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The near‐collapse of the world's financial system in 2008 brought into focus significant limitations in the data and analysis tools available to mitigate potential risks across the financial system. It has raised calls to provide comprehensive data and adequate tools to identify and relieve systemic risk. In this paper, an infrastructure is proposed to address the need for a new information system in systemic regulation.

The proposed infrastructure is developed using the Fed's Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual as a guideline. The model uses a data fusion approach that allows integration of inspection data, external data, and other regulatory data of different granularity. A proprietary application known as Decision Making Toolbox (DMT) is being developed with three‐tier architecture.

The integrated all‐in‐one approach will enhance the efficiency, scope, and quality of studies applied to systemic regulation and will facilitate easy decision making for effective regulation.

This concept integrates data and measures that are needed for systemic regulation. It facilitates easy decision making, by regulators with an integrated all‐in‐one information infrastructure, for effective regulation.

Several recent developments (notably, the breakdown of traditional distinctions between different types of financial activity, the globalisation of financial markets and increasing emphasis on systemic stability as a regulatory objective) have prompted policy‐makers to search for an ‘optimum’ regulatory structure that is adapted to the new market environment. Further impetus has been given to this debate by the radical overhaul of regulatory structures, along quite different lines in Australia, the UK and Japan, and the ongoing deliberations within the US Congress over structured financial reform. This paper examines alternative ways of organising the regulatory function in the context of the new financial market environment. The first section reviews the objectives, targets and techniques of regulation. The second section describes the new market environment and the restructuring of the financial services industry. The third section assesses the implications of this new environment for the structure of regulation. The fourth section addresses the international dimension. The final section provides a summary and conclusion. The paper is based on a presentation made at the World Bank Conference, El Salvador, June 1998.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of financial penalties on the stability of the banking sector.

A unique database of 671 financial penalties imposed on 68 international listed banks between 2007 and 2014 and a fixed-effects panel data approach were used.

The results show that financial penalties increase banks’ systemic risk exposure but do not significantly affect banks’ contribution to systemic risk. Additionally, the link between financial penalties and systemic risk exposure is weaker in regulatory and supervisory systems with more prompt corrective power among national authorities. By contrast, supervisory authorities’ stronger power to declare insolvency and a greater external monitoring culture exacerbate the positive effects of financial penalties on systemic risk exposure.

The punishment of misconduct should correct the social harm and prevent future misconduct while ensuring the banking system’s stability. Therefore, authorities should punish misconduct by implementing penalties against the financial institutions at a specific amount that offsets the damages of misconduct but does not threaten systemic stability. Penalties against institutions may be complemented by financial penalties against upper management to induce a more responsible culture in banks.

This paper is the first to study the effect of financial penalties on the stability of the financial system. The results contribute to the ongoing debate on the appropriateness of financial penalties and address the question of whether bank regulators reduce or contribute to banks’ systemic risk.

Systemic risk has been a cause of concern for the bank regulatory authorities worldwide since the global financial crisis. This study aims to identify systemically important banks (SIBs) in India by using SRISK to measure the expected capital shortfall of banks in a systemic event. The sample size comprises a balanced data set of 31 listed Indian commercial banks from 2006 to 2019.

In this study, the authors have used SRISK to identify banks that have a maximum contribution to the systemic risk of the Indian banking sector. Leverage, size and long-run marginal expected shortfall (LRMES) are used to compute SRISK. Forward-looking LRMES is computed using the GJR-GARCH-dynamic conditional correlation methodology for early prediction of a bank’s contribution to systemic risk.

This study finds that public sector banks are more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks owing to their capital inadequacy vis-à-vis the private sector banks. This study also emphasizes that size should not be used as a standalone factor to assess the systemic importance of a bank.

Systemic risk has attracted a lot of research interest; however, it is largely limited to the developed nations. This paper fills an important research gap in banking literature about the identification of SIBs in an emerging economy, India. As SRISK uses both balance sheet and market-based information, it can be used to complement the existing methodology used by the Reserve Bank of India to identify SIBs.

Traditionally, individual states have shared responsibility for regulating the US insurance industry. The Dodd–Frank Act changes this by tasking the Federal Reserve with regulating the systemic risks that particularly large insurance organizations might pose and assigning the regulation of swap-based substitutes for insurance and reinsurance products to the SEC and CFTC. This paper argues that prudential regulation of large insurance firms and weaknesses in federal swaps regulation could reduce the effectiveness of state-based systems in protecting policyholders and taxpayers from nonperformance in the insurance industry. Swap-based substitutes for traditional insurance and reinsurance contracts offer protection sellers a way to transfer responsibility for guarding against nonperformance into potentially less-effective hands. The CFTC and SEC lack the focus, expertise, experience, and resources to adequately manage the ways that swap transactions can affect US taxpayers’ equity position in global safety nets, while regulators at the Fed refuse to recognize that conscientiously monitoring accounting capital at financial holding companies will not adequately protect taxpayers and policyholders until and unless it is accompanied by severe penalties for managers that willfully hide their firm’s exposure to destructive tail risks.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the development of the electric vehicle, technological capabilities of incumbents and would‐be new entrants in the auto industry. These are discussed with reference to US regulatory moves towards zero emission standards to provide a new framework for identifying the potential success of various types of regulation and the technological capabilities they demand.

Methodologically, a two pronged approach is adopted whereby US patents are analysed to quantitatively confirm the presented case‐based evidence on responses to emission regulation. The paper also discusses the use of patents as a means of examining technological development.

The paper shows the significant need for market protection for disruptive innovation and that a limiting factor of success in regulation occurs when radical technology is demanded.

A new framework is presented for identifying the potential success of various types of regulation by linking to the technological capabilities they demand and identifies the significant need for market protection for disruptive innovation. This implies that a limiting factor of success in regulation occurs when radical technology is demanded.

Corporate governance and its training in universities have become an essential addition to the educational curriculum. Despite its expansion, students still need help to grasp some concepts, affecting their academic performance. This paper examines the expected influence of gender and school libraries on comprehending corporate governance concepts in Ghanaian universities.

With the culturo-techno-contextual approach (CTCA) as the underlying theory, the study sampled 1050 undergraduate students from the selected Ghanaian public universities. The study adopted a quantitative approach, and the data were analysed using descriptive statistics and ANOVA.

The results show a statistically significant difference between male and female Ghanaian students in their understanding of corporate governance concepts, with the mean figures suggesting that males slightly understand corporate governance concepts more than females. The results also show a statistically significant difference among Ghanaian students studying using school libraries of varying quality in their understanding of corporate governance.

This study's novelty stems from examining the corporate governance curriculum in a developing country from the perspectives of gender and school library. Adopting the CTCA components in analysing school libraries and gender further evidences the study's novelty.

The financial crisis 2007‐2009 calls for a regulatory response. A crucial element of this task is the treatment of systemic risk. Basel III gains centre stage in this process. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to evaluate Basel III, examining its ability to reduce systemic risk.

The paper highlights the importance of reducing systemic risk to achieve the goal of overall financial stability. By first focusing on the theoretical foundations of systemic risk, this paper explores and analyzes the crucial aspects of this almost impalpable risk type. It further investigates the current regulation of systemic risk, clearly showing Basel II's inability to reduce it. Then, it evaluates the Basel Committee's efforts to address these weaknesses through Basel III by investigating its incentives and its ability to reduce obvious drawbacks of Basel II as well as systemic risk factors.

The findings show that there are still adjustments necessary. Although the development of Basel III is well advanced, providing some stabilizing incentives, there are still issues calling for closer consideration to counter all Basel II drawbacks and systemic risk factors adequately. These include: a risk‐weighted leverage ratio; a more thorough treatment of procyclicality; adjustments for the NSFR (Net Stable Funding ratio); and most importantly, the mandatory issue to internalize negative externalities from financial institutions, that is, the call for pricing systemic risk.

The paper not only examines the new Basel III framework, as a response to the Financial Crisis 2007‐2009, but also draws attention to specific areas which the Basel Committee and regulators need to focus on more thoroughly.

Post 1991, given the advent of liberalization and economic reforms, the Indian telecom sector witnessed a remarkable growth in terms of subscriber base and reduced competitive tariff among the service providers. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of regulatory announcements on systemic risk among the Indian telecom firms.

This study employed a two-step methodology to measure the impact of regulatory announcements on systemic risk. In the first step, CAPM along with the Kalman filter was used to estimate the daily β (systemic risk). In the second step, event study methodology was used to assess the impact of regulatory announcements on daily β derived from the first step.

The results of this study indicate that regulatory announcements did impact systemic risk among telecom firms. The study also found that regulatory announcements either increased or decreased systemic risk, depending upon the type of regulatory announcements. Further, this study estimated the market-perceived regulatory risk premiums for individual telecom firms.

The regulatory risk premium was either positive or negative, depending upon the different types of regulatory announcements for the telecom sector firms. Thus, this study contributes to the theory of literature by testing the buffering hypothesis in the context of Indian telecom firms.

The study findings will be useful for investors and policy-makers to estimate the regulatory risk premium as and when there is an anticipated regulatory announcement in the Indian telecom sector.

This is one of the first research studies in exploring regulatory risk among the Indian telecom firms. The research findings indicate that regulatory risk does exist in the telecom firms of India.