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This paper proposes a simple model to classify economists according to their preferences towards quality and/or quantity of their publications. When more emphasis is placed on quantity they are defined as r‐strategists. When they put more effort in the quality of their papers targeting top journals, they are defined as K‐strategists. It is shown that prestigious departments tend to select K‐strategists. By analyzing which strategy maximizes the influence of an economist in the profession, the paper shows that neither r‐, nor K‐strategists are the winners. The paper conjectures that the economists more likely to be successful in the profession follow the Samuelson‐strategy, which is characterized by a balance between quality and quantity.

This paper expands theory on strategists by investigating how non-executive strategy professionals in multi-business firms strategize. In focus is the strategizing of two groups of non-executive strategy professionals: a corporate strategy team and eleven business strategists employed in each of the incorporated units.

A case study design was employed to explore privileged accessed data to gain first-hand in-depth qualities of strategists' work. The design was characterized by phenomenon driven immersed participatory insider research with retrospective reflection and theorizing. Data includes strategies, interview data, calendars, meeting minutes, workshop material and observational field notes.

Non-executive strategy professionals in multi-business firms are either employed at the corporate center or in the peripheral businesses. Based on this location and their individual experiences they assume an exclusive content or an inclusive process strategizing orientation. In practice, the groups strategize tightly together.

Case studies are useful in explorative research providing thick descriptions. While empirically rich, the results of this study are limited by the context of one single case. Future research is encouraged to confirm, contradict and refine the results presented.

The insights from this study can help organizations regarding how to employ strategy professionals in multi-business firms.

This paper contributes to a recognized need to explore strategists' work. In contrary to the majority of existing research, focusing on senior management and/or strategy formulation, this paper highlighted non-executive strategy professionals' strategizing.

In this study, nine managers of a Dutch multinational engineering company were interviewed on the success and failure factors of post‐acquisition processes they were involved in over the past five years. When referring to their experiences, the managers mainly spoke about failures and how to avoid these in future. The focus of this study was on the cognitive map structure of the perspectives of managers as disclosed by the interview data. Three different collective maps were found, representing “the Strategists”, strategic business unit‐presidents, and human resource (HR)‐managers. The maps show differences in perspectives on four central themes: control versus cooperation; how to handle the culture of the acquired firm; trust versus distrust; and speed versus carefulness. If the maps are compared with literature on management acquisition processes, the HR‐managers' map shows richer insights into how to manage human factors in acquisition processes than the other two. Instead of exploiting these valuable insights, the differences in perspectives fostered distrust between the two management levels, which constrained mutual learning.

The purpose of this paper is to conceptually and empirically explore and challenge the dogma of Corporate visual identity (CVI) consistency. The goal is to nuance the current polarized debate of consistency or no consistency.

A qualitative research strategy is employed in this paper. Specifically, the empirical work rests on an interview study with strategists from ten different CVI agencies. The interview transcripts are analyzed using template analysis.

In terms of findings, both empirical and conceptual arguments for and against CVI consistency are presented. Many of these arguments rest on conflicting assumptions of CVI communication, CVI authenticity and CVI management, which all influence the debate of CVI consistency.

CVI practitioners are presented with a more reflective approach to dealing with consistency and hands on examples for inspiration.

This paper offers alternative and more nuanced conceptualizations of CVI consistency. This includes seeing consistency and inconsistency as ends of a spectrum to be balanced rather than mutually exclusive and by differentiating between consistency across platforms and consistency over time – coined CVI continuity. Furthermore, several future research areas that can help to further develop the field of CVI are suggested.

Strategy Question: How do I develop an effective plan and strategy in an environment that is highly uncertain, turbulent, and unpredictable?

Summary: An organization exists as a subset of numerous spheres of influence, including the overall environment, the economic forces within that, and the industry forces within that. The Strategic Environmental Scan (SES) uses a structured approach to survey each of those areas, compile responses, sort responses, forecast impacts of those issues seen as higher probability, and highlight those issues for plan consideration. Since a strategist can’t control these forces, it is important to understand the environmental forces to develop real-time course corrections within the planning horizon. The tool consists of a basic one-page framework along with a process to gather, assess, and organize information that the strategist can use to determine what environmental issues deserve serious attention in the development of the strategy and plan, which issues need to be monitored, and which can be ignored (for the time being). This tool builds upon Dr. Michael Porter’s gold standard Five Forces Industry Analysis and employs stakeholder input to ensure a full appreciation of the broad environmental factors.

There is great emphasis in local authorities for strategy development to reflect the characteristics and views of a local populace. Initiating research which effectively supports strategy development is problematic, as the gaps in strategists′ knowledge of a populace are not self‐evident. Examines the problems of initiating effective research which can support strategy development, and the barriers existing in local authorities which can prevent the successful development of research. Presents a format for a research brief that is seen as a means to develop negotiations between the strategist and the researcher. The brief is seen as a means to test the nature of skills in problem diagnosis and data interpretation of the researcher, in addition to their skills of measurement. It is a test of what the researcher can bring to the demanding tasks of strategy development.

This chapter argues that aspiring hegemons face a wide array of complex and distinct military challenges. Managing scarce military resources requires a subtle and complex global strategy that is likely to generate cognitive overload for the political system. As a result of cognitive overload, aspiring hegemons are likely to flail around, rapidly shifting from one global strategy to another. Such strategic flailing will occur independently of whether or not the economy is in crisis, though clearly economic crisis will exacerbate the tendency towards strategic incoherence. The chapter examines U.S. global strategy since the end of the Cold War, looking at the focus on “rogue regimes,” a growing concern with “global chaos,” worry about the rise of a peer competitor (China), and the debates about the root causes of, and best strategies to mitigate, terrorism. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the role of culture and notions of national identity and their role in the formulation of grand strategy.

Courses in strategic management should teach future strategists how to react to unexpected strategic events such as the appearance of innovative technologies, proposed mergers, drastic changes in production costs, or major actions by competitors or customers. Strategic events often trigger important changes in strategies, and reactions to strategic events make the difference between long-run success and failure. Courses can teach students about the philosophical and psychological difficulties posed by complex environments and uncertain futures and teach some procedures that help to assure that important issues receive consideration. Research may be able to identify some decision-making heuristics that foster success.

By theorizing choice as an information and decision problem, behavioral strategy research has not considered fully the agentic capacities of strategists. We argue that agentic capacities are distinct from decision-making and information-processing capacities as they rest on temporally anchored engagements with the world through habit, imagination, and judgment. We propose that understanding agency as temporally anchored action capacities is particularly important for research in behavioral strategy, as strategic phenomena encompass accumulated experience and path-dependencies (the past), ongoing competitive, market, and organizational interactions and exchanges (the present), and plans, visions, and forecasts for the future (the future). We outline how strategic choice and agency involve cognitive engagement in the three time horizons through distinct cognitive capabilities and the organizational processes that support them.