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Stakeholder theory understands business in terms of relationships among stakeholders whose interests are mainly joint but may be occasionally conflicting. In the latter case, managers may need to make trade-offs between these interests. The purpose of this paper is to explore the nature of managerial decision-making about these trade-offs.

This paper draws on the ordonomic approach which sees business life to be rife with social dilemmas and locates the role of stakeholders in harnessing or resolving these dilemmas through engagement in rule-finding and rule-setting processes.

The ordonomic approach suggests that stakeholder interests trade-offs ought to be neither ignored nor avoided, but rather embraced and welcomed as an opportunity for bringing to fruition the joint interest of stakeholders in playing a better game of business. Stakeholders are shown to bear responsibility for overcoming the perceived trade-offs through the institutional management of social dilemmas.

For many stakeholder theorists, the nature of managerial decision-making about trade-offs between conflicting stakeholder interests and the nature of trade-offs themselves have been a long-standing point of contention. The paper shows that trade-offs may be useful for the value creation process and explicitly discusses managerial strategies for dealing with them.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the support for multi-party collaboration in project construction provided by building information modeling (BIM). Based on the perspective of value co-creation, the research results can provide support for the collaborative application and contract design of BIM platform.

In this paper, an evolutionary game model involving the owner, designer and constructor is constructed by using prospect theory and evolutionary game theory. Through simulation analysis, the evolution law of the strategy choice of each party in the collaborative application of BIM platform is discussed and the key factors affecting the strategy choice of all parties are analyzed.

The results show that there is an ideal local equilibrium point with progressive stability in the evolutionary game between the three parties: “the construction party shares information, the designer receives the information and optimizes the project and the owner does not provide incentives”; in addition, the opportunistic behaviors of the design and construction parties, as well as the probability of such behaviors being detected and the subsequent punishment have a significant impact on the evolutionary outcome.

This method can provide support for the collaborative application and contract design of BIM platform.

The development of the digital age has made data and information more transparent, enhancing the strategic perspectives of both buyers (strategic waiting) and sellers (price fluctuations) in their decision-making. This research investigates the optimal dynamic pricing strategy of the content product developer in relation to their consideration of consumer fairness concerns to elucidate the impact of consumer fairness concerns on the dynamic pricing strategy of the developer.

This paper assumes that monopolistic content developers implement a dynamic pricing strategy for the content product. Through constructing a two-period dynamic pricing game model, this research investigates the optimal decisions of the content developer, contingent upon their consideration or disregard of consumer fairness concerns. In the extension section, the authors additionally account for the influence of myopic consumers on these optimal decisions.

Our findings reveal that the degree of consumer fairness concerns significantly influences the developer’s optimal dynamic pricing decision. When a developer offers content products with lower depth, there is a propensity for the developer to refrain from incorporating consumer fairness concerns into a dynamic pricing strategy. Conversely, in cases where the developer offers a high-depth content product, consumer fairness concerns benefit the developer. Furthermore, our analysis reveals a consistent benefit for the developer from the inclusion of myopic consumers.

Few studies have delved into the conjoined influence of consumer fairness concerns and strategic behavior on dynamic pricing strategy. Our findings indicate that consumer fairness concerns can enhance the efficiency of the value chain for content products under specific conditions. This paper not only enriches the existing literature on dynamic pricing by incorporating consumer fairness concerns theoretically but also offers practical insights. The outcomes of this research can guide content product developers in devising optimal dynamic pricing strategies.

Green innovation in supply chains is crucial for socioeconomic development and stability. Factors that influence collaborative green innovation in the supply chain are complex and diverse. Exploring the main influencing factors and their mechanisms is essential for promoting collaborative green innovation in supply chains. Therefore, this study analyzes how upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain collaborate to develop green technological innovations, thereby providing a theoretical basis for improving the overall efficiency of the supply chain and advancing green innovation technology.

Based on evolutionary game theory, this study divides operational scenarios into pure market and government-regulated operations, thereby constructing collaborative green innovation relationships in different scenarios. Through evolutionary analysis of various entities in different operational scenarios, combined with numerical simulation analysis, we compared the evolutionary stability of collaborative green innovation behavior in supply chains with and without government regulation.

Under pure market mechanisms, the higher the green innovation capability, the stronger the willingness of various entities to collaborate in green innovation. However, under government regulation, a decrease in green innovation capability increases the willingness to collaborate with various entities. Environmental tax rates and green subsidy levels promote collaborative innovation in the short term but inhibit collaborative innovation in the long term, indicating that policy orientation has a short-term impact. Additionally, the greater the penalty for collaborative innovation breaches, the stronger the intention to engage in collaborative green innovation in the supply chain.

We introduce the factors influencing green innovation capability and social benefits in the study of the innovation behavior of upstream and downstream enterprises, expanding the research field of collaborative innovation in the supply chain. By comparing the collaborative innovation behavior of various entities in the supply chain under a pure market scenario and government regulations, this study provides a new perspective for analyzing the impact of corresponding government policies on the green innovation capability of upstream and downstream enterprises, enriching theoretical research on green innovation in the supply chain to some extent.

We investigate the extended service strategy choices of competing manufacturers and examine their impact on the retail platform.

We construct a supply chain model with a retail platform as the leader and manufacturers as the followers. Manufacturers face differential consumer preferences on the same agency retail platform, and they can sell a bundled extended service product and sell a separate product without any extended service.

The sale of extended warranty services on the retail platform leads to lower pricing of the manufacturers' products and changes in the product market structure in response to differences in consumer preferences. The retailing platform tends to provide an extended warranty conditionally. The sale of extended warranty services on a retail platform would be detrimental to the interests of the manufacturer who sells products with extended warranty services and in favor of the manufacturer who sells products without them.

The equilibrium results of the retail platform’s non-sales and sales of extended warranty services for the no-extended warranty product under the same commission rate and differential commission rate models are discussed, and the product structure of the market is investigated, respectively.

The purpose of this paper is to advance the understanding of paradoxes, underlying tensions and potential management strategies when integrating digital technologies into existing lean-based production systems (LPSs), with the aim of achieving synergies and fostering the development of production systems.

This study adopts a collaborative management research (CMR) approach to identify patterns of organisational tensions and paradoxes and explore management strategies to overcome them. The data were collected through interviews and focus group interviews with experts on lean and/or digital technologies from the companies, from documents and from workshops with the in-case researchers.

The findings of this paper provide insights into the salient organisational paradoxes embraced in the integration of digital technologies in LPS by identifying different aspects of the performing, organising, learning and belonging paradoxes. Furthermore, the findings demonstrate the intricacies and relatedness between different paradoxes and their resolutions, and more specifically, how a resolution strategy adopted to manage one paradox might unintentionally generate new tensions. This, in turn, calls for either re-contextualising actions to counteract the drift or the adoption of new resolution strategies.

This paper adds perspective to operations management (OM) research through the use of paradox theory, and we (1) provide a fine-grained perspective on why integration sometimes “fails” and label the forces of internal drift as mechanisms of imbalances and (2) provide detailed insights into how different management and resolution strategies are adopted, especially by identifying re-contextualising actions as a key to rebalancing organisational paradoxes in favour of the integration of digital technologies in LPSs.

The study focuses on drug safety regulation capture, reveals the inner mechanism and evolutionary characteristics of drug safety regulation capture and provides suggestions for effective regulation by pharmacovigilance.

The article introduces prospect theory into the game strategy analysis of drug safety events, constructs a benefit perception matrix based on psychological perception and analyzes the risk selection strategies and constraints on stable outcomes for both drug companies and drug regulatory authorities. Moreover, simulation was used to analyze the choice of results of different parameters on the game strategy.

The results found that the system does not have a stable equilibrium strategy under the role of cognitive psychology. The risk transfer coefficient, penalty cost, risk loss, regulatory benefit, regulatory success probability and risk discount coefficient directly acted in the direction of system evolution toward the system stable strategy. There is a critical effect on the behavioral strategies of drug manufacturers and drug supervisors, which exceeds a certain intensity before the behavioral strategies in repeated games tend to stabilize.

In this article, the authors constructed the perceived benefit matrix through the prospect value function to analyze the behavioral evolution game strategies of drug companies and FDA in the regulatory process, and to evaluate the evolution law of each factor.

This study aims to create actionable guidelines for pricing decision-making by employing game a theory matrix to forecast the correlation between the average daily rate and the latest ambiance of hotels.

Utilizing a vector error correction model, the research employs game theory to assess the influence of the average daily rate on the hotel's newest atmosphere during both peak season (April–September) and valley season (October–March).

Findings indicate that during the peak season, when the average daily rate rises in resorts and falls in suburban areas, the hotel’s newest atmosphere is at its best in both types of accommodations. During the off-peak season, the hotel’s newest atmosphere is achieved when both resorts and suburban accommodations increase their average daily rates.

There are two study constraints. One is the assumption that hotel guests in both parties prefer not to change hotels, but in fact they would. Two is a limited sample of two resort and suburban markets.

This suggests that the hotel’s newest atmosphere can draw both leisure and business travelers to suburban areas during the low season and more leisure travelers to resorts during the high season.

The study’s findings have implications for revenue related to the hotel’s newest atmosphere and cleanliness for both suburban and resort hotels, particularly when promoting tourism collaboratively.

The study provides valuable insights for hotel managers in analyzing pricing strategies using matrices.

The expansion of bike-sharing enterprises has led to a series of social problems, and due to the high breakage rate and high recycling cost of bike sharing, enterprises are reluctant to maintain them. Therefore, government regulation does play a leading role in maintaining bike sharing. This study’s purpose is to investigate how the government should regulate the bike-sharing enterprises that maintain bicycles.

Firstly, the authors assume that there is only one bike-sharing enterprise and establish a game model that the government regulates the enterprise. Furthermore, the authors extend the model to the case that there are two competing enterprises in the market. Finally, through numerical analysis, the influence of various factors on the government strategy and revenue is analyzed.

The authors find that the regulatory probability of two enterprises are regulated by the government is larger than that of one enterprise. When two bike-sharing enterprises compete without government regulation, both will choose the non-self-discipline strategy, thus falling into the Prisoner's Dilemma. If the government regulates them, then both enterprises will choose the self-discipline strategy. Finally, through numerical analysis, it is found that the self-discipline behavior of bike-sharing enterprises is related to the government regulatory probability, the cost of self-discipline, the probability of being reported and the penalties. Interestingly, the cost of government regulation will not affect the regulation probability of government.

This research provides a theoretical reference for the government to make the regulation strategies of bike sharing and achieve the sustainable development of bike sharing.

This research provides a theoretical reference for the government to make the regulation strategies of bike sharing and achieve the sustainable development of bike sharing.

To examine how shareholding affects optimal profits, R&D innovation, NEV market scale and social welfare in two supply chain models with partial and cross ownership patterns.

The gradual retreat of government subsidies has directly weakened the financial support available to the stakeholders of new energy vehicles (NEVs). In this context, upstream and downstream enterprises of NEV are constantly seeking new business models of cooperation to achieve possible win-wins. NEV supply chain shareholding is an emerging new practice for such explorations. However, its performance in the NEV supply chain is seldom investigated. In this paper, we employ a Stackelberg game model to investigate how partial and cross-ownership affect the optimal decisions in a NEV supply chain.

Results showed that: (1) Compared with the unilateral shareholding model, the battery supplier will benefit from cross-ownership in the supply chain, while the NEV manufacturer will not necessarily benefit from it. At the same time, cross-ownership will bring the greatest incentive for battery R&D (2) Supply chain downstream competition will not necessarily lead to the improvement of the total consumption of NEVs or the level of battery design. Pareto improvement can be brought only when one of the manufacturers holds less than a certain equity threshold. In addition, downstream competition will also not necessarily bring more benefits to the battery supplier.

At present, NEV supply chain management has attracted widespread attention from scholars from all walks of life. Previous studies have been carried out that covers topics such as pricing strategies and optimal profits and the role of NEV in the sustainable development of the automotive industry supply chain, or disparate impacts of government subsidies and carbon emission regulation on supply chain members. However, as far as the authors know, compared with the new emerging NEV corporate practice, the shareholding phenomenon between upstream and downstream in the supply chain of NEV has not been studied in the existing studies.