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Prevailing information asymmetry in business processes alters the market dynamics. Quality uncertainty ensues from this phenomenon. Philosophy of information economics is implemented to correlate total quality management (TQM) practices in industry with quality perceived by customers. Quality perception, a newly coined term, is discussed at length, along with causal factors. This paper aims to provide a system dynamics framework for quality perception and to investigate the role of the changing level of market‐side enablers on quality perception.

System dynamics is used for modeling and analysis. To realize the impact of information asymmetry on quality perception, simulation runs are carried out for an Indian case.

Enablers, such as advertising, word‐of‐mouth, rebate, warranty and guarantee, mitigate the effect of information asymmetry on quality perception, and commensurately translate TQM to market value.

The study of some aspects of information asymmetry and quality perception is attempted. Further study is required to understand repercussions of information asymmetry on the complete supply chain processes.

The model has a practical relevance to implement quality perception enhancement by deciding upon the policy mix.

With quality perception defined and modeled, the paper attempts market orientation to quality paradigm.

The paper aims to explore how the participants in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) select collecting strategies under the scenarios of information symmetry and asymmetry, and to investigate the value of corporate social responsibility (CSR) cost information for participants.

This paper constructs a two-echelon CLSC Stackelberg game consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where the manufacturer undertakes CSR and is responsible for the remanufacturing of used products. First, the authors establish two collecting models under information symmetry: manufacturer-collecting and retailer-collecting. Second, the authors construct two collecting models under information asymmetry and propose a two-part tariff contract to coordinate the participants’ profits. Finally, the authors make a numerical analysis to verify the results.

Under information symmetry, the profit of the participant who does not undertake collecting is positively related to the collecting rate, and the other participant may not benefit from the increase in the collecting rate. Under information asymmetry, the manufacturer will still select the retailer-collecting channel. Asymmetric information only affects the retailer’s selection. In addition, the manufacturer’s private CSR cost information is always valuable to the retailer.

This paper first explores the influence of the CSR cost information value on the selection of collecting channel under information asymmetry in the CLSC. The results can help company managers choose optimal collecting channel under information symmetry or under information asymmetry.

Total quality management (TQM) at the industry end along with quality function deployment (QFD) molds product quality. It flows to the customer at the market end with a value called quality perception, embedding the concept of probability of acceptance and quality uncertainty. The purpose of this paper is to analyze and validate the existence of upcoming term “quality uncertainty” in the backdrop of information asymmetry.

Theories of probability and reliability engineering are used for mathematical modeling and analysis. Fault tree and success tree method is specifically applied to analyze quality uncertainty and quality perception at the market end.

Quality perception is an outcome of combined probability of information symmetry and TQM or product quality, whereas its inverse is quality uncertainty. Determining quality perception or uncertainty of any product type is possible in a market scenario, and its impact on product life cycle and company revenue can be accessed accordingly.

The model proposed here helps compute information symmetry and quality perception at the market end. More data exploration methods can be investigated to apply this model precisely in real life setting.

It is of equal importance to measure quality uncertainty due to information asymmetry and commensurate revenue loss to the company. Based on this, a policy mix of maneuvering for quality perception enhancement can be developed at both ends of supply chain processes.

With quality perception defined and modeled, the paper attempts market orientation to quality paradigm. It adds a new dimension to quality management.

This paper aims to examine the non-linear aspects of the relationship between asymmetry and performance in supply chains (SCs), under varying intensities of collaboration and integration.

The paper offers a useful new approach to designing strategic elements of supply chain management (SCM) relationships. Using the partial least squares method, an empirical study of 66 companies in Spain has been conducted to clarify contemporary relationships, suggest new directions and ultimately contribute toward developing SCM theory.

The influences of asymmetry on performance in varying collaboration and integration contexts are shown to be unstable and have non-linear paths. It is inappropriate for all firms to collaborate or integrate continually, even for a prescribed period. Furthermore, due to asymmetry, SCM processes are more complex.

The results’ validity may be limited to contexts specific to Spanish SCs. It would be valuable to investigate the impact of asymmetry on firms’ performance and relationships in other markets.

Collaborations and integration between partners in a SC might change the role of asymmetry from restraining to improving performance. The best way to improve performance in asymmetric relationships is to collaborate. Certain dimensions of integration and full integration are not necessarily required to improve firms’ performance under asymmetry conditions.

The study adds a new viewpoint on SCM by suggesting that not all collaboration and integration developments lead directly to improved performance.

The purpose of this paper is to present research work on systemic and cybernetic knowingness: relating according to classical and original concepts: “(a)symmetry” and “subtleness”. There is an entire project focused on contemporary complexity versus the information‐knowledge dynamics.

The starting point is related to the denominations: “perverse effects” and “asymmetric conflicts”. The paper supports innovative (a)symmetric approaches on human beings, ITC and community: shrinking the gap between humanist and technologist perspectives; promoting an anthropocentric perspective with stimuli from the real world expressed by (old and new) ideas regarding the (re)construction of a world/e‐world balance through/within the triad: production, intelligence and morality; and illustrating a positive e‐world response by sketching innovative, synergy‐based, experimental ITC models, considering metaphors linked to the idea of an open definition of subtleness.

The paper finds a shrinking gap between our world and our e‐world, able to integrate biased perspectives and realising a composition of (a)symmetric matter within information/knowledge economy/society. Based on semantic transfer, there is a promising path to a creative partnership between humanists and technologists within the interactive modelling: connectedness‐communication versus incursion‐anticipation. From a knowledge engineering perspective, a solution can be reached more effectively by: a Wienerian view on the information and knowledge as (a)symmetric concepts/constructs – and a dually Göedelian view on the observability and controllability of a subtle entity/system toward a wisdom and/or consciousness society.

This paper provides information and knowledge on “information‐knowledge dynamics” research.

The high uncertainty of technological innovation in megaprojects brings great challenges to the R&D institution and also acts as a trigger for moral hazard. The incentive and supervision are effective means to improve the performance of innovation. The purpose of this paper is to propose appropriate incentive and supervision mechanisms to reduce information asymmetry and improve the efficiency of incentives. Suggestions on technological innovation are put forward to megaprojects management.

According to the principal-agent theory, the research develops incentive models under three states, i.e. information symmetry, information asymmetry and information asymmetry based on supervision mechanism. The Bayesian theory is employed to prove the effectiveness of the novel supervision method based on risk assessment.

The results indicate that under the information asymmetry, the incentive intensity is positively correlated with the social benefits coefficient, and negatively correlated with the patent benefits coefficient. The R&D effort and the owner's incentive intensity decline with the increase of information asymmetry. The supervision of risks can effectively reduce the degree of information asymmetry, and the higher the uncertainty of innovations, the more significant the effect of supervision is. As the supervision intensity increases, the incentive intensity, the R&D effort and the innovation output will increase. In addition, the R&D institutions with high innovation capability, low unit cost of R&D and low risk-aversion are more willing to make efforts to innovate.

This study fills the research gap on incentive and supervision of technological innovation in megaprojects. The externality of innovation benefits is considered in the model. The traditional incentive model is extended through the introduction of supervision. Furthermore, a novel supervision method based on risk assessment is proposed. The results validate the importance of risk management in technological innovation and provide a new insight for project management.

This paper seeks to link conflict and mediation theory to practice using an asymmetry framework. Past conflict research often assumes that conflict parties perceive the same amount of conflict, neglecting that members may have different perceptions.

This study conducted surveys and interviews with 30 conflict parties involved in mediation and examined the effects of asymmetry of parties' perceptions of task and relationship conflict on absenteeism, motivation, and satisfaction with the mediation. In addition, mediator bias was considered as another asymmetry variable that influences mediation success.

Using quantitative and qualitative data it was found that these perceived asymmetries were negatively associated with work motivation and satisfaction, and positively associated with absenteeism.

Recommendations for mediators and organizations are provided.

The purpose of this paper is to comment on Peter Ping Li’s understanding of Zhong-Yong balancing, presented in his article titled “Global implications of the indigenous epistemological system from the East: How to apply Yin-Yang balancing to paradox management.” Seeing his understanding of Zhong-Yong balancing being incorrect and incomplete, the author proposes an alternative perspective on Zhong-Yong as dynamic balancing between Yin-Yang opposites.

The author first explain why Peter P. Li’s “asymmetry” and “superiority” arguments are flawed by referring to the original text of the classical book of Zhong-Yong (中庸) and a comparison between Zhong-Yong and Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. The author then propose an alternative approach to Zhong-Yong balancing that is embedded in the original text Zhong-Yong but somehow has been neglected by many Chinese scholars. The author concludes the commentary by unifying the two alternative approaches to Zhong-Yong balancing under the inclusion-selection-promotion-transition (ISPT) framework of Zhong-Yong balancing.

There are three main findings. First, as the original text of Zhong-Yong does not prescribe asymmetry, Peter P. Li’s notion of “Yin-Yang balancing” is ironically unbalanced or anti-Zhong-Yong due to his emphasis on asymmetry to the exclusion of symmetry. Second, due to the equivalency between Zhong-Yong and Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, Peter P. Li’s assertion that “Yin-Yang balancing” is superior as a solution to paradox management is flawed. Third, his “Yin-Yang balancing” solution is only (the less sophisticated) one of two alternative approaches to Zhong-Yong balancing, i.e., ratio-based combination of Yin-Yang opposites. What Peter P. Li and many other Chinese have neglected is another approach to Zhong-Yong that is embedded in the original text of Zhong-Yong, which I call “analysis plus synthesis.”

As it is a commentary there are no specific limitations except for what can be covered in the space available.

The “analysis plus synthesis” approach to Zhong-Yong can be adopted by practitioners who are demanded to balance between opposite forces in daily life and work.

The rejection of the “Yin-Yang balancing being superior” assertion facilitates reduction of friction and non-cooperation between intellectual traditions.

This commentary contributes to the “West meets East” discourse by debunking Peter P. Li’s assertion that Yin-Yang balancing is superior as a solution to paradox management and his prescription that balancing between Yin-Yang opposites must be asymmetric. It also contributes to the Chinese indigenous management research by identifying a largely neglected approach to Zhong-Yong balancing (i.e. “analysis plus synthesis”) that is alternative to the commonly understood ratio-based combination approach (e.g. “Yin-Yang balancing”). In addition, it contributes to the management literature by proposing the ISPT framework of Zhong-Yong balancing.

This paper aims to model the relationship between oil price and six major agricultural commodity prices using monthly data from January 1997 to December 2016.

The authors use both the linear autoregressive distributed lag by Pesaran et al. (2001) and the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag by Shin et al. (2014), and they also account for structural breaks using the Bai and Perron (2003) test that allows for multiple structural changes in regression models.

These findings are discernible from the authors’ analyses. First, the linear analysis indicates a significant positive effect of oil prices on the agricultural commodity prices, which supports evidence on the non-neutrality hypothesis. Second, oil price asymmetries seem to matter more when dealing with agricultural commodity prices, except for groundnut. Third, it may be necessary to pre-test for structural breaks when modelling the relationship between oil price and agricultural prices regardless of the commodity being analysed. Fourth, the asymmetric effect for the agricultural commodity prices is non-neutral to oil prices, except for rice in the case of structural breaks.

This paper contributes to the on-going debate on the oil–agricultural commodity nexus using the recent technique of asymmetry and also considering the role structural breaks play in the relationship between oil price and agricultural commodity prices.

The environmental management of supply chains has become increasingly relevant in the recent era. Extant research proposes two main forms of mechanisms – collaboration and evaluation – for environmental supply chain management. Despite the wide use of these mechanisms and the empirical insight into the fact that they could be adopted simultaneously, it is unknown if, and, at which levels, environmental collaboration (EC) and environmental evaluation (EE) could be complementary or substitutionary in nature. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to gain a clear understanding into the plural forms of these mechanisms.

The transaction cost economics and relational exchange theory are used to ground the research hypotheses. The results are based on survey data collected from 145 US manufacturing firms. The authors employ polynomial regression as well as the response surface methodology to test the proposed hypotheses.

The results suggest that EC and EE can have an intriguing effect depending on the outcome measure. Specifically, the authors find the effects in the economic and the environmental/social domains to be significantly different.

While scholars acknowledge that collaboration and evaluation could act as complements, extant research does not propose and test models that specifically capture complementary and substitutionary nature of these mechanisms. Accordingly, the study makes the first attempt to empirically test for the effects of the simultaneous pursuit of EC and EE.