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The purpose of this paper is to explain how a multi-market firm develops the motivation to forbear from competition.

A two-way fixed effects model with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors investigates the research question with panel data collected from the US scheduled passenger airline industry.

The results demonstrate that although the interaction of multi-market contact with strategic similarity impairs a firm’s forbearance from competition, the same interaction promotes it as firm performance deteriorates, supporting the hypotheses.

Performance explains not only how forbearance emerges out of coincidental multi-market contact but also reconciles the mixed evidence for the impact of the two-way interaction between multi-market contact and strategic similarity on forbearance.

Antitrust authorities should pay more attention to low performing firms than to high performing firms in their investigations. Also, managers of multi-market firms should identify multi-market rivals with low performance as targets for the initiation of forbearance.

This study revises the mutual forbearance theory to align it with the accumulating empirical evidence that otherwise refutes its assumption and thereby improves theory’s descriptive and predictive power.

The purpose of this study is to offer a theoretical and practical explanation for the nature and reasons for inter-organizational knowledge sharing across an informal clique of competing five-star hotels in the Saudi Arabian religious tourism and hospitality industry.

The methodology is an adapted form of the grounded theory approach deploying a four-stage research design using qualitative interviews with key players in the industry to inform the analysis of the knowledge sharing approaches.

The findings illustrate the features of the knowledge sharing approaches across the five-star hotels studied. In particular, the findings highlight the existence of a cooperative-competitive tension in the relationships and knowledge sharing between the hotels. This illustrates the existence of a tacit strategy that cooperation can lead to long-term benefits for the competitor hotels.

The study is unique in its focus on the cooperative-competitive tension of five-star hotels in the Saudi Arabian religious tourism and hospitality industry and on this influence on the inter-organizational knowledge sharing across hotels within an oligopolistic market structure. The study also has value in using elements of oligopoly theory and of game theory, particularly, the prisoner’s dilemma, in explaining how inter-organizational knowledge sharing occurs within this market context.

Container liner shipping companies started expanding their business by investing in container port terminals in the late 1990s. This market entry results in an extensive presence of vertically integrated liners and terminals. This study aims to explore the competition effects of this vertical integration trend based on a regional (European) analysis. In particular, it extracts lessons from the European Commission (EC) cases on the competition effects of vertical integration. The critical analysis of the cases examined at the institutional level intends to reach conclusions on whether liner–terminal vertical integration harmed or advanced competition in the relevant markets and/or the extent that there is a need to revise the current policy practices.

This study critically assesses the EC’s decisional practices in port container terminal vertical mergers in the last 25 years (1997–2021). Based on a literature review comparing maritime and competition economists' perspectives, it reviews the types of mergers examined, the methodology followed for relevant market definition and calculation of market shares and the estimated competition effects. The Hamburg–Le Havre area is the port range used as a case study for comparing the decisional practice with actual market developments. These container ports serve the greatest consuming market of final and intermediate goods in Europe and are gateways to Central and Eastern Europe.

The assessment identifies a need for expanding the investigation as a precondition for reaching conclusions on both the anti- and pro-competitive effects. First, only a limited number of transactions have been notified to the EC. Second, the empirical research identified a gap in this process, as there were no decisions (phase I) on vertical mergers between 2008 and 2016. Third, the exante assessment has not applied a phase II in-depth analysis to any case due to the absence of competition concerns. Finally, due to the absence of complaints, there is a lack of any ex post assessment of the effects of vertical integration.

This assessment is important for understanding the current and emerging features of intra-port and inter-port competition and the potential effects that the continuation and expansion of liner companies' vertical integration strategies will have along maritime supply chains. It also contributes to the broader discussion on liner companies' strategies, such as the research and policy-making efforts around the globe to understand the impact of both vertical and horizontal integration.

These discussions are critical for a diversity of businesses that use liner shipping services or provide facilities and services to container shipping lines or ports. They are important for the interests of customers and consumers as they could inform any needed re-visiting of competition policy to protect from the dominance of any market developments that would lead to conditions limiting competition. Expanding analysis on the competition effects of non-notified mergers would help a better understanding of market changes.

Enhancing competition and limiting monopolies is valuable from a consumer's perspective. This is more so in the case of maritime trade that serves the needs of societies. The study contributes by generating a better understanding of how decision-makers have worked towards that direction and what realignments are worthy.

There are no previous comprehensive reviews and analyses of the ways that policy-makers at the regional level have addressed the competition effects of vertical integration strategies of liner shipping companies when enhancing competition is valuable from a consumer perspective. Comparing maritime economists and competition, the study, via its literature review, also offers a comparison of maritime and competition perspectives on these competition effects, allowing positioning of how effective decisional-making practices have been.

Plus Factors have long played an important role in inferring a price agreement from the totality of the evidence. In response to changes in the case law, economists have proposed two alternative paths for the future of price fixing analysis. This paper evaluates the suggested approaches and recommends retaining the enhanced Plus Factor methodology.

By carefully defining the Plus Factor concept, three key components of the analysis emerge: (1) information on communications associated with the alleged agreement, (2) economic considerations affecting market competition, and (3) characteristics that serve to differentiate explicit from tacit collusion.

Developments rationalizing the Plus Factor concept show promise, as the methodology is not more closely related to economic theory. On the other hand, replacement of the Plus Factor methodology with one focused on market performance seems problematic. By abandoning the Plus Factor concept, the economist loses a key institutional constraint on over-aggressive enforcement.

Until advocates can address the difficulties associated with using performance evidence to identify price fixing, the standard Plus Factor concept appears more appropriate. Thus, antitrust analysts should continue to use the Plus Factor methodology to infer agreements in price fixing investigations, as long as the economic rationalization of the specific Plus Factor is clearly presented.

The paper synthesizes a number of recent contributions to the price fixing literature and addresses key issues of interest to the enforcement community. By providing a critique of the proposed policy shift to use performance evidence to infer price fixing liability, the study serves to justify continued application of the Plus Factor methodology.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

We compare allocation rules in uniform price divisible-good auctions. Theoretically, a “standard allocation rule (STANDARD)” and a “uniform allocation rule (UNIFORM)” admit different types of low-price equilibria, which are eliminated by a “hybrid allocation rule (HYBRID).” We use a controlled laboratory experiment to compare the empirical performances of these allocation rules.

We conduct three-bidder uniform price divisible-good auctions varying the different allocation rules (standard, uniform, or hybrid) and whether or not explicit communication between bidders is allowed. For the case where explicit communication is allowed we also study six-bidder auctions.

We find that prices are similar across allocation rules. Under all three allocation rules, prices are competitive when bidders cannot explicitly communicate. With explicit communication, prices are collusive, and we observe collusive prices even when collusive agreements are broken. Collusive agreements are particularly fragile when the gain from a unilateral deviation is larger, and an implication of this is that collusive agreements are more robust under STANDARD.

We do not find conclusive evidence of differences in performance among allocation rules. However, there is suggestive evidence that STANDARD may be more vulnerable to collusion.

Divisible-good uniform price auctions are used in financial markets, but it is not possible to use naturally occurring data to test how alternatives to the standard format would perform. Using laboratory methods we provide an initial test of alternative allocation rules.