Discusses the concept of a well‐functioning economy and attempts to define its principal properties. Examines some aspects of rules of decision making that are essential…
Discusses the concept of a well‐functioning economy and attempts to define its principal properties. Examines some aspects of rules of decision making that are essential for the generation of optimal decisions. Brings together the selected properties of a well‐functioning economy and the characteristics of decision making, in order to shed light on how a well‐designed decision‐making system can produce an economy that functions and performs well. Comments on the failure of central planning in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
This paper explores the links between economic and social structures and ethical norms for economic life. As such, the essay is a contribution to the more general…
This paper explores the links between economic and social structures and ethical norms for economic life. As such, the essay is a contribution to the more general philosophical discussions on the relation between fact and value in the social sciences. I begin with a brief discussion of ethics which highlights the social character of ethical “value” and draws upon the work of the Canadian philosopher, Bernard Lonergan, to introduce a novel way of understanding social structures. The analyses show how economic structures can be understood as cooperative meaning schemes, how such schemes are embedded within a wider ecology of social meaning schemes, and how the dynimic relations among such schemes reveal ethical goals and make ethical demands upon participants who depend upon them for their living. I illustrate these linkages in a discussion of three examples drawn from economic life: a consumer purchase transaction, an ancient trade scheme drawn from the work of Karl Polanyi, and a rather novel approach to economic development proposed by Jane Jacobs.
This chapter focuses on the analysis of sectoral structure of the economy of the Republic of Belarus as well as on its structure by forms of ownership. The role of…
This chapter focuses on the analysis of sectoral structure of the economy of the Republic of Belarus as well as on its structure by forms of ownership. The role of industry in national economy is highlighted. Dynamics and problems of its development are analyzed. It is shown that the share of services in GDP increases, while the share of manufacturing declines. Absolute size and share of the manufacturing employment trends down. The ongoing process of ownership structure transformation and the growing share of private and foreign ownership are featured. State-owned enterprises along with private enterprises with a state share comprise two-thirds of total industrial output, but this share is gradually shrinking. The industrial policy is viewed as an enabling factor of the country's economic development. Considerable attention is paid to the analysis of industrial policy of the Republic of Belarus, its goals and instruments as well as regulations. It is noted that the role of government in regulating the industrial structure of the economy is significant.
After the precipitated decline of the Soviet Empire and its satellite states, a system change seemed to be called for, and many countries embarked on social and political…
After the precipitated decline of the Soviet Empire and its satellite states, a system change seemed to be called for, and many countries embarked on social and political reforms focussing on property structures in the economy. This raised the issue of governance in the institutions that would constitute the structures in which production would have to take place. In particular, some Central European countries opted for mass privatisations of the means of production, on the face of it so as to have the people participate in the wealth of the nation. In fact, the wealth of the nation depends on the structures in which it is constituted. Dissipation of property rights will reduce the value of the nation's productive capital, whereas an intelligent structure that creates good governance structures at the same time, increases the value of the producing capital. This relatively simple insight lies at the heart of our understanding of how to analyse different processes of mass privatisation. This essay develops a theoretical framework by which different governance structures can be analysed. The framework consists of a blend of the economic theory of property rights, new institutional economics and Austrian economic theory.
The purpose of this paper is to address two questions: how do business and political (i.e. party politics and state) networks relate? What are the consequences of the…
The purpose of this paper is to address two questions: how do business and political (i.e. party politics and state) networks relate? What are the consequences of the relations between these two networks for the behaviour of the actors involved?
The research design consists of the historical approach based on relevant literature sources of the past, a relatively long period – from 1968, the beginning of the era of market socialism, until the first decade of the twenty-first century, by which time the market economy had been established for more than 20 years. The authors analyse the behaviour of economic and non-economic actors in Hungary based on cases and historical data, applying the IMP network approach.
Research findings demonstrate the long-term influence of the relation between business and bureaucratic networks on managerial and organizational network behaviour. The old and new pictures of the economic system are different, but the background to the pictures and the movement in the two pictures are quite similar.
The historical illustrations and cases the authors have presented cannot be too widely generalized: the characteristics of the Hungarian mode of transition from market socialism to market economy impose important limitations on the generalizability of the findings.
The study offers lessons to policy makers: policy decisions can have long term, unanticipated impacts on non-target areas as well.
The results confirm that the informal networks of socialism can replicate themselves and network structures can be repurposed in the system after the transition as well.
One contribution of the paper is related to the second network paradox: the cases illustrate non-business relationships with non-economic factors, particularly relations with bureaucracy. The other contribution is the description of how the transition from socialism to capitalism affected the networks that firms were embedded in before and after the transition.