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Purpose – This chapter introduces this book’s topics, purpose, and key themes. It summarizes the purpose of the book which is to explore through both descriptive and conceptual means the use of power by institutional investors in bringing about changes to corporate behavior, so that corporations engage in improved environmental, social, and governance actions.

Methodology/approach – This chapter reviews literature and chapters and offers conceptual development.

Findings – The forces driving the actions of institutional investors are different from many other shareholders being determined by a unique set of costs, benefits, and objectives. As such three general categories of institutional elements constrain and guide this behavior: regulative elements which include constitutions, laws, and property rights; normative elements which include informal norms, values, and codes of conduct; and cultural-cognitive elements which include shared beliefs, identities, and mental models. It highlights the role of regulation and “soft” law, the impact of values and customs, and the way sense-making and cognition impacts on decisions and actions.

Practical/social implications – The chapter highlights the interplay between hard and soft law in progressing the agenda. It seems that hard law is a hygiene factor forming the base on which initial gains can be made in the application of institutional shareholder power. Moreover, the use of soft law such as the Global Reporting Initiative and the newly founded Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, institutional investors can gain improved disclosure of sustainability performance to incorporate into their investment decisions. Moreover, it highlights the gaps in the use of the power that exists. The movement is still emerging with the focus on corporate governance and environmental considerations primarily. There are still improvements to be made for institutional investors in the social aspects of the responsibility agenda as well in pushing companies to be more transparent, improve reporting, and engage in more long-term decision-making.

Originality/value – The chapter contributes to the debate on governance convergence between liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs). It is important to look beyond national characteristics alone and demonstrate that organizations, even though they are impacted by institutions, are not necessarily passive acceptors of their fate. Hence this chapter highlights that in expanding from a dyadic approach comparing LMEs and CMEs, the strategic choice of decision-makers, the power of the actors, and the processes used by institutional investors in changing corporate behavior are important considerations.

Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to explore the role and influence of Australian institutional investors in Australian company decision-making and performance; and in particular their role in monitoring companies’ ESG performance.

Approach – The research uses interviews of a range of key executives in Australian companies and other bodies. Interviews were conducted in 2007–2008, 2009, and 2010 totaling 18 in number.

Findings – The data finds that institutional investors priortise engagement rather than exiting the market and this engagement tends to occur through discussion, behind-the-scenes, and covertly. This engagement is primarily focused on governance issues such as succession planning and remuneration, secondly on environmental considerations and thirdly on occupational, health, and safety (O, H, & S). There is evidence of engagement with supply chain issues which signals the importance of social risks becoming more important.

Research implications – From this work further research is highlighted, namely to conduct through qualitative methods a broader survey of the range of Australian institutional investors and companies to investigate the range of factors that investors take into account, their methods of engagement and the effect on company decision-making and ESG performance.

Value – The chapter concludes that the power of institutional investors is recognized and the evidence presented here points to scope for investors through their fund managers and their own actions to be more active and in the future to use their power in a more transparent manner.