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1 – 10 of 473
Article
Publication date: 15 October 2018

Ferdy Novianto, Sumartono, Irwan Noor and Lely Indah Mindarti

This paper aims to examine the effect of communication, resources, disposition and bureaucratic structure to the success of energy subsidy policy, to examine the effect of…

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Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to examine the effect of communication, resources, disposition and bureaucratic structure to the success of energy subsidy policy, to examine the effect of moderation of variable scenario of renewable energy policy on the influence of communication, resources, disposition and bureaucracy structure on the success of energy subsidy policy.

Design/methodology/approach

This study was purposively (based on specific objectives) conducted in Jakarta, which is associated with the implementation and subsidy policy scenario, the study focused on the center of government, namely, the capital city, Jakarta. Collection of data in this research survey was conducted in June-August 2017. The sampling technique was proportional stratified random sampling that took up most of the 770 members of Masyarakat Peduli Energi dan Lingkungan and Masyarakat Energi Terbarukan Indonesia using a representative sample of results that have the ability to be generalized. Based on the formula Slovin (Solimun and Fernandes, 2017), a sample of 145 respondents was obtained. The research approach used was a quantitative with the analysis tool called the generalized structure component analysis.

Findings

This paper exhibited that all relationships between variables have a p-value of 0.05 except the third moderation and fourth moderation relationship. So it can be said that all relationships between variables are significant except the relationship between the variables of moderation to the relationship between the disposition variable (X3) on the successful implementation of subsidy policy (Y) and the relationship between the moderation variable to the relationship between bureaucracy structure variable (X4) to the successful implementation of subsidy policy.

Originality/value

The originality of the research refers to the following: The Policy Theory described by Edwards III (1980), and reinforced by the findings of Ratminto and Winarsih (2005), and Bloom et al. (2009), that communication, resources, dispositions and bureaucratic structures affect the success of the energy subsidy policy. This becomes the formulation of a hypothesized research problem whether communication, resources, disposition and bureaucratic structure affect the success of the energy subsidy policy. In fact, the conditions in Indonesia are quite different from the Western world, and the system in Indonesia has embraced subsidies. Therefore, this study also examines the moderating effects of renewable energy policy scenarios in the relationship between communication, resources, dispositions and bureaucratic structures on the success of the subsidy policy energy. Given that there is no strong theory that examines the effects of moderation of these four factors on the success of the energy subsidy policy. Therefore, as the development of Edward III Theory, this study examines the proposition of whether renewable energy policy scenarios reinforce or weaken (moderation effects) on the effects of communication, resources, dispositions and bureaucratic structures on the success of energy subsidy policies.

Details

foresight, vol. 20 no. 5
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1463-6689

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 23 January 2024

Feng Chen, Suxiu Xu and Yue Zhai

Promoting electric vehicles (EVs) is an effective way to achieve carbon neutrality. If EVs are widely adopted, this will undoubtedly be good for the environment. The purpose of…

Abstract

Purpose

Promoting electric vehicles (EVs) is an effective way to achieve carbon neutrality. If EVs are widely adopted, this will undoubtedly be good for the environment. The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of network externalities and subsidy on the strategies of manufacturer under a carbon neutrality constraint.

Design/methodology/approach

In this paper, the authors propose a game-theoretic framework in an EVs supply chain consisting of a government, a manufacturer and a group of consumers. The authors examine two subsidy options and explain the choice of optimal strategies for government and manufacturer.

Findings

First, the authors find that the both network externalities of charging stations and government subsidy can promote the EV market. Second, under a relaxed carbon neutrality constraint, even if the government’s purchase subsidy investment is larger than the carbon emission reduction technology subsidy investment, the purchase subsidy policy is still optimal. Third, under a strict carbon neutrality constraint, when the cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction and the effectiveness of carbon emission reduction technology are larger, social welfare will instead decrease with the increase of the effectiveness of emission reduction technology and then, the manufacturer’s investment in carbon emission reduction technology is lower. In the extended model, the authors find the effectiveness of carbon emission reduction technology can also promote the EV market and social welfare (or consumer surplus) is the same whatever the subsidy strategy.

Practical implications

The network externalities of charging stations and the subsidy effect of the government have a superimposition effect on the promotion of EVs. When the network effect of charging stations is relatively strong, government can withdraw from the subsidized market. When the network effect of charging stations is relatively weak, government can intervene appropriately.

Originality/value

Comparing previous studies, this study reveals the impact of government intervention, network effects and carbon neutrality constraints on the EV supply chain. From a sustainability perspective, these insights are compelling for both EV manufacturers and policymakers.

Details

Kybernetes, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0368-492X

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 5 February 2018

Qing Liu, Senlin Zhao and Qinghua Zhu

The purpose of this paper is to extend game analysis to explore decision-making mechanisms for promoting a specific type of products, low energy consumption for individual one…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to extend game analysis to explore decision-making mechanisms for promoting a specific type of products, low energy consumption for individual one while the total energy consumption is huge due to the high quantity of sales, that is, low for individual and high for total (LIHT) in terms of energy consumption.

Design/methodology/approach

Game models are developed to compare decisions of optimal prices for newly developed and environmentally friendly (NDEF) and regular products as well as associated sales quantity, profits, carbon emissions under different governmental policies, along with a case of low energy-intensive broadband terminal products in the Chinese telecommunication industry under the carbon tax and subsidy policies.

Findings

For both NDEF and regular products, optimal prices decrease under the subsidy policy while both increase under the tax policy. Manufacturers’ decision of optimal prices is highly relevant with unit carbon tax/subsidy and the consumers’ preference. Both the tax and subsidy policies can improve consumption of NDEF products while the subsidy policy can be more effective at the current initial stage.

Research limitations/implications

This paper provides decision support for manufacturers to promote sustainable consumption of LIHT products. Research ideas on models development and solutions for optimal prices can be applied to other LIHT products.

Practical implications

The results provide insights for governments on how to effectively evaluate and motivate sustainable consumption for LIHT products.

Originality/value

This paper first explores how to motivate sustainable consumption of LIHT products by developing models, examining effectiveness of potential governmental policies as well as associated carbon emissions.

Details

Industrial Management & Data Systems, vol. 118 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0263-5577

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 2 March 2020

Xueping Zhen, Shuangshuang Xu, Dan Shi and Fangjun Liu

This study aims to explore the government’s subsidy preference and pricing decisions of a manufacturer who produces traditional and green product simultaneously under different…

Abstract

Purpose

This study aims to explore the government’s subsidy preference and pricing decisions of a manufacturer who produces traditional and green product simultaneously under different government subsidy policies.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors establish a model consisting of a government, a set of heterogeneous consumers and a manufacturer. Three government subsidy policies are investigated without government subsidy (NS), government subsidy to consumer (CS) and government subsidy to the manufacturer (MS).

Findings

The results show that the government subsidy can increase both the green product’s demand and the manufacturer’s profit. The subsidy level and government’s utility under the CS policy are equal to those under the MS policy. Furthermore, if the government’s subsidy level is exogenous, there exists a Pareto improvement region when social welfare for unit greenness level is high. That is, if the government’s subsidy level under the CS policy is higher than that under the MS policy, both government and manufacturer prefer the CS policy; otherwise, they prefer the MS policy.

Research limitations/implications

This paper considers the market where there is a monopoly green manufacturer and a government that only provides subsidy policy. In fact, competition from traditional manufacturers and carbon taxes are also worth exploring in future research.

Practical implications

This study provides some suggestions for government subsidy and provides guidance for the manufacturer’s pricing decisions under different government subsidy policies.

Originality/value

This paper is the first to compare government subsidy to consumer with a government subsidy to the manufacturer and investigate the pricing decisions of a manufacturer who produces traditional and green product simultaneously by considering an endogenous subsidy level of government.

Details

Nankai Business Review International, vol. 11 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 2040-8749

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 1 February 2013

Zesheng Sun and Shuyun Wang

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to expand the traditional economic effect analysis of export subsidy, which has previously ignored the incentive of export subsidies in…

1075

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to expand the traditional economic effect analysis of export subsidy, which has previously ignored the incentive of export subsidies in terms of competition from re‐importation.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper performs a comparative static analysis based on the traditional welfare analysis of export subsidies by introducing different transportation costs and using small country model and large country model, respectively.

Findings

Compared with the traditional analysis, exporting countries that implement export subsidies suffer less welfare loss and induce intra‐industry trade of homogeneous products. Due to export subsidy policy incentives, transportation costs heavily influence trade patterns, trade volumes and welfare. Trade patterns evolve from unidirectional export to intra‐industry trade as transportation costs are reduced, with the main source of welfare loss coming from transportation costs. The distribution of export subsidies is biased when domestic transportation costs are high. Under low domestic transportation costs, inefficient intra‐industry trade would emerge as a result of export subsidy incentive.

Practical implications

The findings could be helpful to understand the impact of export subsidy policy on trade pattern, trade volumes and welfare when considering international and domestic transportation cost.

Originality/value

The paper emphasizes the incentive of export subsidy on re‐importation, and links it with transportation costs, which expand the traditional export subsidy analysis.

Details

Journal of Chinese Economic and Foreign Trade Studies, vol. 6 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1754-4408

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 12 May 2020

Zhisong Chen, Shong-Iee Ivan Su and Huimin Wang

In the context of the trade war in full swing, the global supply chain systems have experienced a serious shock and become very vulnerable. The purpose of this paper is to explore…

Abstract

Purpose

In the context of the trade war in full swing, the global supply chain systems have experienced a serious shock and become very vulnerable. The purpose of this paper is to explore the intertwining effects between the export-supporting subsidy policy and the import-deterring tariff policy to develop better insights for trade policy-making under the intra-industry-trade (IIT) conflicts. The research results may provide the trade policy makers and international businesses with better insights in making rational trade policy and business decisions.

Design/methodology/approach

Two-stage game-/bargaining-theoretical models for the dual competing international supply chains with a unilateral/bilateral tariff imposing or subsidy implementing under six different scenarios of IIT conflict are developed, analyzed and compared. On this basis, the corresponding numerical analyses are conducted to assess the impact of the tariff and subsidy policies and derive the trade policy implications and business insights.

Findings

The research results indicate that: (1) the bilateral subsidy implementing from both governments is the best policy for all stakeholders in two countries, which would lead to the highest profits, social welfare and consumer surplus than those of the other scenarios; (2) the bilateral tariff imposing of both governments is the worst policy for all stakeholders in two countries, which would lead to the lowest profits, social welfare and consumer surplus than those of the other scenarios; (3) the fair trade scenario without tariff imposing and subsidy implementing turns out to be the second-best trade policy for the governments. Under the World Trade Organization rule and fair-trade principles, the bilateral subsidy policy is not allowed in most of the cases. Thus, adopting a fair-trade policy may be the most appropriate trade policy for two trading countries.

Originality/value

The modeling approach developed for this study is original and innovative due to the following characteristics. First, based on three trade policy alternatives – fair trade, tariff imposing and subsidy implementing – of two generic governments under IIT conflict, nine different combinations of three policy alternatives are defined. Second, excluding the symmetrical combinations, six IIT conflict scenarios under various tariff/subsidy policy pairs ranging from no conflict to high conflict are assumed for two dual competing international supply chains. Third, a novel two-stage game-/bargaining-theoretical modeling approach is applied to investigate the optimal/equilibrium decisions regarding pricing, ordering quantity and their critical economic outcomes for all possible trade policy scenarios. Fourth, this study lays down a research foundation for the future trade conflict study using a game-theoretical modeling approach.

Details

Journal of Modelling in Management, vol. 15 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1746-5664

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 10 April 2024

Ganesh Kumar and Jogendra Kumar Nayak

The adoption of residential rooftop solar panel systems (SPS) in India is at a nascent stage. Therefore, this study aimed to examine the factors affecting consumers’ intention to…

Abstract

Purpose

The adoption of residential rooftop solar panel systems (SPS) in India is at a nascent stage. Therefore, this study aimed to examine the factors affecting consumers’ intention to purchase SPS by expanding the theory of planned behavior (TPB) with three environmental psychology factors. The study was targeted at potential users’ intention to purchase SPS, thus it further explored the moderating role of perceived government subsidy policy (PGSP) in determining consumers’ purchase intention of SPS.

Design/methodology/approach

Using G*power software, the minimum sample size of 189 was calculated; accordingly, 292 valid responses were gathered from potential users of SPS from three Indian states, namely Rajasthan, Punjab and Haryana, via an online questionnaire survey with the help of purposive sampling method. Structural equation modeling technique of partial least squares was employed to analyze the data.

Findings

Results demonstrated that attitude, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE) and PGSP significantly influence purchase intention of SPS. Green trust and green self-identity did not influence the purchase intention of SPS. Further, PGSP strengthens the effect of attitude, green trust, PCE on purchase intention of SPS while it weakens the effect of subjective norms on purchase intention of SPS.

Originality/value

This study contributes to the existing literature by integrating green trust, green self-identity, PCE and PGSP into the TPB model to better understand factors affecting consumers’ purchase intention towards SPS in India.

Details

Built Environment Project and Asset Management, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 2044-124X

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 20 November 2023

Keqing Li, Xiaojia Wang, Changyong Liang and Wenxing Lu

The elderly service industry is emerging in China. The Chinese government introduced a series of policies to guide elderly service enterprises to improve their service quality…

68

Abstract

Purpose

The elderly service industry is emerging in China. The Chinese government introduced a series of policies to guide elderly service enterprises to improve their service quality. This study explores novel differentiated subsidy strategies that not only promote the improvement of service quality in elderly service enterprises but also alleviate the financial burden on the government.

Design/methodology/approach

Evolutionary game and Hotelling models are employed to investigate this issue. First, a Hotelling model that considers consumer word-of-mouth preferences is established. Subsequently, an evolutionary game model between local governments and enterprises is constructed, and the evolutionary stable strategies of both parties are analyzed. Finally, simulation experiments are conducted.

Findings

The findings indicate that local government decisions have a significant influence on the behavior of elderly service enterprises. Increasing the proportion of local governments opting for subsidy strategies helps incentivize elderly service enterprises to improve their service quality. Furthermore, providing differentiated subsidies based on the preferences of the customer base of elderly service enterprises can encourage service quality improvement while reducing government expenditure. The findings offer valuable insights into the design of government subsidy policies.

Originality/value

Compared with previous research, this study examines the role of consumer preferences in a differentiated subsidy policy. This enriches the authors’ understanding of the field by incorporating neglected aspects of consumer preferences in the context of the emerging elderly service industry.

Details

International Journal of Intelligent Computing and Cybernetics, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1756-378X

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 19 October 2022

Fariba Ramezani, Amir Arjomandi and Charles Harvie

As a by-product of the production process, emissions can follow output fluctuations. Hence, disregarding the relationship between economic fluctuations and emissions could result…

Abstract

Purpose

As a by-product of the production process, emissions can follow output fluctuations. Hence, disregarding the relationship between economic fluctuations and emissions could result in undesirable environmental outcomes. This study aims to investigate the environmental and economic effects of abatement subsidies on overall emissions during business cycles in Australia.

Design/methodology/approach

A real business cycle (RBC) model is devised and parameterised in this paper. RBC models have been recently introduced to environmental policy analysis, and this study contributes to the literature by investigating the effects of a potential subsidy policy in an RBC framework. The model is also calibrated and provides solutions for the Australian economy.

Findings

The authors find that under a steady-state situation, supporting abatement can result in reducing emissions by 6.45% while it imposes welfare costs to the economy (by 0.61%). Simulation results show that an optimal abatement policy should be pro-cyclical, with the abatement subsidy increasing during expansions and decreasing during recessions. As well, in a subsidy policy setting, emissions would react pro-cyclically, i.e. emissions increase (decrease) when the gross domestic product increases (decreases). The abatement reaction by firms, however, is different, because when a positive productivity shock occurs, firms reduce abatement and allocate resources to production. Nonetheless, as time passes, the increased subsidy provides a strong enough incentive to allocate resources to abatement and, subsequently, abatement increases.

Originality/value

This paper investigates how an emission reduction subsidy should be adapted to macroeconomic fluctuations so that it can limit variations in emissions.

Details

Studies in Economics and Finance, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1086-7376

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 15 February 2018

Kaiying Cao, Qiushi Bo and Yi He

This paper aims to study whether the recycling of a third party competes with the trade-in service of a manufacturer, and explores the optimal trade-in and third-party collection…

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to study whether the recycling of a third party competes with the trade-in service of a manufacturer, and explores the optimal trade-in and third-party collection authorization strategies for the manufacturer.

Design/methodology/approach

According to whether to authorize a third party to collect its used products, the manufacturer has two choices: one is not authorization (NA); the other is authorization (A). This paper uses profit-maximization model to investigate the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the third party under NA and A, respectively, and then explores which choice is better for the manufacturer.

Findings

It is observed that there is a competition between trade-in service and third-party recycling when the durability parameter of the used product is relatively small. Moreover, when the durability parameter of the used product is relatively large, A is always better choice for the manufacturer; otherwise, NA is a better choice except for the case that the unit trade-in subsidy is low and the salvage of the used product is high.

Practical implications

These results provide managerial insights for the manufacturer and the third party to make decisions in the field of recycling.

Originality/value

This paper is among the first papers to study the competition between trade-in program and third party’s collecting program under government’s trade-in subsidy policy. Moreover, this paper presents the conditions under which the manufacturer should authorize or not authorize the third party to collect its used products.

Details

Kybernetes, vol. 47 no. 5
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0368-492X

Keywords

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