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This paper proposes a simple model to classify economists according to their preferences towards quality and/or quantity of their publications. When more emphasis is placed on quantity they are defined as r‐strategists. When they put more effort in the quality of their papers targeting top journals, they are defined as K‐strategists. It is shown that prestigious departments tend to select K‐strategists. By analyzing which strategy maximizes the influence of an economist in the profession, the paper shows that neither r‐, nor K‐strategists are the winners. The paper conjectures that the economists more likely to be successful in the profession follow the Samuelson‐strategy, which is characterized by a balance between quality and quantity.

This paper expands theory on strategists by investigating how non-executive strategy professionals in multi-business firms strategize. In focus is the strategizing of two groups of non-executive strategy professionals: a corporate strategy team and eleven business strategists employed in each of the incorporated units.

A case study design was employed to explore privileged accessed data to gain first-hand in-depth qualities of strategists' work. The design was characterized by phenomenon driven immersed participatory insider research with retrospective reflection and theorizing. Data includes strategies, interview data, calendars, meeting minutes, workshop material and observational field notes.

Non-executive strategy professionals in multi-business firms are either employed at the corporate center or in the peripheral businesses. Based on this location and their individual experiences they assume an exclusive content or an inclusive process strategizing orientation. In practice, the groups strategize tightly together.

Case studies are useful in explorative research providing thick descriptions. While empirically rich, the results of this study are limited by the context of one single case. Future research is encouraged to confirm, contradict and refine the results presented.

The insights from this study can help organizations regarding how to employ strategy professionals in multi-business firms.

This paper contributes to a recognized need to explore strategists' work. In contrary to the majority of existing research, focusing on senior management and/or strategy formulation, this paper highlighted non-executive strategy professionals' strategizing.

In this study, nine managers of a Dutch multinational engineering company were interviewed on the success and failure factors of post‐acquisition processes they were involved in over the past five years. When referring to their experiences, the managers mainly spoke about failures and how to avoid these in future. The focus of this study was on the cognitive map structure of the perspectives of managers as disclosed by the interview data. Three different collective maps were found, representing “the Strategists”, strategic business unit‐presidents, and human resource (HR)‐managers. The maps show differences in perspectives on four central themes: control versus cooperation; how to handle the culture of the acquired firm; trust versus distrust; and speed versus carefulness. If the maps are compared with literature on management acquisition processes, the HR‐managers' map shows richer insights into how to manage human factors in acquisition processes than the other two. Instead of exploiting these valuable insights, the differences in perspectives fostered distrust between the two management levels, which constrained mutual learning.

The purpose of this paper is to conceptually and empirically explore and challenge the dogma of Corporate visual identity (CVI) consistency. The goal is to nuance the current polarized debate of consistency or no consistency.

A qualitative research strategy is employed in this paper. Specifically, the empirical work rests on an interview study with strategists from ten different CVI agencies. The interview transcripts are analyzed using template analysis.

In terms of findings, both empirical and conceptual arguments for and against CVI consistency are presented. Many of these arguments rest on conflicting assumptions of CVI communication, CVI authenticity and CVI management, which all influence the debate of CVI consistency.

CVI practitioners are presented with a more reflective approach to dealing with consistency and hands on examples for inspiration.

This paper offers alternative and more nuanced conceptualizations of CVI consistency. This includes seeing consistency and inconsistency as ends of a spectrum to be balanced rather than mutually exclusive and by differentiating between consistency across platforms and consistency over time – coined CVI continuity. Furthermore, several future research areas that can help to further develop the field of CVI are suggested.

There is great emphasis in local authorities for strategy development to reflect the characteristics and views of a local populace. Initiating research which effectively supports strategy development is problematic, as the gaps in strategists′ knowledge of a populace are not self‐evident. Examines the problems of initiating effective research which can support strategy development, and the barriers existing in local authorities which can prevent the successful development of research. Presents a format for a research brief that is seen as a means to develop negotiations between the strategist and the researcher. The brief is seen as a means to test the nature of skills in problem diagnosis and data interpretation of the researcher, in addition to their skills of measurement. It is a test of what the researcher can bring to the demanding tasks of strategy development.

The Oxford Strategy Insights Project was designed to assess the current approaches, aims, and focus of strategists across industries and geographies.

The project received input from 167 executives and managers across twenty-six industries, spanning over thirty countries, regarding their firm’s strategy process.

The biggest gap highlighted by the Oxford Strategy Insights Project is effective strategy execution. An overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that their organization’s strategy execution efforts are ineffective and slow, with accelerated implementation being the exception rather than the norm. In line with these findings, few firms appear to be applying the best practice of establishing an implementation management infrastructure including a “Program Manager” tasked to manage and coordinate the firm’s strategy implementation effort. The one positive element related to strategy execution is that most firms seem to have an effective strategic measurement and reporting process.

Organizations that can execute their strategies increase the likelihood of realizing the full potential of their plans. However, the study’s main finding is that effective strategy execution is severely lacking. Strategists need to become more foresighted, with a much greater focus on implementation.

Although the value of effective strategy execution has been well documented for over five-decades in both academic and management practice literature, new research has found that most strategists are still short-sighted, viewing strategy as primarily planning with a limited focus on implementation.

To make strategists aware of decision biases and their potential impact on effective strategic decision‐making.

A review of five critical biases, their sources and impact. The article includes a self‐test. Findings – Suggestions on how the strategist can address biases in self and others as part of strategic leadership.

Conceptual review and self‐test.

Simple, easy to implement guidance on managing biases in self and others.

Raising strategists’ awareness of biases and their potential impact. Self‐test on decision biases. A route to the literature on the issues.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce strategic managers to a multi‐perspective approach to thinking about risk.

This paper takes the form of a review.

An eight‐fold way of thinking about risk is suggested: as a formal idea in finance and economics; as fear of loss, often non‐monetary and qualitative; as something that influences strategic choice; as something that influences strategic behaviour; as a factor in position and status; as something the brain is adapted to deal with – quickly and efficiently; as something that effects the way strategic managers deal with information and impacts on their cognitive processing; and as something that, like resources, is shared between the organisation and its stakeholders.

The article suggests a practical checklist for strategists to think about the risk(s) of different strategic options and how it impacts on strategy evaluation and implementation.

The paper identifies the significant lacuna with regard to risk in modern strategic management.

Business strategists can easily become slaves to their inbox or to the passing enthusiasm of the times, their supervisors or outside influencers, ranging from social activists to securities analysts and investment bankers. This article seeks to put their work in historical context and to encourage them to engage in meta-cognition – a deep consideration of their role in helping to shape their business’s response to its current environment and challenges.

The article reviews the history of modern business strategy and divides it into three major phases, centered on the theories and practices of three strategists: Frederick Taylor, Peter Drucker and Michael Porter. The author suggests that each of these strategists was addressing the key business questions of their time and influenced the thinking of others who built on – and in many cases improved on – their theories and models. He suggests that a business strategist’s thinking should build on the work of those who came before in responding to contemporary questions of importance to their firm.

Business strategy is fundamentally an exercise in understanding and improving business performance and growth. It requires a depth of sophisticated thought that can be sharpened and focused through meta-cognition – thinking about thinking, i.e. a thoughtful consideration of what dominates our thinking and why.

This article invites practicing strategists to find their own place on that arc.

The article presents the history of business strategy as an arc of inquiry that has forward direction, moving inexorably outward, from time–motion studies on the shop floor, to the human beings who occupied it, and to the larger society in which they and the firm live. It invites practicing strategists to find their own place on that arc.

To evaluate whether “numerical flexibility” – specifically a form of temporary and precarious employment – hourly‐paid part‐time teaching in the UK higher education sector – adds strategic value and demonstrates good practice.

The study is based on new evidence drawn from five case study organisations in which a range of managers was interviewed in depth.

Analysis identifies a continuum of strategies from integration into the main workforce through to “deepened differentiation”. Although integration is somewhat problematic when applied to a diverse group, differentiation seems predicated on a defensive, risk management approach designed to further marginalise this activity. Also, differentiation fails to address the aspirations of many employees, creating tensions between institutional strategy and the needs of academic heads.

The number of case studies is limited. These case studies were selected because they had the most proactive strategies on this issue, which infers that the majority of employers in HE have not been rather less strategic or proactive.

The paper is of particular value to HR professionals considering the use of numerical flexibility approaches. It also contributes to the academic debate on the strategic value of such approaches.

The paper explores a neglected but important area of the workforce. The paper notes that some supposed benefits of numerical flexibility might be illusory, such as the deployment of allegedly “cheap and disposable” substitute workers which may be offset by unintentional consequences including rigidities in an organisation's human resource systems.