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The managerial questions of this paper are as follows, and the authors are trying to solve them: How revenue sharing contract (CSR) degree and government subsidy affect the agri-food quality? What kind of model (WPC, revenue-sharing contract [RSC] and cooperative) would be more effective in motivating manufacturers and retailer to increase effort and improve agri-food quality? What kind of model (WPC, RSC and cooperative) would make manufacturer and retailer better off?

Considering the jointing quality effort and contract decision in green agri-food supply chain, this paper proposes six models that consider CSR of manufacturer and retailer, and then the obtained optimal solutions are compared and analyzed. At the same time, the impact of government subsidies is analyzed, and corresponding conclusions are drawn.

The results show that, first of all, whether the increasing CSR of the manufacturer or the retailer can motivate both parties to improve the agri-food quality effort investment. Second, the WPC and RSC contract may play different role in different cases. Finally, under the model with government subsidies, regarding positive influence of government subsidies on efforts of manufacturer and retailer, quality and profits of members is investigated. Based on these conclusions, this study puts forward the following policy suggestions. Firstly, governments should formulate reasonable subsidy policies to support manufacturer and retailer to improve the agri-food quality, thereby promoting green industries' development. Secondly, manufacturer and retailer should actively improve CSR and strengthen the effort of agri-food so as to advance quality. Finally, manufacturer and retailer can choose cooperative model or WPC contract.

In this paper, one manufacturer and one retailer are considered. Since the agri-food supply chain structure in reality is more complicated, the future research direction can consider the supply chain structure with one manufacturer and multiple retailers. In addition, this paper only considers the subsidy, and future research can classify the subsidy into different types.

The study makes two substantive contributions to the body of knowledge in the field of sustainable operations:(1) incorporating quality-based demand function in supply chain and dynamic process of agri-food quality; (2) exploring the impact of CSR awareness of members and subsidy of government on agri-food quality, and comparing the influence in different models.

One of the foremost objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the European Union (EU) is to increase agricultural productivity through subsidization of farmers. However, little empirical research has been done to examine the effect of subsidies on farm performance and, in particular, the channels through which subsidies affect productivity. Using a Bayesian hierarchical model in which input productivity, efficiency change, and technical change depend on subsidies and other factors, including farm location, we analyze empirically how subsidies affect the performance of farms. We use an unbalanced panel from the EU's Farm Accountancy Data Network on Danish, Finnish, and Swedish dairy farms and partition the data into eight regions. The data set covers the period 1997–2003 and has a total of 6,609 observations. The results suggest that subsidies drive productivity through efficiency and input productivities and the magnitudes of these effects differ across regions. In contrast to existing studies, we find that subsidies have a positive impact on technical efficiency. The contribution of subsidies to output is largest for dairy farms in Denmark and Southern, Central, and Northern Sweden.

In this paper, the authors study the production and pricing decisions of a remanufacturing supply chain composed of a supplier, an assembler and a remanufacturer, in which the remanufacturing of components requires patent licensing from the supplier.

The authors consider three different models with government subsidy for remanufacturing: (1) no government subsidies; (2) the government subsidizes the remanufacturing behavior of the supplier and (3) the government subsidizes the remanufacturing behavior of the remanufacturer and use the Stackelberg game model to solve and analyze the equilibrium wholesale prices of components and the equilibrium outputs of new and remanufactured products under three subsidy modes.

The results show that the equilibrium wholesale prices of two kinds of components decrease with the unit patent licensing fee and the unit government subsidy, and the equilibrium quantity of the remanufactured products under the three modes is obviously higher than that of the new products.

Finally through numerical simulation, it is found that the equilibrium profits of the supplier, the manufacturer and the supply chain increase monotonously in relation to the unit government subsidy, while the optimal profit of the assembler in relation to the unit government subsidy tends to decrease first and then increase.

Build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts are widely used in the construction and operation of charging piles for new energy vehicles worldwide and stipulate that governments grant charging pile operators franchises for a certain period of time to invest in the construction and operation of the charging piles. The charging piles are then transferred to governments when the concession expires. To encourage charging pile operators to build and operate charging piles, governments usually provide two kinds of subsidies, namely construction and operating subsidies.

The authors establish a typical game model to study the optimal BOT contract between a government and a charging pile operator and their preferences for the two kinds of subsidies.

First, the authors show that there are substitution and complementarity effects between the concession period and the subsidy level. Second, the operator prefers the construction subsidy (operating subsidy) when the additional operating cost is low (high). The government prefers the operating subsidy (construction subsidy) when consumer sensitivity to the number of charging piles is low (high) and the concession period is short or long (moderate). Finally, the adjusted joint subsidy can not only improve social welfare but also that the charging pile operator can obtain the same profit as under the operating subsidy at a lower subsidy amount.

This work develops the first analytical model to study two subsidies in the construction and operation of charging piles and investigate the optimal BOT contract and subsidy preferences. The insights are compelling not only for the charging pile operator but also for policymakers in practice from a circular economy perspective.

This paper aims to explore the effect of fairness concerns on supply chain members' optimal decisions and profits, to compare their profits under different policies, and to investigate the impact of each policy on members, consumers, and the environment with fairness concerns.

Considering government policies and fairness concerns in recycling management, this paper develops five recycling and remanufacturing decision models (anarchy policy model, reward-penalty mechanism model, recycling investment subsidies model, government tax model, and fund subsidy system model). In each model, the manufacturer and the online platform form the Stackelberg game. This research further discusses comprehensive environmental benefits and consumer surplus under five scenarios.

First, the fairness concerns of the online platform inhibit the recovery rate and supply chain members' profit while increasing the platform's utility. Second, fairness concerns increase the profit gap between the manufacturer and online platform, and the higher the degree of fairness concerns, the greater the profit gap; however, the four policies reduce the profit gap. Finally, when there are fairness concerns, environmental taxes damage the interests of supply chain members and consumers, but are most beneficial to the environment; recycling investment subsidies are on the contrary; the fund subsidy system depends on the relative size of the treatment fund and the subsidy fund.

This paper provides useful insights on how to regulate government policy to improve supply chain management with fairness concerns.

This study aims to develop a Stackelberg Game Model for seeking the optimal subsidy plans with varying levels of government financial capability (GFC). Furthermore, the scenario-based analysis is conducted and will enable governments to identify a comprehensive subsidy plan as follows: improve project performance and optimise social welfare.

A Stackelberg Game Model is developed to optimise the effectiveness of subsidies on the performance of public-private partnerships (PPPs).

According to the scenarios that are generated from the model, governments that are confronting with limited public budgets could reduce the intensity of performance incentives and increase the participation-oriented subsidy. Whilst a participation-oriented subsidy can stimulate private organisations’ willingness to participate in infrastructure PPPs, a performance-oriented subsidy is capable of facilitating the projects’ performances. Intuitively, the performance-oriented subsidy enables the private entities of PPPs to improve their efforts on the projects to realise higher profits. However, the participation-oriented subsidy is unable to affect the level of their effort spent on the projects. To satisfy both parties’ expectations in a PPP, the performance-oriented subsidy needs to be prioritised for a purpose of enabling higher quality outputs.

The game model developed in this study contributes to the literature by offering new insight into the underlying mechanism of governments and private entities, in terms of their decision-making for subsidy planning and contributions (i.e. resource allocation and spending) during the life-cycle of PPPs. This research enriches the government subsidy model by revealing the effects of the GFC and clarifies the impacts of two different schemes of subsidy on the performance of PPPs.

The government has been conventionally viewed as being omnipotent to provide PPPs with a wide range of subsidies. However, the subsidies are not unlimited, due to GFC. In addressing this void, this study has modelled the impacts of government subsidy plans with a consideration of GFC-related constraints. The combined effects of the participation- and performance-oriented subsidies on the project performance of PPPs have been examined.

This paper aims to provide feasible business model options that benefit all stakeholders; the government, the investor and especially the inhabitants in Maluku and Papua, the less-favored business regions in Indonesia.

Three feasible business model options result from ICT for development literature, current role of the government, other models and investment scheme review, statistical analysis, technology analysis and investment simulations.

This paper proposes three different feasible business model options. The infrastructure subsidy model, which combines 20 per cent private investment and 80 per cent government subsidy, is the most feasible business model based on investment simulations. This model which combines 20 per cent private investment and 80 per cent government subsidy provides stronger determination of Indonesian Government for serving rural and remote people. The revenue subsidy and the mixed project subsidy are alternative models that may provide more attractive schemes from the standpoint of investors.

However, current paper has limitation which is subject to enhance for better analysis in future research such as implementation of the in-depth assessment of risk management system to deal with all exposed risks.

This paper provides that setting up a complete telecommunication access infrastructures in eastern Indonesia is feasible under new proposed models.

The new proposed models provide stronger determination of Indonesian Government for serving rural and remote people and minimizing the digital divide in eastern area.

Under the new proposed models, the role and capacity of the government is adjusted. The government should dominate and be less dependent on private investment. Also, the government should shift from triggering service penetration into developing a complete infrastructure set up.

This note sketches out the likely effects of a wage subsidy in a model of LDC which systematically incorporates an Informal sector. It is seen that the effects of a wage subsidy in this model differ considerably from those derived in the Harris‐Todaro‐type frameworks. Also, the ranking policies to improve welfare is likely to be considerably different in this model compared to this in the Harris‐Todaro‐type models.

Why are state business relations in Egypt characterized by widely acknowledged high levels of cronyism? The purpose of this paper is to investigate the institutional factors explaining this research question with a focus on pre-2011 Egypt.

Based on a general theoretical discussion, certain institutions were proposed as being responsible. A game theoretical model is then introduced. It explains why cronyism was the best strategy for various business players in contrast to aggregating and lobbying their efforts to obtain government available resources, whether these resources are energy subsidies, public banks’ credit or regulations. Then pre-2011 Egypt is discussed as a case study. This discussion is enriched by the available literature and empirical data.

Choosing cronyism was attributed to the presence of a weak and dependent private sector, where businesspeople are unable to aggregate their power; a relatively stronger government; poor governance performance; higher levels of regime legitimization practices, such as providing generous consumer subsidies; and economic growth caused by an increase in resources rather than by governance institutional improvement. A discussion of the available literature and empirical data on pre-2011 Egypt, going over the various proposed institutional factors, helped to support these arguments.

Further empirical evidence is needed to support and modify the suggestions of this paper. More detailed indicators would have further helped this research. Moreover, more case studies, other than the case of pre-2011 Egypt, are also needed. It is hoped that this paper would encourage further research endeavors that would cover these limitations.

Governance institutional reform is needed to minimize cronyism, especially institutions such as voice and accountability, rule of law, regulatory quality and control of corruption.

This paper can explain why high levels of cronyism are witnessed in many countries of the world, including the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The region shares many institutional factors with Egypt. Governments in the MENA region have various sources of power with regard to their dependent private sectors added to the general poor performance in various governance indicators in the region.

The deep analysis conducted in this paper for the causes of Cronyism in Egypt has not been done elsewhere. This is also true for the whole MENA region. The introduced theoretical model is the first trial of this sort and should be important for future works on this topic in the MENA region and developing countries.

This paper aims to analyse the Chilean housing policy from a human rights perspective. The work is based on the framework to study socio, economic and social rights as human rights developed by the current special rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights to describe the steps undertaken by the Chilean State in terms of recognition, institutionalisation and accountability of the right to adequate housing.

First, the authors describe the different levels of legal recognition of the right and the lack of constitutional and legislative recognition in the different levels of the Chilean Legal System. Second, they analyse the Chilean Housing Policy and the institutionalisation of the different elements that compose the right to adequate housing, describing and critically reviewing the Chilean housing policy in the past 30 years. The final section analyses the accountability of such policy, taking into consideration the developments of international and regional mechanisms and the processes of accountability lead by civil society and tribunals.

The paper concludes that a human rights perspective of the right to adequate housing with legal recognition could improve the accountability, the results and development of the Chilean housing policy.

The importance of this paper is both empirical and theoretical. Empirically, this paper adds to the current understanding of housing policies in Chile, aiming to complete the narrative of housing laws at the national level. Theoretically, this paper uses for the first time a recognition, institutionalisation and accountability human rights approach to analyse the Chilean housing policies and its loopholes at the national level.