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A supply chain is two or more parties linked by a flow of goods, information, and funds. When one or more parties of the supply chain try to optimize their own profits, system performance may be hurt. Supply chain contract is a coordination mechanism that provides incentives to all of its members so that the decentralized supply chain behaves nearly or exactly the same as the integrated one. We have seen a vast literature on supply chain contracts recently. However, little work has been done on the relationships of those supply chain contract models. In this paper, we provide a general framework that synthesizes existing results for a variety of supply chain contract forms.

We investigate the innovative supply chain contracts developed and implemented by Barilla, the leading Italian pasta company, in sourcing high-quality durum wheat from farmers in Northern Italy in the Emilia Romagna region.

Using case study techniques to gather information, we captured the evolution of the supply chain contracts adopted by Barilla. We gained information mainly through semi-structured interviews with Barilla’s managers, co-op and consortium managers representing farmers, Barilla’s quantitative data related to contracts’ elements and structure, preliminary experimental results, agri-business magazines, industry reports, and academic literature.

These contracts helped the company improve not only its long-term profits and strategic objectives such as supply security, but also the farmers’ income as well as environmental sustainability, thus providing triple bottom line benefits.

We investigate how Barilla and its suppliers – with the support of additional stakeholders, such as regional institutions – combine in their innovative contracts fixed and market-based prices as well as quality and sustainability-based premiums for desired triple bottom line benefits.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of greening and promotional effort dependent stochastic market demand on the remanufacturer's and the collector's profits when the quality of used products for remanufacturing is uncertain in a reverse supply chain.

The proposed model is developed to obtain optimal profits for the remanufacturer, the collector and the whole supply chain. Both the centralized and decentralized scenarios are considered. To motivate the collector through profit enhancement, the remanufacturer designs a cost-sharing contract. Through numerical examples and sensitivity analysis, the consequences of greenness and promotional effort on optimal profits are investigated.

The results show that the remanufacturer gets benefited from greening and promotional effort enhancement. However, a higher value of minimum acceptable quality level decreases the profits of the manufacturer and the collector. A cost-sharing contract coordinates the supply chain and improves the remanufacturer's and the collector's profits. Besides green innovation, remanufacturing mitigates the harmful effects of waste in the environment.

Two different viewpoints of remanufacturing are considered here – environmental sustainability and economic sustainability. This paper considers a reverse supply chain with a remanufacturer who remanufactures the used products collected by the collector. The quality of used products is uncertain, and customer demand is stochastic, green and promotional effort sensitive. These two types of uncertainty with green and promotional effort sensitive customer demand differs the current paper from the existing literature.

Fresh product loss rates in supply chain operations are particularly high due to the nature of perishable products. The purpose of this paper is to maximize profit through the contract between retailer and supplier. The optimized prices for the retailer and the supplier, taking the fresh-keeping effort into consideration, are derived.

To address this issue, the authors consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier (i.e. wholesaler) for two scenarios: centralized and decentralized decision making. The authors start from investigating the optimal decision in the centralized supply chain and then comparing the results with those of the decentralized decision. Meanwhile, a fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract and a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract are designed. Numerical examples are provided, and managerial insights are discussed at the end.

The results show that the centralized decision is more profitable than the decentralized decision; a fresh product supply chain (FPSC) can only be coordinated through a fresh-keeping cost- and revenue-sharing contract; the optimal retail price, wholesale price and fresh-keeping effort can all be achieved; and the profit of a FPSC is positively related to consumers’ sensitivity to freshness and negatively correlated with their sensitivity to price.

This research is based on the assumption that demand is relatively stable. It has not addressed when demand is stochastic.

The findings would be useful for managers in fresh food sector in terms of how to deal with suppliers in order to maximize total profit while also provide freshest food to the customers.

Few studies have considered fresh-keeping effort as a decision variable in the modelling of supply chain. In this paper, a mathematical model for the fresh-keeping effort and for price decisions in a supply chain is developed. In particular, fresh-keeping cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract are examined simultaneously in the study of the supply chain coordination problem.

Long-term contract is an important developing direction of China's coal industry coordination. This paper aims to discuss how to use contract for difference (CFD) to avoid risk and effectively increase the benefit of both coal and thermal power plants in the coal-electricity supply chain.

Based on prospect theory, this paper takes the risks and benefits of the coal and coal-fired power plants in the coal supply chain under CFD into balanced consideration to construct the contract coordination mechanism. In this mechanism, the coal demand in the coal supply chain equilibrium under centralized decision-making is regarded as the total annual volume of transactions needed to design the contract coordination mechanism and solve double marginalization. Then, based on prospect theory, in the construction of CFD, this paper takes the income of power and coal enterprises when they are in equilibrium under Stackelberg non-cooperative game as the reference point. In addition, considering that coal demand is a random variable, the CFD with a one-year trading session can be designed.

The research derives the coal price of the contract for difference, contract trading volume and its proportion of the total trading volume. A numerical example shows that the model above can be used to effectively avoid the risk of both coal and electricity sides.

To solve the conflict between coal enterprises and thermal power plants, let the coal-electricity supply chain be converted from non-cooperative game to cooperative game. Based on the prospect theory, this paper takes the income of the non-cooperative game of coal and thermal power plants as a reference point and considers how to design the coordination mechanism, the contract for difference, so as to make the two parties cooperate to solve the double marginal utility of the non-cooperative game in a chain supply. The main innovation of the work lies in the following: first, the coal demand when the coal-electrical supply chain is in balance under centralized decision-making is taken as the total annual trading volume needed to design the contract coordination mechanism and solve double marginalization. Second, based on prospect theory, in the construction of CFD, the benefits of coal-fired power plants and coal enterprises when both sides are in equilibrium under the Stackelberg non-cooperative game are taken as the reference points, and coal demand is taken as a random variable to design the CFD with a one-year transaction period. The price of coal that is not traded through CFD is calculated according to the daily market price. Third, this paper proposes the prospect M-V criterion of the risk-benefit equilibrium of both power and coal enterprises, which means that the risk-benefit equilibrium of both sides is the prospect variance effect of both sides relative to the reference point benefit divided by the prospect expectation effect.

A lack of visibility into the manufacturer’s production cost information impedes a retailer’s ability to maximize her own profits, especially when market demand is uncertain. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the use of an option contract within a one-period two-echelon supply chain in the presence of asymmetric cost information.

Based on the principal-agent model, the retailer, acting as a Stackelberg leader, offers a menu of option contracts to mitigate the risk of uncertain demand and reveal asymmetric production cost information. The optimal contract in asymmetric and symmetric information scenarios is derived. Finally, the impact of production costs on the optimal contracts and the actors’ profits is explored by numerical experiments.

By comparing the optimal equilibrium solutions in two scenarios, the authors show that asymmetric cost information has a large impact on the optimal option contract and profits. In addition, information rent is affected by the type differential. The results prove that the level of information asymmetry plays a vital role in option contracts and profits.

Different from the existing literature on private demand information, this paper considers a supply chain with asymmetric cost information in the context of option contracts. Interestingly, not only the production cost but also the probability of a low production cost can affect the option strike price. In addition, from the perspective of the manufacturer, a high cost does not always bring a high information rent. These findings can provide some guidance to decision-makers.

This study investigates information quality, information security technology and information sharing with moderation by information security culture and information leakage and how they all play out to influence supply chain performance for contract suppliers (Contract), noncontract suppliers (Noncontract) and pooled suppliers (Contract and Noncontract combined).

Multigroup analysis was deployed to compare the impact on Contract and Noncontract.

The finding on pooled suppliers confirmed the hypothesis that, in the multigroup analysis, information security culture negatively impacted the information quality–information sharing relationship of Contract.

The practical learning point is that Noncontract could still share information and perform and in some instances better than Contract. Noncontract suppliers are still workable.

Information security culture motivated Noncontract to share and perform better than Contract. This result presents a dilemma.

The aim of this paper is to study the influence of quality standards on contract arrangements in food supply chains.

A qualitative double case study was conducted on the dairy and citrus sectors in Uruguay. A transaction cost theoretical framework was used. All current public and private quality standards applied by processors were studied in relation to contract arrangements between processors and upstream producers as well as downstream buyers for each sector.

Quality standards complement contract arrangements for upstream transactions, leading to hierarchy-type contract arrangements. Quality standards substitute contract arrangements for downstream transactions, leading to market- or hybrid-type contract arrangements.

Longitudinal studies that measure changes in contract arrangements over time are recommended.

Supply chain actors can reduce transaction costs by aligning quality standards with appropriate contract arrangements – further supported by public instruments.

Quality standards have differential influence on underlying transaction characteristics, and therefore on contract arrangements, depending on the location of the transaction in the supply chain.

This paper aims to investigate that how to mitigate the weaker party's risk perception in imbalanced supply chain relationships by framing contracts according to complexity and recurrence. The level of information technology (IT) integration is considered as the moderator influencing the effectuation of contract framing.

The authors conducted a questionnaire survey with 229 firms involved in imbalanced supply chains. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses.

The authors found contractual complexity positively influenced performance and relational risk, while contractual recurrence negatively impacted performance and relational risk. This study further reveals the positive moderating effect of IT integration in influencing contractual complexity on relational risk and performance risk and the negative impact of IT integration in influencing contractual recurrence on relational risk and performance risk.

Overall, this study posits the coordinating role of contracts in reducing the weaker party's risk perception in imbalanced supply chain relationships.

The authors concluded by illustrating how to customize contracts based on the level of IT integration to maximize their role in reducing risk perception.

This study is embedded in imbalanced supply chain relationship, aiming to solve the problem of high-risk perception held by the weaker party, which is a salient threat to the sustainability of collaboration. Contract framing is proposed as an effective approach for mitigating risk perception, which should be carefully designed based on the level of IT integration of the relationship. The authors found that contractual complexity has a positive influence on performance and relational risk, but contractual recurrence has a negative impact on performance and relational risk. This study further reveals the moderating effect of IT integration on the effectuation of contractual framing.

In the hybrid electricity market consisting of renewable and conventional energy, the generation output of renewable power is uncertain because of its intermittency, and the power market demand is also fluctuant. Meanwhile, there is fierce competition among power producers in the power supply market and retailers in the demand market after deregulation, which increases the difficulty of renewable energy power grid-connection. To promote grid-connection of renewable energy power in the hybrid electricity market, the authors construct different contract decision-making models in the “many-to-many” hybrid power supply chain to explore the pricing strategy of renewable energy power grid-connecting.

Considering the dual-uncertainty of renewable energy power output and electricity market demand, the authors construct different decision-making models of wholesale price contract and revenue-sharing contract to compare and optimize grid-connecting pricing, respectively, to maximize the profits of different participants in the hybrid power supply chain. Besides, the authors set different parameters in the models to explore the influence of competition intensity, government subsidies, etc. on power pricing. Then, a numerical simulation is carried out, they verify the existence of the equilibrium solutions satisfying the supply chain coordination, compare the differences of pricing contracts and further analyze the variation characteristics of optimal contract parameters and their interaction relations.

Revenue-sharing contract can increase the quantity of green power grid-connection and realize benefits Pareto improvement of all parties in hybrid power supply chain. The competition intensity both of power supply and demand market will have an impact on the sharing ratio, and the increase of competition intensity results in a reduction of power supply chain coordination pressure. The power contract price, spot price and selling price have all been reduced with the increase of the sharing ratio, and the price of renewable power is more sensitive to the ratio change. The sharing ratio shows a downward trend with the increase of government green power subsidies.

On the basis of expanding the definition of hybrid power market and the theory of newsvendor model, considering the dual-uncertainty of green power generation output and electricity market demand, this paper builds and compares different contract decision-making models to study the grid-connection pricing strategy of renewable energy power. And as an extension of supply chain structure types and management, the authors build a “many-to-many” power supply chain structure model and analyze the impact of competition intensity among power enterprises and the government subsidy on the power grid-connecting pricing.