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This study tends to investigate how the outbreak of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has affected banks' contribution to systemic risk. In addition, the authors examine whether the impact of the pandemic may vary across advanced/emerging economies, and with banks with differed characteristics.

The authors construct the bank-specific conditional value at risk (CoVaR) and marginal expected shortfall (MES) to measure their contribution to systemic risk and define the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic by the timing when countries report more than 100 confirmed cases. The authors use the approach of difference-in-differences to assess the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on banks' contribution to systemic risk. This sample comprises monthly panel data of around 900 listed commercial banks in 39 advanced and emerging economies.

The authors find that, firstly, the COVID-19 pandemic increased banks' contribution to systemic risk significantly around the world. Secondly, the impact of the COVID-19 virus was more pronounced in developed countries than in emerging economies. Finally, banks with a larger size and higher loan-to-deposit ratio are more greatly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, while a higher capitalization for banks is insufficient to shelter them from the adverse impact of such pandemic.

The authors assess the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on banks' contribution to systemic risk. Using the conditional value at risk (marginal expected shortfall) of banks as the measure, this study’s results suggest that banks' contribution to systemic risk increases by around 25% (48%) amid the COVID-19 pandemic. This study’s findings may shed some light on the potential policies that financial regulators may employ to ameliorate the adverse outcomes of the ongoing pandemic.

There is an emerging consensus that systemically important banks should face stricter regulations and systemic surcharges. To make this latter principle operational the regulator will need to quantify the systemic importance of individual banks. The purpose of this paper is to review the proposed measures of systemic importance from the research community and discuss their merits relative to how a regulator would ideally wish to calibrate surcharges on systemically important banks, and to evaluate how useful proposed measures of the systemic importance of financial institutions will be to regulators.

The author reviews the main contributions to the research literature and discusses their relevance for the problem faced by regulators.

There are five main caveats that make the proposed measures of systemic importance less useful for regulators.

The proposed measures may help identify relevant aspects of systemic importance, but the regulators will need to construct their own measures for practical use.

The paper provides a critical review of a research literature that could potentially have large practical implications.

The paper models the financial interconnectedness and systemic risk of shadow banks using Granger-causal network-based measures and takes the Indian shadow bank crisis of 2018–2019 as a systemic event.

The paper employs pairwise linear Granger-causality tests adjusted for heteroskedasticity and return autocorrelation on a rolling window of weekly returns data of 52 financial institutions from 2016 to 2019 to construct network-based measures and calculate network centrality. The Granger-causal network-based measure ranking of financial institutions in the pre-crisis period (explanatory variable) is rank-regressed with the ranking of financial institutions based on maximum percentage loss suffered by them during the crises period (dependent variable).

The empirical result demonstrated that the shadow bank complex network during the crisis is denser, more interconnected and more correlated than the tranquil period. The closeness, eigenvector, and PageRank centrality established the systemic risk transmitter and receiver roles of institutions. The financial institutions that are more central and hold prestigious positions due to their incoming links suffered maximum loss. The shadow bank network also showed small-world phenomena similar to social networks. Granger-causal network-based measures have out-of-sample predictive properties and can predict the systemic risk of financial institutions.

The study considers only the publicly listed financial institutions. Also, the proposed measures are susceptible to the size of the rolling window, frequency of return and significance level of Granger-causality tests.

Supervisors and financial regulators can use the proposed measures to monitor the development of systemic risk and swiftly identify and isolate contagious financial institutions in the event of a crisis. Also, it is helpful to policymakers and researchers of an emerging economy where bilateral exposures' data between financial institutions are often not present in the public domain, plus there is a gap or delay in financial reporting.

The paper is one of the first to study systemic risk of shadow banks using a financial network comprising of commercial banks and mutual funds. It is also the first one to study systemic risk of Indian shadow banks.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of financial penalties on the stability of the banking sector.

A unique database of 671 financial penalties imposed on 68 international listed banks between 2007 and 2014 and a fixed-effects panel data approach were used.

The results show that financial penalties increase banks’ systemic risk exposure but do not significantly affect banks’ contribution to systemic risk. Additionally, the link between financial penalties and systemic risk exposure is weaker in regulatory and supervisory systems with more prompt corrective power among national authorities. By contrast, supervisory authorities’ stronger power to declare insolvency and a greater external monitoring culture exacerbate the positive effects of financial penalties on systemic risk exposure.

The punishment of misconduct should correct the social harm and prevent future misconduct while ensuring the banking system’s stability. Therefore, authorities should punish misconduct by implementing penalties against the financial institutions at a specific amount that offsets the damages of misconduct but does not threaten systemic stability. Penalties against institutions may be complemented by financial penalties against upper management to induce a more responsible culture in banks.

This paper is the first to study the effect of financial penalties on the stability of the financial system. The results contribute to the ongoing debate on the appropriateness of financial penalties and address the question of whether bank regulators reduce or contribute to banks’ systemic risk.

In this paper, the authors investigate whether the systemic local banking crises (LBCs) and global financial crisis (GFC) impact the association between bank profit efficiency and earnings quality in developing economies.

Using panel data spanning 29 years over the period 1991–2019 for 169 banks drawn from five East African countries, the authors perform difference-in-difference multivariate analyses using the generalised method of moments (GMM) system estimator on a sample consisting of 2,261 bank-year observations.

The results, which are robust for endogeneity and other checks, show that banks with higher profit efficiency consistently report higher quality earnings. The authors further establish that whereas systemic LBCs contribute negatively to bank earnings quality, the GFC tends to have a positive impact. These results are upheld when the joint impacts of both systemic LBCs, GFC and profit efficiency on earnings quality are considered. The positive influence of profit efficiency and GFC on earnings quality is pronounced under income-decreasing earnings management. The impacts of profit efficiency, LBCs and GFC on earnings quality appear to be non-monotonic and vary across the sampled countries.

The study's findings are based on banks in five developing countries within a regional economic bloc. Additional studies could focus on other economic blocs for enhanced generalisability of the findings. In addition, some of the variables examined are studied at bank-level, while other variables are at country-level. Finally, the study establishes an association between the variables of interest, and this does not necessarily imply causation.

The results provide useful insights to bank regulatory and supervisory agencies on the need to exercise increased risk-based scrutiny over bank loan loss provisioning and minimum loan loss reserve requirements. From an audit perspective, auditors need to be cautious and apply an enhanced risk-based audit especially when auditing banks during and after a financial, banking or systemic crisis. Credit rating agencies need to pay closer attention to the LLPs of distressed banks. Finally, bank investors and customers should be cautious when using bank financial statements, since bank managers of poorly performing banks might engage in aggressive earnings management.

The study is perhaps the first to examine the joint effects of systemic LBCs on the association between bank profit efficiency and the quality of earnings in a larger dataset of banks in a developing regional economic bloc. The authors also employ the GMM system estimator in the modelling, which helps address some weaknesses in prior studies.

This paper aims to investigate the drivers of systemic risk and contagion among European banks from 2007 to 2012. The authors explain why some banks are expected to contribute more to systemic events in the European financial system than others by analysing the tail co-movement of banks’ security prices.

First, the authors derive a systemic risk measure from the concepts of marginal expected shortfall and conditional value at risk analysing tail co-movements of daily bank stock returns. The authors then run panel regressions for the systemic risk measure using idiosyncratic bank characteristics and a set of country and policy control variables.

The results comprise highly significant drivers of systemic risk in the European banking sector with important implications for research and banking regulation. Using a set of panel regressions, the authors identify bank size, asset and income structure, loss and liquidity coverage, profitability and several macroeconomic conditions as drivers of systemic risk.

Analysing the tail co-movement of security prices excludes a number of “smaller” institutions without publicly listed securities. The other shortfall is that we do not assess the systemic impact of non-bank financial institutions.

Regulators have to consider a broad variety of indicators for assessing systemic risks. Existing microprudential-oriented rules are less effective, and policymakers may consider new measures like asset diversification to mitigate systemic risks in the banking system.

The authors contribute to existing empirical analyses in three ways. First, they propose a method to identify systemically important banks (SIBs). Second, they develop two measures to assess their potential negative impact on the system. Third, they contribute to the closing of the research gaps by analysing which macroprudential regulations for SIBs are most effective without hampering free market forces.

Systemic risk has been a cause of concern for the bank regulatory authorities worldwide since the global financial crisis. This study aims to identify systemically important banks (SIBs) in India by using SRISK to measure the expected capital shortfall of banks in a systemic event. The sample size comprises a balanced data set of 31 listed Indian commercial banks from 2006 to 2019.

In this study, the authors have used SRISK to identify banks that have a maximum contribution to the systemic risk of the Indian banking sector. Leverage, size and long-run marginal expected shortfall (LRMES) are used to compute SRISK. Forward-looking LRMES is computed using the GJR-GARCH-dynamic conditional correlation methodology for early prediction of a bank’s contribution to systemic risk.

This study finds that public sector banks are more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks owing to their capital inadequacy vis-à-vis the private sector banks. This study also emphasizes that size should not be used as a standalone factor to assess the systemic importance of a bank.

Systemic risk has attracted a lot of research interest; however, it is largely limited to the developed nations. This paper fills an important research gap in banking literature about the identification of SIBs in an emerging economy, India. As SRISK uses both balance sheet and market-based information, it can be used to complement the existing methodology used by the Reserve Bank of India to identify SIBs.

The authors provide a comprehensive study on systemic risk of the banking sectors in the ASEAN-6 countries. In particular, they investigate the systemic risk dynamics and determinants of 49 listed banks in the region over the 2000–2018 period.

The authors employ the market-based SRISK measure of Brownlees and Engle (2017) to investigate the systemic risk of the ASEAN-6's banking sectors.

The authors find that the regional systemic risk fluctuates significantly and currently at par or higher level than that of the recent global financial crisis. Systemic risk is generally associated with banks that have bigger size, more traditional business models, lower quality in their loan portfolios, less profitable and with lower market-to-book values. However, these relationships vary significantly between ASEAN countries.

The research focuses on the systemic risk of ASEAN-6 countries. Therefore, the research results may lack generalizability to other countries.

The authors’ empirical evidence advocates the use of capital surcharges on the systemically important financial institutions. Although the region has been pushing to higher financial integration in recent years, the authors encourage the regional regulators to account for the idiosyncratic characteristics of their banking sectors in designing effective macroprudential policy to contain systemic risk.

This paper provides the first study on the systemic risk of the ASEAN-6 region. The empirical evidence on the drivers of systemic risk would be of interest to the regional regulators.

The distinction between systemic banks (GSIBs) and non-systemic banks (non-GSIBs) is driven by policy reasons. This study aims to examine the behaviour of non-performing loans in European GSIBs and non-GSIBs from 2004 to 2013.

The author uses regression methodology to analyse the association between non-performing loans (NPLs) and the state of the economy.

The author finds that more profitable banks witness higher NPLs regardless of them being systemic or non-systemic. Secondly, GSIBs have fewer NPLs during economic booms and during periods of increased lending, while non-GSIBs experience higher NPLs during periods of increased lending. The author also observes that European non-GSIBs that exceed regulatory capital requirement also experience higher NPLs. In the post-crisis period, there is a significant and negative relationship between NPLs and the economic cycle for GSIBs in the post-financial crisis period and a significant and positive relationship between NPLs, loan supply and bank profitability for GSIBs in the post-financial crisis period; on the other hand, there is a significant and negative relationship between NPLs and regulatory capital ratios for non-GSIBs in the post-financial crisis period and a significant and positive relationship between NPLs and bank profitability for non-GSIBs in the post-financial crisis period. The findings have implications.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, the literature on the determinants of NPL has not empirically examined the behaviour of NPLs in European GSIBs and non-GSIBs. This paper examines this issue to provide insights to help policymakers and academics understand the peculiarities of NPLs in Europe.

Systemic risks affect financial market participants in many ways. However, the literature insists firmly that they are and, in fact, should be of little concern to (private) banks (as opposed to regulators). The purpose of this paper is to argue for the relevance of systemic risks for private banks as opposed to regulators only by making use of causal loop models as being traditionally used in the discipline of systems dynamics. In contrast to the starting point for all common risk-management frameworks in banks, which is the classification of risks into risk categories, the authors show that risk has been compartmentalized too much and provide a strong case for a really holistic approach.

Systems thinking, causal loop models and conceptual approach.

Relevance of systemic risks for private banks as opposed to regulators only. In contrast to the starting point for all common risk-management frameworks in banks, which is the classification of risks into risk categories, the authors show that risk has been compartmentalized too much and provide a strong case for a really holistic approach, which stems from using explanatory models such as causal loop diagrams. On top of that more explanatory models ought to be used for risk management purposes while banks currently rely too much on statistical-descriptive approaches.

Integration of systems thinking into risk management, which is novel: in contrast to the starting point for all common risk-management frameworks in banks, which is the classification of risks into risk categories, the authors show that risk has been compartmentalized too much and provide a strong case for a really holistic approach.