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Many firms did not have mechanisms in place prior to 2007 to identify and track the weak signals of an impending financial crisis, and as a result they were not prepared for the stresses and opportunities the crisis generated. The author aims to offer a guide to identifying these weak signals and a system for mitigating the risk of being hurt by another such crisis.

This is a guide to strategic risk management (SRM), which defines a process of identifying, assessing and economically managing potentially enterprise-threatening losses. It is a way to mitigate developing ambiguous threats before they manifest themselves and then spiral out of control.

Corporate leaders can follow the example of savvy investors who use risk management insights to mitigate the effects of a potential crisis and to profit from one if it develops.

Market pressures can cause firms to loosen product or investment standards incrementally, which over time can radically change a business model’s risk profile without anyone acting to mitigate it.

This guide to Strategic Risk Management provides insight into how corporate leaders can identify the “weak signals” of a financial crisis well before the actual crisis develops and also describes how they can mitigate financial risk in their portfolios and make opportunistic investments and adopt hedging strategies at very favorable price levels.

The author offers executives a strategic process for proactively mitigating the risk of catastrophic unwanted Black Swan surprises that can severely, and often abruptly, impair a balance sheet.

One practical way to apply the author’s approach is through hedging concentrated balance sheet exposures when market volatility is low or contracting.

Though no one can reliably anticipate pandemics and related stock market turbulence, executives do not have to predict the future to economically protect their balance sheets from Black Swan events.

Managers can construct Black Swan scenarios to assess how an unforeseen, disadvantageous future could develop and which risk management derivative would best mitigate it.

This strategic approach to managing balance-sheet-threatening risks could help a firm outperform its competitors during future crises and catastrophes.

The purpose of this paper is to examine information and volatility linkages among real estate, equity, bond and money markets in Australia.

A novel rational expectations framework of financial contagion (Kodres and Pritsker, 2002), along with a combination of robust statistical methods including simple and dynamic correlations and generalized impulse response (Fereidouni et al., 2014) have been employed using data covering three dynamic pre-pandemic economic cycles, namely, global financial crisis (GFC) period, pre-pandemic housing boom and pre-pandemic housing downturn from 2008 (February) to 2019 (December).

Results reveal information linkages across real estate, equity, bond and money markets through correlations in return and volatilities of these series. Finding indicates that the three financial markets (equity, bond and money markets) are interdependent and integrated through information and volatility linkages during the GFC period and pre-pandemic housing downturn period. Financial markets have stronger associations with real estate market during pre-pandemic housing boom. The findings contribute to the general notion that the performances of three financial markets are closely related to the “boom” phase of the real estate cycle.

This research provides an extension of existing literature regarding the information and volatility contagion of the expanded set of core investment markets in Australia. The findings could assist household buyers and investors in designing strategic investment portfolios/hedging strategies and minimizing asset specific risks through diversification over short-term and long-term. In addition, results could support the maintenance, growth and development of a combination of competitive balanced investment markets including real estate, equity, bond and money markets in post-pandemic economy.

The purpose of this paper is to unveil the main changes in the UAE’s policy towards Iran since its foundation in 1971. The UAE favored strategic hedging, extending its commercial and diplomatic relations with Iran, in addition to developing its military capabilities and maintaining military/security alliances with Saudi Arabia and the USA. However, the UAE started to reorient its policy towards Iran by adopting some sort of balancing strategy in the aftermath of the Arab Spring of 2011. This paper examines how and why the UAE had to change course and explores whether it would revert back to strategic hedging with Iran.

The study will be carried out based on a theoretical framework drawn from strategic hedging theory, a new structural theory in international relations, to examine the shifts in UAE policy towards Iran. Previous literature suggests that small states prefer hedging over balancing or bandwagoning. The authors also undertake a descriptive analysis and deploy a longitudinal within-case method to investigate changes in UAE policy towards Iran and identify the causal mechanisms behind these changes. That method allows investigating the impact of a particular event on a case by comparing the same case before and after that event occurred.

The main finding of this study is that the UAE hedging strategy towards Iran allowed maximizing the political and economic returns from the cooperation with Iran and mitigating the long-range national security risks without breaking up the consistent and beneficial ties with other regional and global powers. Hedging achieved the desired outcome, which is preventing direct military confrontation with Iran. Hard balancing, adopted by Abu Dhabi after the 2011 Arab Spring, has proved to have some negative effects, most importantly provoking Tehran. Some recent indicators suggest, though that the UAE may revert back to its long-established hedging policy towards Iran.

Strategic hedging is a new structural theory in international relation, although hedging behavior in states’ foreign policies is far from new. It is new enough, thus, not have been researched sufficiently, strategic hedging still needs theorizing and comparison. This paper highlights the importance of strategic hedging as the most appropriate strategy for small states. It provides an important contribution to the application of the theory to the case of UAE policy towards Iran. The paper also assesses the conventional wisdom that small states prefer hedging over balancing in the light of the changes in the UAE foreign policy since 2011.

Many companies have either rejected or reduced the size of risk management (hedging) programs because they do not believe that the market will reward them sufficiently for the reduction in earnings volatility. In fact, many commodity companies would take the argument a step farther and argue that the market will punish them for reducing their commodity exposure.

The effect of exchange rate movements on firm value is important to firms engaged in international transactions. These accounting exposures can be managed using financial instruments. However, the competitive or strategic effects that create economic exposure require firms to adopt a strategic approach. This paper reports on the extent to which large, publicly‐listed UK firms adopt a strategic approach to the management of exchange rate risk. Unlike earlier studies, the results indicate the widespread use of a range of operational hedging techniques. A significant proportion of firms are also found to incorporate currency risk management as a factor in decisions made by their operating departments. However, the study also indicated considerable variation in the application of operational techniques between firms and industry sectors.

The lessons and merits of changes in the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities are still debated and are a major policy issue. Prior studies provide mixed evidences on the economic consequences of mandatory derivative instruments ' recognition and disclosure. This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the impact of mandatory derivative instruments ' recognition and disclosure on managers’ risk-management behavior. More importantly, this paper aims to investigate the role of product market competition on the impact of mandatory derivative instruments ' recognition and disclosure on managers’ risk-management behavior.

This paper tests the author ' s hypotheses using the fixed-effects estimation technique, where it includes firm dummies in all the regressions. This approach enables to control for unobserved firm effects (fixed effects) on firms’ risk-management behavior that are assumed to be constant through time but vary across firms.

The author finds that mandatory recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities, on average, decreases firms’ market rate risk exposure. This finding suggests that after the implementation of the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities required by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (SFAS 133), firms engage in more prudent risk-management activities to mitigate the potential cost of earnings volatility imposed by the standard. However, the decrease in market rate risk exposure is lower when the level of product market competition is higher. This finding is consistent with the idea that the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities required by SFAS 133 unintentionally forces firms in competitive industries to engage in significant risk-taking. The result suggests that more disclosure in risk management may change risk-management incentives in undesirable ways if firms face the threat of entry in their product markets.

The results provide a new understanding on the role of product market competition on the effectiveness of mandatory derivative instruments ' recognition and disclosure. The findings imply that standard setters should take product market competition into consideration before making derivative instruments and hedging activities ' recognition and disclosure mandatory for all firms.

The paper contributes to the accounting literature by providing a new insight into the moderating role of product market competition in the accounting recognition and disclosure regulation and firms’ reporting behavior relation. Moreover, the paper extends the current literature on the effects of SFAS 133 on risk-management activities and sheds light on the impact of accounting regulations on firms’ real economic behavior.

In the presence of capital market imperfections, risk management at the enterprise level is apt to increase the firm's value to shareholders by reducing costs associated with agency conflicts, external financing, financial distress, and taxes. The purpose of this paper is to provide an accessible and comprehensive account of these rationales for corporate risk management and to give a short overview of the empirical support found in the literature.

The paper outlines the main theories suggesting that corporate risk management can enhance shareholder value and briefly reviews the empirical evidence on these theories.

When there are imperfections in capital markets, corporate hedging can enhance shareholder value through its impact on agency costs, costly external financing, direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy, as well as taxes. More specifically, corporate hedging can alleviate underinvestment and asset substitution problems by reducing the volatility of cash flows, and it can accommodate the risk aversion of undiversified managers and increase the effectiveness of managerial incentive structures through eliminating unsystematic risk. Lower volatility of cash flows also leads to lower bankruptcy costs. Moreover, corporate hedging can also align the availability of internal resources with the need for investment funds, helping firms to avoid costly external financing. Finally, corporate risk management can reduce the corporate tax burden in the presence of convex tax schedules. While there is empirical support for these rationales of hedging at the firm level, the evidence is only modestly supportive, suggesting alternative explanations.

The discussed theories and the empirical evidence are described in an accessible way, in part by using numerical examples.

The purpose of this paper is to re-examine currency swaps as an effective hedging technique for individual asset performance in today’s global real estate market, by considering hypothetical prime office investments across six different cities and five currency pairs. The perspective of a risk-averse, high net worth, non-institutional, smaller-scale Swiss investor is paired with investors from five additional national markets.

The study examines currency swaps in key office markets across three continents (Frankfurt, London, New York, Sydney, Warsaw and Zurich) and extends previous work on the topic by adopting both Monte Carlo (MC) and Latin Hypercube (LH) techniques to create stochastic samples for individual asset performance analyses. This is the first paper to apply LH sampling to currency swaps with underlying real estate assets, and the validity of this method is compared with that of MC. Four models are presented: the experience of the domestic investor (no exchange rate (ER) fluctuations); an unhedged direct foreign investment; hedging rental income and initial purchase price via a currency swap; and hedging rental income and anticipated terminal value.

The efficacy of a swap depends on the historical framework of the ERs. If the foreign currency depreciates against the domestic one, hedging the repatriated cash flow of a property investment proved superior to the unhedged strategy (EUR, GBP, PLN and USD to the CHF). An investor would benefit from exposure to an appreciating foreign currency (CHF to the EUR, GBP, PLN and USD), with an unhedged strategy clearly outperforming the currency swap as well as the domestic investor’s performance, while a historically sideways fluctuating ER (AUD to the CHF) also favours an unhedged approach. In all scenarios, unexpected economic or market shocks could cause negative consequences on the repatriated proceeds.

This research is of interest to small-scale, non-institutional investors aiming to develop strategies for currency risk mitigation in international investments for individual assets; however, tax-optimising strategies and the implications on a larger portfolio have not been taken into account.

There is no recent academic work on the efficacy of currency swaps in today’s global office market, nor has the position of smaller-scale high net worth investors received much academic attention. This research revisits the discussion on their validity, providing contemporary insight into the performance of six markets using LH as an alternative and original sampling technique.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the benefits of international equity portfolios from the viewpoint of Polish investors.

Eight national stock markets are included in the sample and three different portfolio forming strategies – Equally‐Weighted Portfolio (EWP), Minimum Variance Portfolio (MVP) and Tangency Portfolio (TP) – are adopted to construct the international diversified portfolios. In order to reveal the impact of currency hedging, the performance of a non‐hedged versus a fully‐hedged strategy is estimated. Finally, for comparison purpose, performances of the international portfolios from US investors' perspective are also examined.

Using monthly data from 1999 to 2008, the results show that from an ex post basis, an equally‐weighted global portfolio offers risk reduction opportunities for Polish investors and performance improvement potentials for US investors. In addition, US investors seem to fare better leaving their foreign investment unhedged, while Polish investors benefit from currency hedging. However, ex ante analysis reveals that when short‐selling is allowed, TP outperforms other portfolios and the risk‐adjusted portfolio performance could be enhanced by currency hedging.

In summary, the ex post analysis suggests that global portfolio either reduces risk or improves return. Compared to the domestic portfolio, the international portfolio reduces the portfolio risk while maintaining certain level of portfolio return for Polish investors who experience unusual high volatility in domestic market. On the other hand, an international portfolio yields higher portfolio return with similar risk level, as compared to the domestic portfolio, for US investors who suffer losses in the domestic market. A full currency hedging strategy benefits Polish but not US investors. Hedging or not, the risk of the local stock market is the major contributor to the risk of the equally‐weighted portfolio for both Polish and US investors.