Search results

The empirical support for agency theory explanations for the great variance in CEO pay has been equivocal. Drawing from the performance appraisal literature, we hypothesize that boards of directors incorporate human judgment into the evaluation and reward of CEO performance in order to balance managerial risk with agency costs. We test Baysinger and Hoskisson’s (1990) proposition that insider‐dominated corporate boards rely on subjective performance evaluation to reward the CEO, and we argue that R&D intensity influences this relationship. Using a sample of Fortune firms, findings support our contention that human judgment is important in evaluating and rewarding CEO performance.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of the use of subjective (objective) performance measures on relevant organisational outcomes, namely perceived managerial discretion (PMD) and manager’s satisfaction with the performance measurement system (PMS). Furthermore, the paper analyses the indirect link between subjective vs objective measures and managers’ satisfaction through PMD.

To test the research hypotheses, a paper-based questionnaire was sent to Italian health care managers in Lombardy. Thus, a PLS-SEM analysis was performed on a data set of 97 Italian health care managers.

Empirical findings showed that objective measures are more capable of supporting the managerial perception of discretion when compared to more subjective ones such as “fads” and “fashions”, and that managers are more satisfied with the PMS when it is grounded on objective measures rather than subjective ones.

The paper operationalizes and empirically tests the measure of PMD, linking this to antecedents and consequences. It also extends the literature on subjectivity in the PMS, since it develops new knowledge on the choice between subjective and objective measures by applying this choice to a variety of PMS, whereas prior literature on objective vs subjective measures has mainly focussed on performance evaluation.

Based on the referent cognitions theory (RCT), individuals compare their outcomes to a given reference point. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of centrality bias in subjective performance evaluation on two employees’ work behaviors; willingness to exert work effort and retaliation intention.

A 2  ×  2 × 2 between-subject real-effort task experiment was conducted on 162 Accounting and Management students. Centrality bias and level of task difficulty were each manipulated into two groups. Meanwhile, the level of performance was divided based on the average score of the real-effort task.

The experimental data were examined using MANOVA and PROCESS macro regression. It reveals that centrality bias negatively affects willingness to exert work effort through perceived procedural fairness and positively affects retaliation intention. These findings align with the RCT in explaining the perceived procedural fairness psychological mechanism and the work behavior resulting from an unfair evaluation procedure.

This study is the first of its kind to investigate the effect of centrality bias in subjective performance evaluation on positive and negative employee behaviors concurrently, which refers to the real-effort experimental task. The study demonstrates the significant impact of centrality bias on unwillingness to exert effort and adverse behavior.

Sleep quality, a crucial parameter for health and life performance, is affected by mattress components; particularly mechanical and thermal comfort management ability of the upper layers. The aim of this study is to investigate effects of quilted mattress ticking fabric material (polyester, polypropylene, viscose, lyocell and their blends) on thermal comfort of the bedding system by objective and subjective measurements.

The permeability (air and water vapour), heat transfer, water absorption, transfer and drying behaviours of knitted quilted fabrics which influence the thermal comfort of the bedding system were investigated. Subjective coolness and dampness evaluations were gathered by forearm and hand-palm tests to provide more realistic discussion in light of fabric characteristics.

According to the results, polypropylene can be suggested for winter use with its higher air and water vapour permeabilities, lower thermal absorption and conductivities and warmer evaluation results. Lyocell can be suggested for summer use with also high permeabilities, higher thermal absorption and conductivities and cooler evaluation results. Polyester and viscose may also be considered for winter and summer in turn as a result of thermal feelings they create.

In addition to fabric thermal, permeability, liquid absorption and transfer properties, this study also includes subjective coolness and dampness evaluations which can provide realistic results regarding the coolness-to-touch and liquid transfer performances of mattress ticking fabrics. The relationships among objective and subjective data were investigated and the proposed subjective evaluation techniques can be used for different products.

This paper replicates with a unionized, Indian sample, the well‐established finding that managerial evaluations of employee performance are affected by both objective productivity and organizational citizenship behavior. Data from the managers of 104 Indian pharmaceutical sales representatives and company records replicated the findings of previous research. While objective productivity alone accounted for 9 percent of the variance in subjective performance, objective productivity and organizational citizenship behavior together accounted for 41 percent of the variance. Implications of the findings for future research and managerial practice are discussed.

The purpose of this paper is to test the relationship between objective and subjective sales performance and salespeople’s economic and non-economic satisfaction in a sequential logic model.

Based on a questionnaire survey using a deductive approach. A total of 315 companies were ultimately selected for participation in the study, to represent a range of companies from different industries and company sizes in the product-oriented business sector of Norway. A total of 236 questionnaires were returned, generating a response rate of 74.9%.

The sequential logic of objective and subjective sales performance, in connection with salespeople’s economic and non-economic satisfaction, reveals an underlying structure that can link existing theory and previous studies on sales performance and salesperson satisfaction in business-to-business (B2B) settings.

The results reported applying only to a B2B setting, to test whether the sequential logic model and mediating effects still hold in such setting. This study is also limited to product-oriented companies in Norway, which offers the opportunity for a future study to verify whether the refined research model also applies to service-oriented companies.

The results indicate that the constructs of objective and subjective sales performance and salespeoplés economic and non-economic satisfaction are intertwined in a B2B setting. Specifically, these constructs are related to one another sequentially.

Contributes to structuring in a B2B setting, the relationships between objective and subjective sales performance on the one hand and salespeoplés economic and non-economic satisfaction on the other. It also highlights two mediating effects, namely, subjective sales performance mediates the relationship effect between objective sales performance and salespeoplés economic satisfaction and salespeople economic’s satisfaction mediates the relationship effect between subjective sales performance and salespeople’s non-economic satisfaction.

This paper aims to analyze challenges of subjective performance evaluation (SPE) and their effects on team performance. It focuses on discretionary bonus allocations in teams and challenges driven by cognitive biases on the superior or the employee side. This is important as efficient teamwork is a relevant source of competitive advantages in firms, and firms often rely on teams to coordinate various, mutually supportive organizational activities.

The author analyzes results that have recently been discussed in the literature and link them to each other to create a more holistic picture about potential performance effects of SPE. Based on the analyses, the author develops avenues for future research and point out open questions.

Exploring employees’ fairness perceptions in team settings in which there is no clear standard for a “fair” team bonus allocation, the author finds that perceived fairness of team bonus allocation may decrease under SPE because employees interpret the “fairness” of the bonus allocation from an egocentric perspective. Such decrease in perceived fairness can eventually even lead to decreased team performance. Likewise, on the superior side, more complex, but highly relevant team can cause cognitive biases of superiors in assessing employee performance, thereby decreasing the potentially positive effects of SPE on team performance.

This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing recently discovered challenges of SPE in teams and linking them to each other to draw more general conclusions about the performance effects of SPE. For practice, my findings imply that firms may want to be cautious when evaluating the potential effects of SPE – as it is made by human beings with their cognitive biases. For research, the paper opens up new research possibilities and points out open questions.

Purpose – Accounting research has long shown the effect of subjectivity in performance evaluation. This study investigates one form of subjectivity in performance evaluation: flexibility in weighting performance measures examining decisions made by supervisors about weighting. Empirical studies show that the performance-measure weights are only partially consistent with the predictions of the agency theory and they are a still outstanding issue.

Methodology/approach – We develop an experiment to analyse supervisor decision-making, manipulating two factors: internal organisational interdependence and the level of managerial performance. We derive hypotheses along with both economic and behavioural approaches. The economic approach is based on agency theory predictions and the controllability principle while the behavioural approach is drawn on the organisational justice theory. We argue that in low interdependence contexts the supervisor's decision confirms the agency theory predictions, while in high interdependence conditions weighting decisions could be driven by behavioural considerations of fairness perceptions of the evaluation process and the level of managerial performance.

Findings – We find that in low interdependence contexts the supervisor's decision confirms the agency theory predictions, while in high interdependence contexts it does not. The results indicate that the supervisor's decision stems from the integration of economic and behavioural perspectives.

Research and social implications – The theoretical framework can be useful for interpreting the supervisor decision-making and the weighting process.

Originality – The economic and behavioural approaches allow us to understand flexibility in weighting performance measures suggesting that, in addition to economic considerations, a behavioural perspective may also be relevant in explaining subjective weighting.

Many argue that the design of compensation contracts for public company chief executive officers (CEOs) is often not guided by a goal of value maximization. Yet, there is limited direct empirical evidence on the negative consequences of the proposed inefficient contracting between shareholders and CEOs. Using data on CEO bonus contracts of the S&P 500 firms, we investigate potential firm performance implications of the use of qualitative criteria such as leadership and mentoring in those contracts. We maintain that unlike quantitative criteria, qualitative criteria are difficult to define and measure on an objective basis, possibly resulting in an inefficient and biased incentive structure. Twenty-five percent of the sample observations have CEO bonus contracts that include a qualitative criterion for bonus payment determination. Our results show that employee productivity, asset productivity, capital expenditures, and future abnormal stock returns are lower for firms that use a qualitative criterion in CEO bonus contracts than those that do not. Further, contrary to the argument in prior literature that earnings management decreases with the use of subjective performance indicators in incentive contracts, we find that income-increasing accruals are actually higher when the CEO bonus contract includes a qualitative criterion. We recommend that compensation committees set concrete, measurable performance goals for CEOs, providing CEOs with better guidance and helping improve their corporate decision making.

This study aims to reconceptualize performance evaluation styles and reveal their performance effects.

Based on a literature review, this study conceptualizes performance evaluation styles on two dimensions: priority of budgetary targets when setting performance criteria and use of accounting information for ex-post performance evaluation. This study discusses two concepts – budget rigidity and discretionary adjustments – to explain these two dimensions, and their optimal combination is then investigated by considering environmental uncertainty. The empirical analysis uses survey data from Japanese firms.

The results indicate that suitable combinations of budget rigidity and discretionary adjustments differ depending on environmental uncertainty. As expected, a combination of lower budget rigidity and higher discretionary adjustments is optimal in an uncertain environment. Contrary to expectations, a combination of higher budget rigidity and higher discretionary adjustments is optimal in a stable environment. Moreover, higher discretionary adjustments complement budgetary targets’ motivational effects, regardless of environmental uncertainty.

This study’s theoretical and empirical analysis suggests that it is difficult to understand the performance implications of performance evaluation styles without recognizing their multidimensionality and interdependencies. Moreover, the results demonstrate that discretionary adjustments in budget-based performance evaluations seem to act rationally in practice.