mechanisms for the control of managerial influences in the design of stock-option compensation. An alternative hypothesis, that firms elect to grant advantageously designed options to encourage risk taking by managers, is not supported by our empirical results. Finally, we determine that the market response to the announcements of such grants varies inversely with the extent to which the options are managerially advantageous. Overall, we conclude that managerial power effects are present in the design of executive stock options and that theory of managerial power advanced by Bebchuk et al. holds internationally.

We present a critical literature review debating Brazilian research on social and environmental accounting (SEA). The aim of this study is to understand the role of politics in the construction of hegemonies in SEA research in Brazil. In particular, we examine the role of hegemony in relation to the co-option of SEA literature and sustainability in the Brazilian context by the logic of development for economic growth in emerging economies. The methodological approach adopts a post-structural perspective that reflects Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory. The study employs a hermeneutical, rhetorical approach to understand and classify 352 Brazilian research articles on SEA. We employ Brown and Fraser’s (2006) categorizations of SEA literature to help in our analysis: the business case, the stakeholder–accountability approach, and the critical case. We argue that the business case is prominent in Brazilian studies. Second-stage analysis suggests that the major themes under discussion include measurement, consulting, and descriptive approach. We argue that these themes illustrate the degree of influence of the hegemonic politics relevant to emerging economics, as these themes predominantly concern economic growth and a capitalist context. This paper discusses trends and practices in the Brazilian literature on SEA and argues that the focus means that SEA avoids critical debates of the role of capitalist logics in an emerging economy concerning sustainability. We urge the Brazilian academy to understand the implications of its reifying agenda and engage, counter-hegemonically, in a social and political agenda beyond the hegemonic support of a particular set of capitalist interests.

We examine bidder returns in Japanese mergers and find that shareholders of bidders experience a significant positive announcement return. Bidder returns are higher when firms acquire targets in the same industry, when their managers performed well before the merger, and when their managers acquire relatively large targets. Unlike non-keiretsu firms, returns to keiretsu firms are higher when they acquire firms operating in different industries. We also find that bidder returns increase with the bidder’s leverage and the bidder’s ties to financial institutions through borrowings. Our evidence is consistent with the view that managerial incentives affect firm value.