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To investigate the nature of investment expertise and factors affecting the information processing and performance of investment experts, this paper hypothesizes normative characteristics of investment expertise and compares such characteristics with actual characteristics documented in prior literature on the investment expert. Based on collective evidence from these sources, a model of investment expertise is proposed.

Results support the existence of investment expertise in (1) the nature of knowledge, (2) problem solving and information search, and (3) performance. A variety of factors that could influence the information processing and performance of the investment expert, including personal, cognitive, and contextual elements, are also discussed in the paper and included in the proposed model of investment expertise.

Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to explore the proactive role played by investor relations officers (IROs) in enhancing the quality and delivery of corporate social performance (CSP) information to social responsibility investment (SRI) analysts and investors, thereby improving the link between CSP and corporate financial performance (CFP). The increasing pressures on corporations to produce and communicate CSP information will be described, as well as how the timely and meaningful communication of CSP can improve CFP.

Methodology/approach – Subsequent to a review of relevant literature, three case examples from McDonald’s, Nestlé, and Stora Enso illustrate Hockerts and Moir’s grounded theory framework that suggest how IROs can improve communication of CSP.

Findings – This chapter illustrates three levels of communicating CSP information. First, IROs target SRI investors and respond to ESG inquiries and surveys. At the second level, IROs integrate ESG information into business strategy and financial results. At the third level, IROs actively market CSP and create a two-way proactive dialogue between SRI investors and senior management and the board.

Practical implications – This chapter provides practical examples to improve ESG activities and their communication via the IRO to SRI analysts and investors.

Originality/value of chapter – This chapter contributes to the literature on the CSP–CFP link by illustrating how proactive IROs are improving the CSP information channel to SRI securities analysts and investors. Furthermore, it advances the theory and research concerning the impact of the information channel between IROs and securities analysts behind the CSP–CFP link.

This chapter analyses how corporate governance codes in Europe approach CSR, devoting specific guidelines or recommendations or specifying the responsibility of implementing and disclosing CSR in the company.

Content analysis have been used in a sample of 27 corporate governance codes of 27 European countries, issued in the European Union (EU) and United Kingdom (UK), issued by governments (seven codes), national stock exchange (eight codes), industrial associations (six codes) and composites (six codes).

Only five out of 27 codes make and explicit reference to the term Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Two of them reflect the importance of a CSR Report (Slovenia and Spain), whereas the Spanish Code was the only code which devoted a section to the implementation of a CSR policy.

Although corporate governance codes could represent an opportunity to shift the focus from an implicit CSR approach to an explicit CSR approach in Europe, the truth is that content related to the issue and its level of specificity does not reflect that change yet.

Previous literature has not focused on the analysis of corporate governance codes from a CSR perspective, so the chapter is relevant for policy makers when it comes to updating corporate governance codes.

Recent corporate scandals such as WorldCom, Enron, and others suggest a failure of corporate governance, that is, of the allocation of power and its lawful use and accountability within the corporation.

This chapter presents a game theoretic model for analyzing the power dynamics among the three groups responsible for oversight in the Anglo-American corporate model – namely the Board of Directors through its audit committee, corporate management, and the external auditors.

The chapter shows, among other findings, that the current governance structure results in an extreme imbalance of power among the three groups that not only permits but even induces management to conceal necessary financial data and often to ignore the long-term interests of the firm.

The chapter also derives changes in principles of governance that can right such imbalances and prevent defalcations from taking place through institutionalizing effective ex-ante checks and balances of power in addition to the ex post measures that come into play only after a wrong has been committed and which are the case with recent exchange rules and Congressional enactments.

None.

No prior analysis along these lines.

We develop and test an innovative approach to teaching financial statement analysis (FSA) and assessing student learning outcomes based on making complex stock investment decisions compared to professional analysts. We train students to apply FSA and emphasize interdisciplinary factors and high integrative complexity. Our innovative FSA teaching approach, which we apply in an MBA financial reporting course, involves the instructor lecturing on FSA as a tool for integrative and complex decision making, students researching and applying FSA to public companies, and presenting the rationale for individual and group stock investment decisions. The instructor gives high-quality and timely feedback on the students’ application of FSA with a focus on investment judgments involving critical thinking, problem-solving, and teamwork skills. Our detailed efficacy analysis shows that our FSA teaching approach is effective. Students who perceive a public company to have credible management, effective competitive strategy, and an acceptable level of financial flexibility make comparable individual and group stock investment decisions as professional analysts.

The bankruptcy of Enron in December 2001 marked the beginning of broad awareness that American corporations had left behind the strategy of expanding through diversification that was the hallmark of the 1950s through the early 1980s. CEOs now made it job one to meet the earnings projections of securities analysts, such that by the year 2000 they were, in record numbers, “restating earnings” – admitting that they had cooked the books. Accounting shenanigans were the tip of the iceberg, and what lay under the water was a new approach to running the corporation to produce numbers that analysts and institutional investors would like. Three groups that stood to benefit from the new strategy spun it to investors as in the interest of all. Managers of hostile takeover firms defined their business as setting firms on the path to performing for shareholders. Institutional investors defined earnings management, rather than acquisitions management, as increasing shareholder value and focused management attention on earnings by popularizing stock options. Securities analysts hawked their own profit projections as the reigning metric of corporate performance, and favored easy-to-analyze single-industry firms through “buy” recommendations. These three groups changed the incentives executives faced, making accounting shenanigans in the pursuit of earnings management widely popular and enriching institutional investors, analysts, and executives in the process. Regulatory changes to end malfeasance have made it marginally more difficult to perform illegal accounting practices, but they have not changed the core corporate strategy that has emerged since the early 1980s. The changes illuminate the rise of groups of business professionals in the power structure, for it was not investors but different groups of business professionals who won the day. The changes illuminate, as well, the role of the social construction of interest in power relations among groups – it was by convincing executives and shareholders that a new corporate strategy was in their own interest, which these business professionals succeeded.

An obvious way to improve acquisition performance is to avoid completing value-destroying acquisitions. However, once announced, manager motivations often focus on completing acquisitions. The authors develop how external governance actors can interpret acquisition characteristics and make counter-signals that acquiring firm managers could use to improve acquisition outcomes. The authors specifically develop how managers may react to counter-signals by shareholders, media, analysts, and short sellers. While there is limited research considering these external governance actors, evidence suggests that managers’ reactions to these actors may vary. A more integrated assessment of external governance actors’ influence on acquisition completion offers an opportunity to better understand acquisition processes and performance.

In the stock market, herding behavior occurs when investors mimic the actions of others in their investment decisions. As a result, the market becomes inefficient and speculative bubbles form. This study aims to investigate the relationship between information, overconfidence, market sentiment, experience and national culture, and herding behavior among Malaysian investors. A total of 400 questionnaires are distributed to bank institutions' investors. The survey design based on cross-sectional data is analyzed using the Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Model. The results indicate that information, market sentiment, experience, and national culture are positively related to herding behavior, while overconfidence has no effect. With this, the government should strengthen regulations to prevent the dissemination of misleading information. Moreover, investors are encouraged to overcome narrow thinking by expanding their understanding of different cultures when making investment decisions.