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This study proposes a framework based on salience theory and shows that focusing on one type of risk (idiosyncratic or systemic) can explain overpricing of securities ex ante, and resales at low prices during crisis periods.

The author consider an overlapping generations (OLG) model where each generation lives for two periods and there is no population growth. Agents (investors) start their lives with an endowment W > 0 and have mean-variance utility. They invest their endowment when young and consume when old. Each period, the young investors optimally choose their portfolio from different risky assets acquired from the old generation, all assumed to be in fixed supply.

The author show that investor salience bias can explain excess volatility of asset prices and the resulting fire-sales in periods of financial turmoil. A change in salience – from one component (idiosyncratic) to the other (systemic) – will generate excess volatility. Interestingly, higher risk aversion generally exacerbates the excess volatility of prices. Moreover, the model predicts that if a big systemic shock hits the financial system, due to salience bias the price of systemic assets falls sharply. This relates to the observed fire-sales of assets during the global financial crisis.

The proposed model and results suggest that there may be a scope for intervention in financial markets during turbulences. In terms of ex ante policies the study suggests that investors and regulator should use better risk assessment technologies.

This is the first study constructing a tractable model based on the argument that investor salience may exacerbate the excess volatility of prices during financial downturns. The author relate salience to two types of risk; idiosyncratic and systemic and assume that investors' risk perception is biased towards the type of risk that is currently salient based on prior beliefs or past data. The author show that the diversification fallacy of the precrisis period, where seemingly safe assets were overpriced, can be explained by agents overweighing idiosyncratic risk and ignoring systemic risk.

Viewing the domestic downside risk as a “pushing” factor for outward foreign direct investment (OFDI), this study aims to examine the surge in Chinese cross-border acquisitions (CBAs) between 2008 and 2017, a unique window when private firms in China were allowed to conduct CBAs.

This study examines the effect of down-side risk on cross-border acquisition performance by using the sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2017. Specifically, this study considers three kinds of systemic risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk, and respectively examines their impact on CBAs activities; this study also investigates their subsequent results after CBAs activities. The contingency effect of state ownership on the above relationship is also discussed.

The findings reveal that pre-CBA systemic risk explains the volume of CBA activities; CBAs are followed by a reduction in systemic risk; the interactions between systemic risk and CBAs decrease with the level of state ownership; and the above results do not hold for traditional risk measures (i.e. systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk).

This study contributes to the literature by revealing the role of systemic risk as a “pushing” factor in the context of OFDI and suggesting an alternative explanation for CBAs from China: Chinese firms (especially private firms) took advantage of the rare opportunity between 2008 and 2017 given by the government to transfer assets overseas through CBA.

This paper explores the building blocks of risk governance systems that are equipped to manage systemic risk in the 21st century. Whilst approaches to risk governance have been evolving for more than a decade, recent disasters have shown that conventional risk management solutions need to be complemented with a multidimensional risk approach to govern complex risks and prevent major, often simultaneous, crises with cascading and knock-on effects on multiple, interrelated systems at scale. The paper explores which risk governance innovations will be essential to provide the enabling environment for sustainable development that is resilient to interrelated shocks and risks.

This interdisciplinary literature review-based thought piece highlights how systemic risk is socially constructed and identifies guiding principles for systemic risk governance that could be actionable by and provide entry points for local and national governments, civil society and the private sector. particularly in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC), in a way that is relevant to the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This considers preparedness, response and resilience, but more importantly prospective and corrective risk control and reduction strategies and mechanisms. Only when systemic risk is framed in a way that is relevant to the political agendas of countries will it be possible to begin a dialogue for its governance.

The paper identifies opportunities at the global, national and local levels, which together draw up a viable framework for systemic risk governance that (1) embraces the governance of sustainability and resilience through a strengthened holistic governance framework for social, economic, territorial and environmental development; (2) improves managing conventional risk to ultimately manage systemic risks; (3) fosters the understanding of vulnerability and exposure to gain insight into systemic risk; (4) places a greater focus on prospective risk management; (5) manages systemic risk in local infrastructure systems, supply chains and ecosystems; (6) shifts the focus from protecting privatized gains to managing socialized risk.

The choices and actions that societies take on the path of their development are contributing intentionally or unintentionally to the construction of systemic risks, which result in knock-on effects among interconnected social, environmental, political and economic systems. These risks are manifesting in major crises with cascading effects and a real potential to undermine the achievement of the SDGs, as COVID-19 is a stark reminder of. This paper offers the contours of a new risk governance paradigm that is able to navigate the new normal in a post-COVID world and is equipped to manage systemic risk.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of bank mergers on systemic and systematic risks on the relative merits of product and market diversification strategies. It also observes determinants of M&A deals criteria, product and market diversification positioning, crisis threshold and other regulatory and market factors.

This research examines the impact and association between merger announcements and regulatory reforms at bank and system levels by investigating the impact of various bank consolidation strategies on firms’ risks. We estimate beta(s) as an index of financial institutions’ systematic risk. We then develop an index of the estimated equity value loss as the long-rum marginal expected shortfall (LRMES). LRMES contributes to compute systemic risk (SRISK) contribution of these firms, which is the capital that a firm is expected to need if we have another financial crisis.

Large acquiring banks decrease systemic risk contribution in cross-border M&As with a non-bank financial institution, and witness profitability (ROA) gains, supporting geographic diversification stability. Capital requirements, activity restrictions and bank concentration increase systemic risk contribution in national mergers. Bank mergers with investment FIs targets enhance productivity but impair technical efficiency, contrary to bank-real estate deals where technical efficiency change accompanied lower systemic risk contribution.

Financial institutions are recommended to avoid trapped capital and liquidity by efficiently using local balance sheet and strengthening them via implementing models that clearly set diversification and netting benefits to determine capital reserves and to drive capital efficiency through the clarity on product–activity–geography diversification and focus. This contributes to successful ringfencing, decreases compliance costs and maximises returns and minimises several risks including systemic risk.

Policy implications: the adversative properties of bank mergers in respect of systemic risk require strict and innovative monitoring of bank mergers from the bidding level by both acquirers and targets and regulators and competition supervisory bodies. Moreover, emphasis on regulators/governments intervention and role, as it provides a stabilising factor of the markets and consecutively lower systemic risk even if the systematic idiosyncratic risk contribution was significant. However, such roles have to be well planned and scaled to avoid providing motives for banks to seek too-big-too-fail or too-big-to-discipline status.

This research contributes to the renewing regulatory debate on banks sustainable structures by examining the risk effect of bank diversification versus focus. The authors aim to address the multidimensional impacts and risks inherent to M&A deals, by examining the extent of the interconnectedness of M&A and its implications within and beyond the banking sector.

Systemic risks affect financial market participants in many ways. However, the literature insists firmly that they are and, in fact, should be of little concern to (private) banks (as opposed to regulators). The purpose of this paper is to argue for the relevance of systemic risks for private banks as opposed to regulators only by making use of causal loop models as being traditionally used in the discipline of systems dynamics. In contrast to the starting point for all common risk-management frameworks in banks, which is the classification of risks into risk categories, the authors show that risk has been compartmentalized too much and provide a strong case for a really holistic approach.

Systems thinking, causal loop models and conceptual approach.

Relevance of systemic risks for private banks as opposed to regulators only. In contrast to the starting point for all common risk-management frameworks in banks, which is the classification of risks into risk categories, the authors show that risk has been compartmentalized too much and provide a strong case for a really holistic approach, which stems from using explanatory models such as causal loop diagrams. On top of that more explanatory models ought to be used for risk management purposes while banks currently rely too much on statistical-descriptive approaches.

Integration of systems thinking into risk management, which is novel: in contrast to the starting point for all common risk-management frameworks in banks, which is the classification of risks into risk categories, the authors show that risk has been compartmentalized too much and provide a strong case for a really holistic approach.

Before providing an overview of the conference with the above title and this Special Issue, this paper aims to present a view of the meaning of systemic risk, factors that affect systemic risk and measures of systemic risk. Thereafter, the conference presentations and the papers in this issue are summarized.

Characteristics and measures of systemic risk are reviewed. Conference papers and presentations are summarized.

While some aspects of systemic risk of a financial institution can be measured, an important aspect associated with contagion through markets is not easily captured by simple measures.

The conference and the papers in this issue contribute to the policy debate about sources and characteristics of systemic risk.

The financial crisis 2007‐2009 calls for a regulatory response. A crucial element of this task is the treatment of systemic risk. Basel III gains centre stage in this process. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to evaluate Basel III, examining its ability to reduce systemic risk.

The paper highlights the importance of reducing systemic risk to achieve the goal of overall financial stability. By first focusing on the theoretical foundations of systemic risk, this paper explores and analyzes the crucial aspects of this almost impalpable risk type. It further investigates the current regulation of systemic risk, clearly showing Basel II's inability to reduce it. Then, it evaluates the Basel Committee's efforts to address these weaknesses through Basel III by investigating its incentives and its ability to reduce obvious drawbacks of Basel II as well as systemic risk factors.

The findings show that there are still adjustments necessary. Although the development of Basel III is well advanced, providing some stabilizing incentives, there are still issues calling for closer consideration to counter all Basel II drawbacks and systemic risk factors adequately. These include: a risk‐weighted leverage ratio; a more thorough treatment of procyclicality; adjustments for the NSFR (Net Stable Funding ratio); and most importantly, the mandatory issue to internalize negative externalities from financial institutions, that is, the call for pricing systemic risk.

The paper not only examines the new Basel III framework, as a response to the Financial Crisis 2007‐2009, but also draws attention to specific areas which the Basel Committee and regulators need to focus on more thoroughly.

Post 1991, given the advent of liberalization and economic reforms, the Indian telecom sector witnessed a remarkable growth in terms of subscriber base and reduced competitive tariff among the service providers. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of regulatory announcements on systemic risk among the Indian telecom firms.

This study employed a two-step methodology to measure the impact of regulatory announcements on systemic risk. In the first step, CAPM along with the Kalman filter was used to estimate the daily β (systemic risk). In the second step, event study methodology was used to assess the impact of regulatory announcements on daily β derived from the first step.

The results of this study indicate that regulatory announcements did impact systemic risk among telecom firms. The study also found that regulatory announcements either increased or decreased systemic risk, depending upon the type of regulatory announcements. Further, this study estimated the market-perceived regulatory risk premiums for individual telecom firms.

The regulatory risk premium was either positive or negative, depending upon the different types of regulatory announcements for the telecom sector firms. Thus, this study contributes to the theory of literature by testing the buffering hypothesis in the context of Indian telecom firms.

The study findings will be useful for investors and policy-makers to estimate the regulatory risk premium as and when there is an anticipated regulatory announcement in the Indian telecom sector.

This is one of the first research studies in exploring regulatory risk among the Indian telecom firms. The research findings indicate that regulatory risk does exist in the telecom firms of India.

The near‐collapse of the world's financial system in 2008 brought into focus significant limitations in the data and analysis tools available to mitigate potential risks across the financial system. It has raised calls to provide comprehensive data and adequate tools to identify and relieve systemic risk. In this paper, an infrastructure is proposed to address the need for a new information system in systemic regulation.

The proposed infrastructure is developed using the Fed's Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual as a guideline. The model uses a data fusion approach that allows integration of inspection data, external data, and other regulatory data of different granularity. A proprietary application known as Decision Making Toolbox (DMT) is being developed with three‐tier architecture.

The integrated all‐in‐one approach will enhance the efficiency, scope, and quality of studies applied to systemic regulation and will facilitate easy decision making for effective regulation.

This concept integrates data and measures that are needed for systemic regulation. It facilitates easy decision making, by regulators with an integrated all‐in‐one information infrastructure, for effective regulation.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of audit client importance on future bank risk and systemic risk in US-listed commercial banks.

The authors use archival research method.

The authors mainly find that client importance is negatively related with future bank-specific crash risk and distress risk, and also with sector-wide systemic crash risk and systemic distress risk in the future. The authors also report some evidence that these relations become more pronounced during the crisis period than during the non-crisis period. Moreover, the effect of client importance on systemic risk is found to strengthen in banks audited by Big-N auditors, by auditors without clients who restate earnings, and by auditors with more industry expertise.

These findings contribute to the auditing and systemic risk literature.

This study has implications for regulating the banking industry.

This study provides original evidence on how client importance affects bank-specific risk and systemic risk of the banking industry.