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The purpose of this paper is to compare the pricing decisions and earning potential of the software supplier and the smart device manufacturer in different software promotion strategies.

Based on game theory, the authors formulate two promotion models, that is, the supplier implements software promotion activities individually (SP model) or outsources the promotion activity to the manufacturer under profit-sharing contract (MP model) when taking different channel power structures into consideration. Besides, in order to test the robustness of the conclusions, the authors also extend the basic model to the following situations: (1) the customers have different price elasticity toward service fee and product price; (2) the revenue sharing contract is employed by the supply chain members; and (3) the manufacturer's product promotion practice is taken into consideration.

The optimal service fee (product price) of the supplier (manufacturer) under SP model is always lower (higher) than that under MP model. Surprisingly, if the supplier is the channel leader and the profit sharing ratio exceeds certain threshold, the manufacturer's profit decreases in profit sharing ratio, which remains robust in three extension models. Moreover, the supply chain's profit in supplier-led game is always lower than that in Nash game irrespective of the promotion strategy in profit sharing context. When revenue sharing contract is adopted, the result holds only when the revenue sharing ratio is relatively low.

The authors originally explore two promotion strategies of the software supplier when taking the channel power structures into considerations, which has not been explored in the literature to the best of the authors' knowledge.

The paper aims to elucidate effective strategies for promoting the adoption of green technology innovation within the private sector, thereby enhancing the value of public–private partnership (PPP) projects during the operational phase.

Utilizing prospect theory, the paper considers the government and the public as external driving forces. It establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of government regulators, the private sector and the public. The paper uses numerical simulations to explore the evolutionary stable equilibrium strategies and the determinants influencing each stakeholder.

The paper demonstrates that government intervention and public participation substantially promote green technology innovation within the private sector. Major influencing factors encompass the intensity of pollution taxation, governmental information disclosure and public attention. However, an optimal threshold exists for environmental publicity and innovation subsidies, as excessive levels might inhibit technological innovation. Furthermore, within government intervention strategies, compensating the public for their participation costs is essential to circumvent the public's “free-rider” tendencies and encourage active public collaboration in PPP project innovation.

By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model, the paper comprehensively examines the roles of government intervention and public participation in promoting green technology innovation within the private sector, offering fresh perspectives and strategies for the operational phase of PPP projects.

This paper aims to examine the optimal sourcing strategies and pricing decisions of competing toy manufacturers and to discuss how manufacturers’ decisions are impacted by competition.

The authors consider a single-period model to characterise the competition between two competing toy manufacturers. Both of them are free to choose between virgin material and recycled material. The authors consider two types of consumers: sensitive consumers who are concerned about product safety and prefer the toy made of virgin material and insensitive consumers who do not care what material is used in the toy. The competing manufacturers play a Cournot competition.

The results reveal a special case of a win-win situation for both the manufacturer and the consumer. In addition, an increasing number of sensitive consumers does not always raise the price of virgin-material toys.

The authors derive the manufacturer’s equilibrium sourcing strategies, corresponding market-clearing prices and profits obtained.

The paper investigates how toy manufacturers’ optimal sourcing strategies are impacted by competition, considering market segments.

Due to product value uncertainty, consumers do not know the product matching rate before they get the product, which is the probability of product fitness. Taking the consumers’ anticipated regret into account, this paper aims to develop a theoretical model to explore how the anticipated regret affects pricing and advertising decisions and profits of retailers in the online to offline (O2O) supply chain.

This paper considers an O2O supply chain consisting of an e-retailer and a brick-and-mortar retailer; both retailers cooperate to provide buying online and pick up in-store (BOPS) for consumers.

It shows three major findings. Retailers should decide whether to introduce BOPS channel according to the matching rate of the product when the BOPS channel is not very convenient for consumers. When the BOPS channel does not exist in the market, the profits of two retailers increase with the online regret of consumers, while the BOPS channel exists in the market and the matching rate of the product is low, the higher offline regret can enable both retailers to increase the profits; furthermore, when the matching rate is high, the higher degree of online regret can bring more profit to the O2O supply chain. Therefore, both retailers can take measures together to induce consumers’ regrets according to the different matching rates, which makes both retailers obtain more profits. Counterintuitively, consumer surplus will not always increase due to consideration of anticipated regret.

The model has some limitations that are worth further discussing. First, in practice, the O2O supply chain includes many forms except the BOPS channel, for example, order online and pick-up in-store (ROPS) channel; future research can discuss and consider the impact of consumers’ anticipated regret on ROPS. Second, the authors consider that O2O is a supply chain composed of two retailers. In reality, there is also a situation where an oligopoly retailer opens two channels to realize O2O supply chain, in the case the inventory decision-making of the product is worth studying. Finally, to highlight the impact of the anticipated regret on consumers’ decision-making, the return of the product is not considered. Future research can take the return of the product into account to assess the robustness of the results.

The contributions are in two main aspects. First, this paper considers an O2O supply chain with consumer value uncertainty, where there are duopoly retailers in the market and most of the existing literature focus on oligopoly retailer operates both online and offline channels; meanwhile, consumers’ value perceptions of the product is deterministic. Second, this paper explores how the consumer anticipated channel regret affects the pricing and advertising decisions of O2O supply chain, and the authors take behavioral theory into account when studying omnichannel operations, while most studies on anticipated regret consider traditional two-stage price reduction management, product innovation, etc.

Although green logistics has become a new focus of cooperation between government and enterprises under environmental constraints, how local governments formulate subsidy policies to effectively guide the green transformation of regional logistics and how to facilitate the reasonable cost-sharing are rather critical. This paper will deeply explore the dynamic process of the tripartite participation (government, platform, and logistics enterprises) in the selection of regional green logistics strategy, and reveal the evolutionary game relationship of the three parties.

To explore the dynamics involving the government, platform and logistics enterprises for the green logistic transformation, and reveal the evolutionary gaming among the three parties, based on the bounded rationality premise, this study constructs the tripartite asymmetric evolutionary game models, uses the stability theorem of differential equation to explore the evolution and stability strategy of the system in different cases and explicates the paths of influence on the tripartite behaviors via simulations.

Results of this study indicate that there exist stable equilibrium strategies among the three parties regarding the regional green logistics, and they are affected by different factors. The government's subsidy, subsidy intensity and the platform's cost-sharing proportion can generate positive effects, but the latter two can also impact negatively beyond the effective ranges. The findings provide a theoretical basis for local governments, platforms and logistics enterprises to formulate justifiable subsidy intensity and determine reasonable sharing proportion.

Firstly, considering the significant relevance of local government, it is included in the evolution model, and the tripartite game (among government, platform and enterprises) is explored; Secondly, by comparing the equilibrium results under different game conditions, this paper analyzes the evolution of each party's game strategy to achieve the optimal return under bounded rationality and the important factors determining the strategic selection; Finally, the key factor of platform cost sharing is involved, and to what extent the change of platform cost sharing ratio will influence the systematic stability is explored.

This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model between the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports and uses the system dynamics model to simulate and find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, aiming to promote the development of foreign trade of film copyright and innovation and development of the film industry so as to improve the overall social benefits of the film industry and provide policy enlightenment for enhancing the import power of foreign core enterprises to introduce domestic film copyrights.

In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports is constructed, the evolution process of cooperation strategy is derived, the impact of innovation income coefficient, mixed incentive policy and single incentive policy on the evolution results is analyzed, and the system dynamic model is used to simulate to find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, so as to provide reference for the government’s dynamic incentive decision-making.

The results show that export-oriented core firms are more sensitive to mixed incentives, while import-oriented core firms respond more quickly to single incentives. The large innovation income coefficient has a negative impact on the willingness of import-oriented core enterprises to cooperate. The study proposes measures to increase the willingness of core companies to participate.

Due to the fact that numerical simulation is based on simulation, there may be a certain gap between it and the actual situation. Therefore, it is necessary to further use actual data to conduct empirical analysis on the theoretical model.

This article mainly focuses on analyzing the impact of strategy choices and related parameters of various entities on the incentive mechanism and studying the foreign trade cooperation strategies of film copyright export enterprises under policy support from a theoretical model perspective. Furthermore, research has proven that in order to effectively enhance the willingness of foreign import core enterprises to participate in the foreign trade of domestic film copyrights, the government needs to coordinate the use of single incentive policies and mixed incentive policies. This study provides a major contribution for policymaker to develop film copyright import and export trade.

Based on the research conclusions, this paper puts forward management countermeasures to further improve the development of the film copyright import and export trade. The first is to enrich government incentive methods and stimulate the vitality of film copyright and foreign trade market entities. The second is to guide the core enterprises of film copyright export to increase investment in innovation and stimulate the endogenous driving force of industrial development. Finally, lengthen the foreign trade industry chain of film copyright and increase the income of film derivatives.

Firstly, this paper applies the research methods of evolutionary game and system dynamics simulation to the field of foreign trade research on film copyright and expands the research perspectives and methods of the film industry. Secondly, by analyzing the “cost-benefit incentive” relationship of the evolutionary game of government export-oriented core enterprises and importing core enterprises, an evolutionary game model is constructed, the quantitative point of tripartite interest decision-making is solved and the research object of the evolutionary game method is expanded. Finally, the system dynamics model is used to simulate and find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, so as to provide reference for the government’s dynamic incentive decision-making.

From the quantum game perspective, this paper aims to study a green product optimal pricing problem of the dual-channel supply chain under the cooperation of the retailer and manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions.

The decentralized and centralized decision-making optimal prices and profits are obtained by establishing the classical and quantum game models. Then the classical game and quantum game are compared.

When the quantum entanglement is greater than 0, the selling prices of the quantum model are higher than the classical model. Through theoretical research and numerical analysis results, centralized decision-making is more economical and efficient than decentralized decision-making. Publicity and education on carbon emission reduction for consumers will help consumers accept carbon emission reduction products with slightly higher prices. When the emission reduction increases too fast, the cost of emission reduction will form a significant burden and affect the profits of manufacturers and supply chain systems.

From the perspective of the quantum game, the author explores the optimal prices of green product and compares them with the classical game.

This study delves into how corporations make decisions about influencer marketing. Specifically, it examines the differences between human influencers, who carry the risk of scandals, and virtual influencers, a new and unpredictable realm, regarding their integration with social media platforms.

Using game theory and empirical data, the study explores crucial factors in influencer marketing, including influencer quality, reputation repair costs and the probability of R&D failures.

This study suggests that companies favor human influencers when the risk of scandal is low. However, competing companies switch to virtual influencers at different intervals as this risk increases. The costs, likelihood of scandals and competition intensity all play a role in a company's decision-making regarding technology management. Additionally, a higher chance of R&D failure can motivate a company to invest more in R&D to gain a competitive advantage over rivals that may suffer failures.

This study provides insights into how corporations manage social media influencer marketing in the digital age. It contributes to marketing theory and technology management decisions by offering a fresh perspective on the relationship between corporate reputation and influencer marketing strategy.

This study offers valuable perspectives into a relatively uncharted area of marketing strategy. It employs game theory and empirical analysis to introduce a fresh method of comprehending the dynamics of influencer marketing, its impact on corporate reputation management and its interaction with social media.

In the context of constructing an integrated national strategic system, collaborative innovation among enterprises is the current social focus. Therefore, in order to find the interest relationship between multiple game subjects, to explore the influencing factors of collaborative innovation of civil-military integration enterprises. This paper constructs a collaborative innovation mechanism for military–civilian integration involving four game subjects (military enterprises, private enterprises, local governments, and science and technology intermediaries). It aims to solve and reveal the evolutionary game relationship among the four parties.

To explore the mechanism of military–civilian collaborative innovation involving four players, this study employs game theory and constructs an evolutionary game model for collaborative innovation with the participation of military enterprises, civilian enterprises, local governments, and technology intermediaries. The model reveals the evolutionary game patterns among these four entities, analyzes the impact of various parameters on the evolutionary process of the game system, and numerical simulation is used to show these changes more specifically.

The research findings demonstrate that active government subsidies promote cooperation throughout the system. Moreover, increasing the input-output ratio of research and development (R&D), the rate of technological spillovers, and the R&D investment of civilian enterprises all facilitate the tendency toward cooperation within the system. However, when the government chooses to actively provide subsidies, increasing R&D investment in military enterprises may hinder the tendency toward cooperation. Furthermore, central transfer payments, government punishment from the central government, and an increase in the information conversion rate of technology intermediaries may suppress the rate of cooperation within the system.

Most of the previous studies on the collaborative innovation of military–civilian integration have been tripartite game models between military enterprises, private enterprises, and local governments. In contrast, this study adds science and technology intermediaries on this basis, reveals the evolution mechanism of collaborative innovation of civil-military integration enterprises from the perspective of four-party participation, and analyzes the factors influencing the cooperation of the whole system. The conclusion of this study not only enriches the collaborative innovation evolution mechanism of military–civilian integration enterprises from the perspective of multiple agents but also provides practical guidance for the innovation-driven development of military–civilian integration enterprises.