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This study aims to examine the effect of supplier monitoring on procurement performance in the Tanzanian public sector, as well as how contract management difficulty moderates the effect of supplier monitoring on procurement performance.

In this paper cross-sectional data were collected from 179 Tanzanian public procuring organizations using a structured survey questionnaire. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and the PROCESS macro were used to analyse the collected data.

Supplier monitoring has a positive and significant relationship with procurement performance in terms of cost reduction, lead times and buyer satisfaction. Furthermore, contract management difficulty has a negative moderating effect on the relationships between supplier monitoring and procurement performance dimensions.

Because public procurement is governed by laws and procedures, generalization of results should be done with caution. This is because the study is currently limited to Tanzanian public procurement. Apart from contract management difficulty, future research can look at other factors that may be needed to moderate the link between supplier monitoring and procurement performance.

Procurement practitioners must monitor major suppliers’ timeliness, product quality and order accuracy in order to improve procurement performance. Furthermore, proper contract management is required, which necessitates effectively reinforcing procurement contract managers’ responsibilities and providing contract management training for practitioners in order to control anomalies when suppliers and contracts are involved.

By adding a moderating variable, the study adds to the literature on supplier monitoring in public procurement and the on-going debate on supplier monitoring and performance.

What are the performance implications of peer monitoring in a multiple-supplier context? Grounded in agency and social exchange theories, this study aims to examine how, when, and why peer monitoring works as a crucial control mechanism to reduce opportunism among suppliers.

A conceptual model and research hypotheses are tested using survey data from 246 respondents in 82 supplier groups.

Results suggest that peer monitoring is related positively to perceived deterrence (as mediator) and negatively to opportunism, whereas the mediated relationship is moderated negatively by generalized reciprocity and positively by balanced reciprocity and negative reciprocity.

This study introduces the application of peer monitoring into business-to-business research and shows how it reduces opportunism. Its findings have implications for manufacturers on how to use peer monitoring to control opportunism among multiple suppliers.

Firms are increasingly being pressured by the public, regulators and customers to ensure that their suppliers behave in a socially and ecologically sound manner. Yet, the complexity and risks embedded in many supply chains makes this challenging, with monitoring practices offering one means to attenuate supply sustainability risk. Drawing on agency theory, the purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between sustainability and operations risk, supplier sustainability monitoring practices, supply improvement initiatives and firm performance.

This research uses data from a survey and archival sources from a sample of large US firms to empirically examine the relationship between sustainability and operations risk, supplier sustainability monitoring practices, supply improvement initiatives and firm performance.

Findings indicate that higher levels of perceived sustainability risk is related to greater monitoring of supplier sustainability practices by focal firms. Perceptions of higher operations risk are indirectly related to greater social monitoring through investment in supply improvement initiatives. Monitoring of supplier sustainability practices is also found to have a positive effect on focal firm performance.

Findings suggest that managers process operations risks and sustainability risks independently. Greater sustainability risk leads to increased sustainability monitoring, while greater operations risk leads to increased investment in supply improvement initiatives, which in turn leads to increased social monitoring. The research also indicates that behavior-oriented approaches, such as monitoring of supplier environmental and social practices, are an effective approach to improving firm sustainability performance. However, due to resource constraints, a challenge for supply chain managers is where and when to invest in behavior-oriented approaches for suppliers.

This research advances supply risk literature by exploring the effects of supply sustainability risk on the use of monitoring practices to manage supplier environmental and social behavior. Using a combination of survey and archival data to independently assess the implications of sustainability monitoring practices on firm sustainability performance, this study provides a methodology for evaluating the impact of sustainability monitoring practices on the triple bottom line in supply chain management.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of monitoring and mentoring strategies on sustainability diffusion within supply networks through focal companies and how suppliers engage in implementing these strategies.

The paper reports on three in-depth case studies conducted with focal companies and their suppliers. An interaction approach was adopted to guide the analysis of focal companies’ strategies for implementing and diffusing sustainability in supply networks.

The monitoring strategy impacts sustainability diffusion at the dyadic level, while the mentoring strategy is a prerequisite for the diffusion of sustainability at the supply network level. The findings suggest that coupling monitoring with mentoring can lead to diffusion beyond first-tier suppliers. Interaction intensity, supplier proactiveness and mindset change facilitate sustainability diffusion in supply networks.

The authors suggest more research be conducted on specific practices within monitoring and mentoring, as some of these imply very different levels of commitment and interaction.

The paper suggests that in the future, companies will be increasingly called upon to adopt cooperative initiatives to enable the diffusion of sustainability in supply networks.

The contribution of the paper lies in its identification of the impacts of monitoring and mentoring strategies on the diffusion of sustainability in networks, revealing different supplier engagement in these strategies, which may foster or hinder sustainability diffusion.

The supply chain management literature and agency theory suggest that preventing supplier non-conformance—a supplier's failure to conform to the requirements of the buyer—requires monitoring supplier behavior. However, case studies collected to explore how buyers monitored suppliers revealed an unexpected empirical phenomenon. Some buyers believed they could prevent non-conformance by either trusting their suppliers or relying on a third party, without monitoring their behavior. The purpose of this article is to examine conditions when buyers should monitor supplier behavior to prevent non-conformance.

This article employs a mixed-method design by formulating an agent-based simulation grounded in the case-study findings and agency theory to reconcile observed unexpected behaviors with scholarly suggestions.

The simulation results indicate that buyers facing severe consequences from non-conformance should opt to monitor supplier behavior. Sourcing from trusted suppliers should only be reserved for buyers that lack competence and have a small number of carefully selected suppliers. Moreover, buyers facing minor consequences from non-conformance should generally favor sourcing from trusted suppliers over monitoring their behavior. The results also suggest that having a third-party involved in monitoring suppliers is an effective path to preventing non-conformance.

By combining a simulation with qualitative case studies, this article examines whether buyers were making appropriate decisions, thereby offering contributions to theory and practice that would not have been possible using either methodological approach alone.

Pressured by various stakeholder groups to improve the sustainability performance of their emerging economy suppliers, multinational firms continue to expand their supplier monitoring. Leveraging the strategy literature on alliances and the buyer-supplier relationship management literature, the authors propose that a buyer firm's efforts to proactively develop cultural sensitivity and operations cognizance to understand the operational culture and routines of its suppliers can ameliorate some shortcomings of supplier monitoring, thereby improving the performance of the buyer firm.

Using primary survey data from a sample of US manufacturing firms, combined with secondary data of supplier monitoring and financial performance, this research examines the relationship between supplier monitoring, cultural sensitivity, operations cognizance, and buyer firm performance.

Supplier monitoring was associated with positive but diminishing returns for financial and sustainability performance for the buyer. Second, increasing cultural sensitivity and operations cognizance for suppliers in emerging economies were associated with improved buyer performance. Finally, the synergistic use of supplier monitoring and operations cognizance was associated with improved buyer firm financial performance.

While the buyer-supplier relationship literature has mainly treated organizational differences between dyadic supply chain partners as exogenous to the context in which their relationship evolves, the authors posit that buyer firms' efforts to understand such differences can affect the value of buyer-directed interactions, such as supplier monitoring. This research adds to the theoretical understanding of the process of developing relational mechanisms with emerging economy suppliers. In particular, efforts of buyer firms to better understand the operational culture and routines of their suppliers can complement monitoring and are associated with a positive impact on performance.

Grounded in agency and clan theories, this study aims to examine how, when and why joint liability works as a control mechanism to reduce opportunism among tea supplier groups in China.

Survey data from 82 supplier groups (three respondents per group) were collected.

Joint liability is related positively to peer monitoring (as mediator) and negatively to opportunism, whereas the mediated relationship is moderated positively by group leaders’ perceived legitimate authority and negatively by reciprocity and shared norms.

Opportunism is operationalized as the use of illegal pesticides, the violation of manufacturer–supplier contractual agreements and joint liability, as suppliers’ liability of having the whole group’s seasonal production is rejected by the manufacturer if a single act of opportunism is detected in the group.

Our study demonstrates how and under what conditions the joint-liability mechanism is linked with the reduction of multi-suppliers’ opportunism. We pave the way for future applications of the control mechanism to fields related to inter-organizational governance. Most importantly, we apply Ouchi’s clan theory (1979, 1980) to conceptualize manufacturer–supplier and supplier–supplier relationships in China and provide first-hand evidence to validate its applicability and generalizability to the context. The study also offers insights on network influences in inter-organizational relationships (Gu et al., 2010; Wathne and Heide, 2004) and confirms the important roles of network factors in inter-organizational relationships. In particular, peer monitoring operates as a mediator and normative factors operate as facilitators (moderators) for the joint liability to work as a mechanism to control opportunism in this relationship context.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the complex interrelationships among environmental drivers, Green Supply Chain Management (GSCM) approaches and performance.

A survey was sent to a sample of managers in the field of Purchasing and Supply Management in Spanish firms. Data were analysed using SmartPLS 2.0 to test a model that relates GSCM drivers, GSCM approaches and performance.

Results show that coercive and non-coercive drivers have different implications in terms of GSCM approaches. Moreover, monitoring itself is not sufficient to improve performance; firms need to adopt collaborative practices with their suppliers. Results show that whereas collaboration has a direct effect on performance, monitoring has only an indirect relationship through collaboration.

One of the main limitations of this study is the use of data from a single country (Spain). The main contribution of the paper is to show that coercive and non-coercive drivers have different effects on the GSCM approaches. Additionally, it quantifies the mediating effect of collaboration on the relationship between monitoring and environmental performance. As further research, the authors suggest the replication of this study in other countries (notably in emerging markets) and industrial sectors.

This study provides guidance to managers in the implementation of specific approaches of GSCM. For example, it shows that monitoring alone has no direct effect on performance whereas joint collaborative initiatives with suppliers have a significant effect on environmental performance.

This study analyses the implications in terms of drivers and performance for each GSCM approach (monitoring and collaboration), using a quantitative approach.

This study aims to examine the role of supplier selection and supplier monitoring in public procurement efficiency in terms of cost reduction in Tanzania.

A structured questionnaire was used to collect cross-sectional survey data from 179 public procuring entities in Tanzania. Structural equation modelling (SEM) was used to analyse the collected data.

The findings revealed that supplier selection and supplier monitoring are positive and significant predictors of public procurement efficiency in terms of cost reduction.

This study was conducted in Tanzanian public procurement contexts, so generalisations should be made with caution. Also, this study collected cross-sectional data; other studies may consider longitudinal data.

This study provides procurement practitioners with insights into selecting the proper suppliers and embracing supplier monitoring to achieve procurement efficiency in terms of cost reduction.

This study examines the effects of supplier selection and supplier monitoring on procurement cost reduction as a measure of public procurement efficiency in the Tanzanian context. Consequently, it provides empirical evidence of supplier management practices in the public procurement context.

The article seeks to explain the impact of the adoption of control mechanisms by a manufacturer as a safeguard against the betrayal of trust, which could consequently have performance implications for its relationship with its supplier.

This study was conducted within the context of the relationship between a manufacturer and its major supplier and the framework was tested by survey data collected from 174 manufacturers. LISREL was used in the testing of the hypotheses.

This study reflects that a manufacturer may reduce the risk associated with trusting its suppliers by either monitoring them directly or adopting the norm of information sharing. Alternatively, it could seek to reduce risk by adopting both types of control mechanism simultaneously. Conversely, the results of this study indicate that control mechanisms, when used individually, are not effective in increasing supplier performance. However, when used in combination as plural control mechanisms, increased supplier performance can be attained.

A high level of trust placed in an exchange partner does not necessarily ensure greater success of the relationship. What this means is that firms cannot take performance for granted where trust plays a key role within the professional relationship. Therefore, firms still need to put mechanisms in place to ensure that, in the event of betrayal, their assets are protected. Among the different types of control mechanisms, the plural control mechanism results in enhanced supplier performance.

This study uses factual performance data but does not use perceptual performance measures. The ideal way to measure channel performance is to measure both perceptual and factual performance data to increase reliability.

There has been little research on control mechanisms that guarantee the protection of the trustor. This study clarifies which control mechanisms manufacturers rely on to protect themselves from breach of trust, and investigates the effects of control mechanisms on supplier performance when used as a safeguard against the betrayal of trust.