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As cross-cultural mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have learning effects on organisations, assessing their impacts on corporate performance is crucial. This study aims to explore the impact of inter-firm cultural differences on long-term post-M&A stock market performance.

The authors select domestic M&A transactions of Chinese listed companies during 2010–2021 as the sample. Then, the authors use the partial least squares structural equation model (PLS-SEM) to construct the latent variable of cultural differences in four dimensions to explore long-term stock market performance.

Cultural differences first positively and then negatively impact post-M&A performance. Three transmissions mechanisms are identified: investor sentiment, takeover premiums and information disclosure quality. Further analysis reveals that acquirer stock performance improves with higher analyst coverage and non-local shareholders but worsens if there are business affiliations between the acquirer and target firms.

This study can help optimise information disclosure systems in M&A transactions for regulatory authorities and aid investors’ understanding of post-M&A performance changes. Furthermore, it can improve acquirers’ understanding of the risks and opportunities in cross-cultural M&A, thereby facilitating the adaptation of management practices to the im-pacts of cultural differences.

By integrating the theories of resource dependence and transaction costs, this study examines the reversal effect of cultural differences between merging companies on post-M&A performance. The authors use a PLS-SEM to empirically analyse the main effects and reveal three transmission mechanisms.

National cultures significantly explain cross-country differences in the relation between asset growth and stock returns. Motivated by the notion that managers in individualistic and low uncertainty-avoiding cultures have a higher tendency to overinvest, this study aims to show that the negative relation between asset growth and stock returns is stronger in countries with such cultural features. Once the researchers control for cultural dimensions, proxies associated with the q-theory, limits-to-arbitrage, corporate governance, investor protection and accounting quality provide no incremental power for the relation between asset growth and stock returns across countries. Evidence of this study highlights the importance of the overinvestment hypothesis in explaining the asset growth anomaly around the world.

This paper examines the relationship between poison pills, real earnings management and initial public offering (IPO) failure.

The authors sampled 2,997 IPO firms that went public during 1993-2015.

The authors find that IPO firms manipulate earnings upward using real earnings management. The authors also find that IPO firms exhibiting a higher level of real earnings management have a higher probability of IPO failure. In addition, the authors find that weak shareholders' governance is positively associated with IPO failure.

These results suggest that poor governance structures in failed firms open the door to manipulating real activities and increasing operational risk.

The study findings are of most significant interest to potential investors and other stakeholders affiliated with a firm going public, an auditor, an underwriter, the lawyers who consult with the firm and employees or executives who might consider joining that firm.

Building on the venture capital (VC) literature, this paper aims to study the impact of the value added by corporate venture capitalists (CVCs) on their funded companies by comparing its IPO valuation with its independent venture capitalists (IVCs) peers.

This study uses a sample of 3,719 VC-backed ventures, between the years 1998 and 2020. The empirical analysis focuses on the propensity score matching approach, pairing ventures based on their probability of being funded by CVCs, and consequently, interpret the results derived from the valuation multiple ratios between the “nearest neighbors.”

This study finds that companies funded by CVCs can achieve higher valuations at their IPO compared to IVC-backed companies. Moreover, CVC-backed companies outperformance is mainly driven by startups which hold a technological fit with their CVC investor, with higher technological overlaps being translated into more significant valuations.

This study presents systematic evidence to the subject concerning ventures’ type of investors and its effect on the startups’ IPO valuations.

This paper contributes to the enrichment of the industry’s literacy while also easing entrepreneurs’ decisions when choosing a funding partner. CVCs offer a variety of services and support that fits the specific needs of their funded companies.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the first to examine the role of CVCs as a tool to help venture growth.

The purpose of this paper is to systematically examine and organize the literature that has explored the effects of several environmental conditions (ECs) on mergers and acquisitions (M&As), in particular highlighting the increasing role of protectionism.

The systematic literature review methodology was applied for the purpose of identifying, analyzing and interrelating specific ECs that affect M&As, thereby underlining and elucidating the requisite role of protectionism. Specifically, this research is based on 51 methodically selected peer-reviewed articles published from 1991 to 2020.

The research summarizes and assesses the current state of relevant literature through comprehensive and coherent descriptive and thematic analysis. The proposed conceptual framework allows us to recognize the connections between M&As and external conditions, highlighting varying degrees of study and in-depth analysis across the different areas under consideration.

This study contributes to original and significant knowledge, by developing a conceptual framework that descriptively classifies existing knowledge; by defining refining and explicating the theoretical foundations for scholars to build on; by identifying the research gaps and proposing effective avenues for impactful further research; and by presenting practitioners and policymakers with a practical guide to implementation.

While Merger & Acquisition (M&A) activity has reached unprecedented levels over recent years, M&A failure rates remain high. Yet, there is growing evidence that private equity funds show high success rates. As little is known about the differences between different types of buyers, and only scant information exists on private equity funds’ operations, we inductively explore the reasons for their outperformance. In this qualitative study, we identify three characteristics (i.e., organizational set-up, private equity investors’ professional identities, and an integrative work approach), which we brought together into a theoretical framework that explains how private equity professionals can enable better M&A performance. Finally, our findings underline the effectiveness of specific incentivization approaches applied in private equity funds.

This paper aims to examine the effects of managerial ability (MA) on the likelihood and the timeliness of goodwill impairment and explore whether the desirable effect of MA vary with the degree of agency problems.

The authors propose a unified framework to simultaneously examine the effects of MA on the likelihood and the timeliness of goodwill impairment by incorporating a market-based impairment indicator (denoted as BTM), MA and the interaction of BTM with MA to this study’s regression model to account for the likelihood of goodwill impairment. BTM addresses the timeliness of goodwill impairment.

This study finds that firms with higher MA have lower likelihood of goodwill impairment, and such firms are more likely to recognize goodwill impairment in a timely manner when the underlying value of goodwill is economically impaired. This desirable effect of MA is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprise (SOEs) and firms without chief executive officer (CEO) duality.

Firms can reduce the losses arising from goodwill impairment by enhancing the ability of their management teams combined with improved corporate governance structure.

This paper provides novel insights on understanding the role of MA in not only reducing the likelihood but also enhancing the timeliness of goodwill impairment. The findings help advance the upper echelons theory by uncovering the heterogenous effects of executives with different levels of ability.

Exploiting a novel measure of innovation, the authors investigate whether independent directors improve innovation efficiency. This novel measure of innovation captures the extent to which the firm generates revenue from its research & development and is, therefore, more economically meaningful. The authors also use a text-based measure of innovation.

The authors rely on a quasi-natural experiment based on the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that compelled certain firms to raise board independence. The difference-in-difference analysis is far less vulnerable to endogeneity and is more likely to show a causal influence, rather than a mere association.

The results show that more independent directors improve innovation efficiency significantly. Specifically, firms forced to raise board independence experienced a much higher increase in innovation than those not required to change their board composition. The authors also explore another novel measure of innovation, a text-based metric of innovation.

The research is original in several ways. First, the authors take advantage of an exogenous regulatory shock as a quasi-natural experiment. This approach is far less susceptible to endogeneity. Second, the authors use a novel measure of innovation efficiency, i.e. research quotient, which is more economically meaningful. Finally, the authors use a unique measure of innovation derived from powerful textual analysis.

Takeovers play a critical role as an external corporate governance mechanism to ensure investor protection. There is a long-standing debate on whether the convergence of corporate governance to global standards can enable emerging economies to ensure investor protection. This paper aims to analyse the evolution of the takeover code, namely, Securities Exchange Board of India’s Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers (2011) in India from the lens of investor protection. It then compares the takeover provisions in India, the USA, the UK, Singapore and Australia to examine the extent of convergence and its implications for investor protection.

Using a cross-national comparative analysis of takeover mechanisms in common law countries, the study analyses the extent and relevance of convergence in form. The focus of the comparison is on regulations governing offer size, offer price, creeping acquisition and initial trigger limit for the mandatory open offer.

The findings suggest that certain provisions such as the initial trigger threshold for the mandatory offer and the offer prices of the Indian takeover code are converging with the standards in common law countries. However, the offer price determination based on market prices may not reflect true market value in an inefficient market like India. Other provisions such as creeping acquisition and offer size are not only diverging from the international standards but are also inconsistent with the key objective of investor protections of the Indian regulator.

Indian takeover regulation needs to converge to higher global standards to ensure adherence to improved investor protection. This needs to be done for the initial trigger limit for mandatory bid and offer prices, after accounting for the differences in institutional structure. The Indian regulators need to revisit provisions on the initial trigger, creeping acquisition to converge to the broader principle of investor protection.

This technical paper provides a comprehensive depiction of takeover mechanisms in an emerging economy context as a means of investor protection. Further using a comparative lens, it analyses the relevance of convergence of takeover laws. Thus, advances the theoretical knowledge of limited extant work on external corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy context.

The authors investigate the effects of Chinese acquirer’s chief executive officer (CEO) risk preference on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) payment method and the moderating roles played by acquirer’s ownership, industry relatedness and whether the M&A is cross-border.

Using 4,624 worldwide M&A deals conducted by Chinese firms from 2009 to 2021, the authors conduct multiple linear regression and ordered probit regression. And comprehensive indexes constructed based on the observed features of acquirer’s CEOs are used to be the proxy for CEO risk preference.

The results show that the higher-level Chinese acquirer’s CEO risk preference is overall positively associated with using more stock in payment. Moreover, the above relationship is strengthened if the ownership of the acquirer is state-owned.

The authors highlight the importance of the non-economic factors and demonstrate a relationship between the Chinese acquirer’s CEO risk preference and the M&A payment method, providing support for and enriching the upper echelons theory (UET). Moreover, the unique risk priorities of Chinese acquirers’ CEOs are revealed.