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This chapter outlines the academic training and career characteristics of institutional leaders (presidents) in three higher education systems in East Asia. These three systems have a large share of private universities, have experienced rapid massification during the last four decades, achieved a global reputation, and have experienced managerial governance since the 1990s. University presidents are elected through faculty voting in most national universities while it is optional for private universities. This chapter uncovers how these three countries differ and are similar in terms of their institutional leaders' training and career development before they were appointed as university president. We found that university presidents are “old” and “male” in these three countries. In addition, their academic disciplines are balanced between hard and soft disciplines. A large number of university presidents are drawn from alumni members in Korea and Japan while this is a relatively uncommon in Taiwan. Their international experience is relatively high in Korea and Taiwan while it is low in Japan. Most university presidents have prior experience in senior leadership positions in Taiwan but much less so in Japan and Korea. Faculty members in Taiwan perceive their senior managers to be more competent than faculty in Japan and Korea.

In his autobiography, Chen Shui-bian (1999, p. 40) condemned the Koumintang's (KMT's) corruption and praised the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for being free from money politics and corruption. The DPP fought the 1992 Legislative Yuan election campaign effectively on an anticorruption platform and used the same strategy in subsequent elections. If Chen Shui-bian had criticized the KMT for its involvement with “black gold” politics and had won the 2000 presidential election on his anticorruption platform, why was he and his family found guilty of corruption after his second term of office? The short answer is that even though he had promised to curb corruption, President Chen himself had succumbed to corruption after assuming office. In June 2002, Keesing's Contemporary Archives cited a poll in Taiwan that indicated that more respondents had perceived the DPP to be more corrupt than the KMT (Copper, 2006, p. 14).

The purpose of this paper is to find how the changing relationship between labour and political parties influenced the growth of reasonably independent labour unions in Taiwan.

The authors have drawn on data collected through in-depth interviews of union officials, labour activists and members of legislature from two major political parties in Taiwan.

The authors found that the breach between labour and political parties was affected by the eventualities contemplated in democratisation. Though the DPP (Minchin-tang/Democratic Progressive Party) provided the initial “shot in arm”, autonomous unions have not necessarily grown underneath DPP’s dominion. Political liberalisation of Taiwan’s industrial relations systems has gained more momentum when the DPP was in opposition than in power. Anti-incumbency pushed independent unions to sway the opposition’s backing when Kuomintang (KMT/the Chinese Nationalists) was in power and not to that extent when the KMT stepped down. The autonomous labour movement in Taiwan was initially influenced by the changing relationship between labour and ruling parties. However, the movement was subsequently shaped by the ethnic and political characteristics based on the historical divide between the mainlanders and Taiwanese and Taiwan’s changing economic landscape.

Specific limitations include the subjectivity of the inference and lack of generalisability of the findings that are based on interviews with two out of three players of industrial relations system.

Because of globalisation and global financial crisis that brought together a new generation of workforce who hold individualistic values, have lesser faith in collectivism and perform new forms of work where unionisation is no more relevant, the autonomous labour movement in Taiwan was hugely impacted.

Growth of independent unions is not being shaped by democratisation alone. If we refocus the debate about democracy’s implied relationship with the rhetoric of national identity, one can see the crucial role played by the changing economic landscape and ethnic divisions ingrained in political origins.

This conceptual paper seeks to develop hypotheses to explain a process of involvement of highly skilled members of diaspora to improve badly functioning institutions at home.

To arrive at the hypotheses, the paper relies on four diaspora pilots (in Armenia, Chile, Mexico and Argentina) that were designed and launched with the participation of the author.

A three‐stage process of diaspora involvement is identified: starting from first movers (individuals with longer planning horizon and higher tolerance to risk), to informal search networks, and to institutionalized search networks. Examples of this sequence are given from Taiwan, Chile and Mexico.

The hypotheses of the paper need qualifications which can be done with time, as more evidence and diversity in outcomes become available. The hypotheses are not rigorous, in a sense that no counterfactual information has been identified to prove them.

The paper examines dynamics of diaspora knowledge networks from “outside”, from a perspective of economic development, rather than migration of skills or network dynamics.

Relationships are a critical success factor for business operations across markets with dominant Chinese culture, like Taiwan. The intersection of a high-quality institutional environment and a traditional Chinese cultural background in Taiwan provides a unique setting for exploring different types of relational mechanisms and ensuing renqing practices (i.e. reciprocal exchange of favors with empathy). The purpose of this paper is to examine when, where and how Taiwanese high-performance organizations manage and deploy interorganizational renqing across their business relationship portfolios. Answering these questions can help build a theory of interorganizational renqing and advance interorganizational reciprocity theorization more generally.

This research is motivated by two key research questions. First is related to how renqing givers understand renqing in the context of their organizations and their interorganizational business relationship portfolios. Second, whether organizations prefer a neutral renqing balance, a renqing debt or a renqing surplus is another point of interest. The study is based on interviews with upper echelon elite informants at six high-performing Taiwanese organizations with business relationship portfolios worldwide.

It is found that interorganizational renqing is deployed as a hybrid resource, taking on the functions of both an investment and a type of insurance against risk. Two notable differences between interorganizational and interpersonal renqing are also noted. First, the social exchange norm aspect of renqing points to salient social exchange norms also in interorganizational exchanges. This confirms the importance of understanding not only the regulative and normative dimensions of business relationships, as a type of institution, but also the cognitive dimensions and underlying institutional logics. Second, this study shows that unlike at the interpersonal level, the notion of renqing debt is not common at the interorganizational level – at least not within high-performance organizations with market leader positions.

This study explores interorganizational renqing practices and their strategic deployment through the use of “accessing” and “embedding” relational mechanisms. The study also adds to the poorly understood nature of interorganizational reciprocity and provides support for developing a theory of interorganizational renqing, as a form of interorganizational reciprocity within a Chinese cultural context.