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“Tell me the price and I’ll tell you the terms,” is a common axiom among early-stage investors. Investors and seasoned entrepreneurs know that the overall company value is only the half of the valuation story. Investors frequently insist on receiving securities beyond common stock in return for capital financing. Such securities may be convertible debt, or, frequently, preferred shares.

The classic approach to valuing preferred stock as debt frequently understates the value of preferred shares and, accordingly, overvalues the value of common stock. Aside from preferential liquidation rights and dividends, preferred stock frequently carries conversion rights, participation features, antidilution rights, and other enhancements that are designed to give more return to preferred shareholders at the expense of the common shareholders (who are frequently the founders). Preferred share investment terms are so flexible that they can be engineered to completely negate the perceived benefits of a high valuation to incumbent shareholders, and shift the return to the entering, preferred shareholders.

More sophisticated methodologies for allocating equity value among various classes of shareholders are becoming more common in the accounting and regulatory communities, resulting in more robust and credible value conclusions. Such methodologies are discussed in this chapter using specific examples. These methodologies are also expected to eventually propagate to the investment community because of the economic and financial foundations are quite sound. Although some of these techniques are, admittedly, complex, an understanding of early-stage venture valuation is incomplete without, at least, a high-level understanding of such techniques.

In this chapter we investigate the role of family-specific factors in facilitating or constraining business exit in family firms. Family business literature seems to have an implicit bias toward continuity and persistence in the founder's business. This is explained by heavy emotional involvement and development of path-dependent core competences over generations. However, several long-lived family firms were able to successfully exit the founder's business. Exit allowed them to free significant strategic resources, which were later reinvested in exploiting novel entrepreneurial opportunities. Our aim is to investigate the process of exit from the founder's business in family firms, to explain both triggers and obstacles to decommitment and de-escalation. We address this issue through the study of the Italian Falck Group's exit from the steel industry in the 1990s, followed by successful startup of a renewable energy business. By carefully triangulating different data sources and different voices within and outside the controlling family, we develop a framework describing family-specific facilitators and inhibitors of business exit, and subsequent startup of a new business. Three types of family-specific factors emerge as relevant in shaping a family firm's likelihood and speed of exit from a failing business: family-related psychological triggers and obstacles to business exit; family-specific components of the structural de-escalation context; family responses to ensuing de-escalation and exit needs. The emerging framework offers a more nuanced interpretation of decommitment activities in family firms, pointing to the differential role family-specific factors may play as facilitators or inhibitors of business exit. We also suggest how these family-specific results may contribute to a deeper understanding of exit in nonfamily firms. Our results also have practical implications for family business entrepreneurial management. Actively managing the different determinants of exit choices that emerged from our study will set the stage for de-escalation from a failing course of action – a dynamic capability all family firms should learn and practice if they intend to transfer their entrepreneurial orientation to next generations.

We challenge the premise that the CEO's job is to keep the corporation alive and thriving at all costs and under all circumstances. We briefly review the differing normative views of strategic management theorists and organizational theorists about organizational inertia. We then develop an economic model of incumbent behavior in the face of challenger competition that accommodates complementary assets. The model predicts and describes conditions under which organizational inertia, as subsequent organizational failure, is optimal. We then extend the logic and propose that the failure of entrepreneurial firms does not necessarily imply the failure of entrepreneurs. We conclude with a call to study “exit” as a viable strategic option.

Venture capital’s role in clean energy (CE) technologies can be transformative in creating a sustainable society. Yet there are limitations on how far venture capitalists (VCs) can go in supporting these technologies. These limits exist because of the performance expectations of the main stakeholder group who hold VCs accountable. The financial backers of VCs expect an exceptional return on their investment, given the high level of risk they take on when they invest in unproven startups. This chapter explores the constraints that the financial obligations VCs have to their main backers put on their role in bringing about a more sustainable global society. It investigates VC firms’ responses to CE exits (initial public offerings (IPOs) and acquisitions) and shows how prior CE exits affect CE investment growth when we compare VCs exit records to that of their peers. This chapter demonstrates that VCs only increase CE investments when the cumulative number of exits substantially exceed that of their peers, while they decrease these investments when the cumulative number of their exits only moderately outpace that of their peers. The chapter suggests that the reason VCs respond in this way is the financial pressure VCs experience because of their dependence on their financial backers.

This study empirically examines how firms manage real options over time in the context of the U.S. venture capital industry. It tracks the venture-capital funding histories of U.S. portfolio companies founded during 1989–1993, and their outcomes, until 2004. An examination of sequential investments suggests asymmetries in the management of successful and unsuccessful companies. Signals of a company's progress, such as the number of its patents, are significant predictors of VC investment practices in the case of successful companies, but not in the case of unsuccessful companies. In contrast, VC firm characteristics, such as experience in the company's industry, IPO experience, and geographic proximity, appear to explain variance in investment policies for unsuccessful companies, but not successful ones. This suggests that signals of progress are relatively easier to interpret when real options perform well over time, and investors can perhaps apply them equally effectively. In contrast, signals of failure are more ambiguous and complex; and firm-level differences are more pronounced in the management of unsuccessful options.

This chapter addresses the general process of determining the value of a particular company, with additional detail on how valuation processes might be adapted to produce credible value conclusions of emerging technology ventures. There are three primary approaches to business valuation. There is the income approach, which indicates that value is a product of expected future cash flows – cash flows that are discounted to equate them to dollars in-hand (present value). There is the market approach, which attempts to draw conclusions of value based on the market prices of similar companies in the public and/or private markets. Finally, there is the asset approach, which indicates that the value of a company is equal to the sum of the values of its net assets. Specific adjustments are appropriate with respect to each of these approaches where the value of an emerging technology company is concerned. Professional valuation standards require that all of these approaches be considered in the valuation, even if the available information does not permit their credible application. Often, multiple approaches and techniques can be applied. The results of applying multiple techniques often do not overlap, and it is the analyst’s very important task to reconcile differing valuation results, or to decide which result or results should be discarded.

We advance entrepreneurship research by developing a theoretical model of how founding teams form. Our neo-Carnegie model situates nascent founders in particular network-structural milieus, engaging in aspiration-driven search for and evaluation of prospective co-founders. The formation of co-founding ties between nascent founders can be divided into four theoretical steps, which we label activation, evaluation, approach, and reciprocation. Successful founding team formation is a consequence of mutually favorable evaluations by nascent founders in a multi-sided matching process. Nascent founders with higher and less flexible aspirations are more likely to undertake distant search for co-founders by seeking referrals, forming ties with strangers, and forming new ties to social foci where they might meet potential co-founders. Churn in newly formed founding teams emerges as a consequence of shifting dominant coalition dynamics in the founding team caused by organic venture evolution and intentional changes in strategic direction. Our theoretical model provides new insights on the formation pathways of founding teams, their initial task and relational resource endowments, and initial team dynamics.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a link between entrepreneurial activity on the one hand, and industry evolution and economic growth on the other. The role that entrepreneurship plays in innovative activity is explained. The link between entrepreneurship and industry evolution through the spillover of knowledge in generating entrepreneurial activity is analyzed. This implies that the relationship between entrepreneurship and growth is identified. In particular, this paper finds that entrepreneurship generates a positive pulse in the evolution of industries in such a way that fosters economic growth.