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Workers in the United States who lose their job may benefit from temporary assistance programs and may apply for Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). We measure whether participation in four temporary assistance programs (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Unemployment Insurance (UI), and Temporary Disability Insurance programs (TDI)) influence application for DI, SSI, and re-employment. We instrument temporary assistance participation using variation in policies across states and over time. Results from our instrumental variables models suggest that increased access to UI benefits reduces applications for DI. This result is robust to different sensitivity checks. We also find less robust evidence that UI participation increases the probability of return to work and reduces the probability of claiming SSI benefits. In contrast, some of our results suggest a positive effect of SNAP participation on claiming SSI.

This article examines the impact of the 1996 welfare‐to‐work law on women’s work and welfare outcomes. I investigate four welfare and work outcomes: (1) off welfare and employed; (2) off welfare and unemployed; (3) on welfare and employed; and (4) on welfare and unemployed. I compare how women on welfare move into these different categories from 1990 to 2000, with specific interest in examining what happened to the number of women in these categories after 1996, which is the bench mark year to examine the impact of the 1996 welfare‐to‐work law. In this article I will investigate four questions: (1) are long‐term welfare users permanently leaving welfare?; (2) is there a group of welfare users that permanently left welfare before the 1996 welfare‐to‐work law? (3) is there a hard‐to‐serve welfare population?; and (4) are those women that leave welfare finding employment. I draw four conclusions from my analyses. My first conclusion is that a new group of welfare users emerged after 1996 that is different than the conventional three groups (e.g., long‐term users, short‐term users, and recidivists). I call this new group PRWORA leavers, which are long‐term welfare users that have permanently left the welfare rolls after 1996. My second conclusion is that a group of welfare users permanently left the welfare rolls before 1996. Thus, many women were already leaving welfare and finding work be fore the law was passed. My third conclusion is that there remains a consistent hard‐to‐serve population on welfare. However, this group of welfare users is small. My fourth conclusion is that work participation has significant in creased from 1996 to 2000 for long‐term welfare users.

This paper examines the experiences of welfare clients on Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Indian immigrant information technology (IT) workers on the H-1B visa to analyze how public–private collaborations in the spirit and practice of outsourcing, i.e. systematic fragmentation and decentralization of both corporate and state activities, function as mechanisms for disciplining labor. Through an analysis of these groups’ parallel experiences with exploitative work and employers in the U.S., this paper identifies how outsourcing is not merely a business model for cross-border trade, but also a key principle, component, and outcome of policy-based neo-liberal economic restructuring.

It has been over a decade since the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) was passed in 1996 with the intention of “ending welfare as we know it.” The main cash assistance entitlement program that had been in place since the 1930s, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), was eliminated in favor of the non-entitlement Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program. This drastic change occurred at a time of economic growth, where employment and wages rose across the United States. Initially, caseloads fell dramatically.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationships between measures of ethnic and religious heterogeneity on the one hand and measures of inequality and redistribution on the other, using state‐level US data.

The relationship between ethnic/religious heterogeneity and inequality/redistribution is estimated, first, with ordinary least squares (OLS) and then with generalized method of moments (GMM). The principal explanatory variables for inequality and redistribution in the study are ethnic and religious polarization and fractionalization measures.

It is found that inequality is positively associated with polarization and has an inverse‐U relationship with fractionalization. These findings are bolstered by findings of indirect effects of ethnic and religious heterogeneity on inequality through their influence on welfare programs.

This is the first paper investigating the magnitude of possible direct and indirect effects of ethnic and religious heterogeneity on income inequality using US data.

The extent to which means-tested transfers, social insurance, and tax credits fill the gap between a family's private resources and the poverty threshold is a periodic barometer of the social safety net. Using data on families from the Current Population Survey I examine how the level and composition of before- and after-tax and after-transfer poverty gaps changed in response to changes in the policy and economic landscapes over the past two decades. The estimates presented here indicate not only dramatic changes in the level and sources of income maintenance programs filling the poverty gap, but also dramatic changes in which demographic groups successfully fill the gap. From the peak-to-peak business-cycle years of 1979 to 1999, the fraction of the gap left unfilled among non-elderly families in poverty has expanded by 25 percent, while the unfilled gap has increased by 50 percent among single female-headed families, families headed by non-whites, and families residing in the Northeast. In a given year the poor in the South fill considerably less of the poverty gap with cash welfare, but make up for much of the shortfall with higher payments of food stamps, SSI, and SSDI. Over time the poor in all regions of the country have substituted SSI, SSDI, and the EITC for cash welfare. Indeed, by 1999 the unfilled gap for families with related children present would be one-fifth larger without the EITC. With the exception of married-couple families, this apparent rate of replacement of disability payments and tax credits for cash welfare is less than one for one, leaving most poor families, especially non-white families and single female-headed families, financially more vulnerable today than in previous decades.

This study investigates the effects of a broad-based policy change that altered maternal employment, family income, and other family characteristics on drug-related crime among youth. Specifically, we exploit differences in the implementation of welfare reform in the United States across states and over time in the attempt to identify causal effects of welfare reform on youth arrests for drug-related crimes between 1990 and 2005, the period during which welfare reform unfolded. We use monthly arrest data from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports to estimate the effects of welfare reform implementation on drug-related arrests among 15- to 17-year-old teens exposed to welfare reform. The findings, based on numerous different model specifications, suggest that welfare reform had no statistically significant effect on teen drug arrests. Most estimates were positive and suggestive of a small (3%) increase in arrests.

This article discusses interstate fiscal disparities in the context of welfare reform. It presents the trend of interstate fiscal disparities during 1970-1996 and highlights the need to study how the welfare reform of 1996 affects interstate variances in welfare support.

Social policy linked to child poverty, welfare programs and needs of children has been undergoing major change in the United States. In 1996, major welfare reform was passed that eliminated the old cash assistance program of AFDC (Aid to Families of Dependent Children Program) and replaced it with a new block grant program, TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families). Advantages of the new TANF program were that it provided more flexibility to States, made the time period for which funds could be received much shorter, and therefore strongly encouraged adult welfare recipients to enter the workforce (Sherman & Sandfort, 1998; Watts, 1997). As part of this change, along with changes enacted earlier from 1984 to 1990, Medicaid eligibility for low-income children was expanded by gradually delinking Medicaid eligibility from welfare eligibility (Kronebusch, 2001). As part of a continued policy goal of expanding access to health care services to children at lower ends of the income spectrum, Congress in 1997 passed the Balanced Budget Act of that year. That act created the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). This program provided an opportunity for States to participate in CHIP and thus acquire funding from the federal government to expand their health care coverage to uninsured, lower-income children. This program was particularly aimed at children of the working poor, whose parents were often in the labor force but worked for an employer who did not provide health care insurance. The numbers of these parents were expected to increase in future years, as the TANF welfare reforms decreased the number of parents on welfare who were receiving cash benefits and increased the number of parents who accepted jobs. Many of these jobs will not provide the full set of benefits that are common in many white-collar and middle income jobs (Seccombe & Amey, 1995). The legislation allowed States to expand their Medicaid programs, create a separate CHIP program, or combine the two options (Shi, Oliver & Huang, 2000).

In this study, we ask whether economic factors that can be directly manipulated by public policy have important effects on the probability that women experience long-lasting unions. Using data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we estimate a five-stage sequential choice model for women's transitions between single with no prior unions, cohabiting, first-married, re-single (divorced or separated), and remarried. We control for expected income tax burdens, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits, Medicaid expenditures, and parameters of state divorce laws, along with an array of demographic, family background, and market factors. We simulate women's sequences of transitions from age 18 to 48 and use the simulated outcomes to predict the probability that a woman with given characteristics (a) forms a first union by age 24 and maintains the union for at least 12 years, and (b) forms a second union by age 36 and maintains it for at least 12 years. While non-policy factors such as race and schooling prove to have important effects on the predicted probabilities of long-term unions, the policy factors have small and/or imprecisely estimated effects; in short, we fail to identify policy mechanisms that could potentially be used to incentivize long-term unions.