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The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the effects of stock price synchronicity and herding behavior of qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) on stock price crash risk, especially the mediating effect of herding behavior of QFII on the relation of stock price synchronicity and stock price crash risk.

Taking China’s A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2014 and QFII holding shares data as the research sample, this study calculates herding effect index, sock price synchronicity index and stock price crash risk index, and perform linear regression.

This study concludes that, either herding behavior of QFII or the stock price synchronicity can increase the stock price crash risk. Further study reveals that, the herding behavior of QFII also improves the effect of stock price synchronicity on stock price crash risk. Namely, herding behavior of QFII acts as the mediating role between stock price synchronicity and stock price crash risk.

This study empirically analyzes and verifies the mediating roles of herding behavior of QFII in affecting the relation of sock price synchronicity and stock price crash risk for the first time. The findings of this study contribute to the study of the role of QFII in stabilizing Chinese security market.

The nature and extent of our knowledge of stock market efficiency are examined. The development of “efficiency”, as a way of thinking about stock markets, is traced from Roberts (1959) and Fama (1965) onward. The early work successfully introduced competitive economic theory to the study of stock markets and paved the way for a flood of empirical research on the relation between information and stock prices. This literature irreversibly altered our views on stock market behavior. The theory and evidence of seemingly‐rational use of information lay in sharp contrast to prior beliefs. It was associated with a widespread increase in respect for stock markets, financial markets, and markets in general, at the time. Researchers began developing and using a variety of formal models of security prices. Nevertheless, “efficiency” has its limitations, both theoretically (as a way of characterizing markets) and empirically (by stretching the quality of the data, the estimation techniques used, and our knowledge of price behavior in competitive markets). Extensive evidence of anomalies suggests either that the market systematically misprices securities or that the theoretical or empirical limitations are binding, or both. The less interesting research question now is whether markets are efficient, and the more interesting question is how we can learn more about price and transactions behavior in competitive stock markets. The concept of an “efficient stock market” has stimulated both insight and controversy since Fama (1965) introduced it to the financial economics literature. As a construct, “efficiency” models the stock market in terms of the reaction of prices to the flow of information. Like all theory choices, modelling the market in this fashion involved tradeoffs. The benefits included opening the literature to an abundance of high‐quality researchable data, covering a variety of information, and the resulting insights obtained on the role of information in setting prices. The opportunity costs included temporarily closing the literature to alternative ways of viewing stock markets, for example by modelling public information as a homogenous good and thus ignoring factors such as differences in beliefs among investors, differences in information processing costs, and the “animal spirits” that might drive group behavior. The costs also included reliance on particular asset‐pricing models of how an “efficient” market would set prices. Not surprisingly, the ensuing deluge of research has produced some startling evidence, for and against the proposition that financial markets are “efficient”. Strongly‐conflicting views and puzzling anomalies remain. The early evidence seemed unexpectedly consistent with the theory. The theory, and its implications, also seemed clear at the time. After a period that seems short in retrospect, the growing body of evidence in favor of the efficient market hypothesis emerged as one of the most influential empirical areas of economics. Fama's (1970) review described a flourishing, coherent and confident literature. This research had an irreversible effect on our knowledge of and attitude toward stock markets, and financial markets generally. It coincided with an emergence of interest in, and respect for, all markets among economists and politicians, and influenced the worldwide trend toward “liberalizing” financial and other markets. The research consistently appeared to show an unbiased reaction of stock prices to public information. The property of “unbiased reaction” to public information, which formed the basis of the early definitions of “efficiency”, was seen to be an implication of rational, maximizing investor behavior in competitive securities markets (Fama 1965, p.4). Reduced to a basic level, the reasoning was that any systematicallybiased reaction to public information is costlessly publicly observable, and thus provides pure profit opportunities to be competed away. Characterizing the market in terms of its reaction to information is only one of many feasible ways of modelling stock price behavior, but it introduced economic theoryto the empirical studyof stock prices, which had received little serious attention from economists prior to that point. Despite the subsequent spate of anomalies, the early efficiency literature not only adapted standard economic theoryto provide the first formal economic insights into how stock prices behave, but it helped pave the way for an outporing of theoretical and empirical work on stock markets and capital markets in general. Subsequent empirical research was not as consistent with the theory. Evidence of “anomalous” return behavior now is widespread and well‐known. It generallytakes the form of variables (for example, size, day‐of‐the‐week, P/E ratio, market/book value ratio, rank of scaled earnings change, dividend yield) that are significantly but inexplicablyrelated to subsequent abnormal stock returns. Much of this evidence has defied rational economic explanation to date and appears to have caused many researchers to strongly qualify their views on market efficiency. Disagreement has not been not confined to the evidence. The literature has produced a variety of research designs, ranging from the “market model” of Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (FFJR, 1969) to Shiller's (1981a,b) variance‐bounds tests. The very term “efficiency” has engendered controversy: there is a modest literature on precisely what efficiency means, on the role of transaction costs, and on whether efficient markets are logically feasible. Making sense of this literature requires careful definition of “efficiency” in this context and careful analysis of the type of evidence that has been offered in relation to it. This involves an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of both the theory of efficient markets, as a way of characterizing stock markets, and of the data and research designs used in testing it. Not surprisingly, a mixed conclusion emerges. While the concept of efficient markets was an audacious departure from the comparative ignorance and suspicion among economists of stock markets that preceded it, and provides valuable insights into their behavior, the concept has its limitations, in terms of both its internal logical coherence and its fit with the data. Section 1 ofthis survey sketches the development of the efficient market theory, reviewing the principal contributions in terms of their usefulness in guiding and evaluating empirical research. Section 2 addresses the limitations inherent in what is knowable about stock market efficiency, given the present state of theory about how security prices might behave in an “efficient” market. It argues that there are binding limitations in the theoryof asset pricing, some of which are known and others of which are unknown or even unknowable. These limitations must be borne in mind when choosing whether to interpret the data as evidence of: (1) market efficiency, under the maintained hypothesis that a specific research design, including a specific model of asset pricing used to benchmark price behavior, correctly describes pricing in an efficient market; or (2) the ability of our models and research designs to encapsulate how prices behave in an efficient market, under the maintained hypothesis of efficiency. Against this background, section 3 then provides an assessment of the accomplishments of the theory of stock market efficiency, including an interpretation of the evidence. It focuses on the nature and influence of the evidence and does not attempt to provide a comprehensive literature taxonomy. The final section offers conclusions. The principal conclusion is that the theory of efficient markets has irreversibly enhanced our knowledge of and respect for stock markets (and perhaps for all financial market or even for markets in general) but that, like all theories, it is fundamentally flawed.

The price clustering behavior is becoming a core part of the market efficiency theory especially with the development of trading strategies and the occurrence of major and unprecedented shocks which have led to severe inquiry regarding asset price dynamics and their distribution. However, research on emerging stock market is scant. The study contributes to the literature on price clustering by investigating an active emerging stock market, the Muscat stock market one of the Arabian Gulf Markets.

This research adopts the artificial intelligence technique and other statistical estimation procedure in understanding the price clustering patterns in Muscat stock market and their main determinants.

The findings reveal that stock prices are marked by clustering behavior as commonly highlighted in the previous studies. However, we found strong evidence of price preferences to cluster on numbers closer to zero than to one. We also show that the nature of firm’s activity matters for price clustering behavior. In addition, firms with traded bonds in Oman market experienced a substantial less stock price clustering than other firms. Clustered stock prices are more likely to have higher prices and higher volatility of price. Finally, clustering raised when the market became highly uncertain during the Covid-19 crisis especially for the financial firms.

This study provides novel results on price clustering literature especially for an active emerging market and during the Covid-19 pandemic crisis.

This study investigates the ex-dividend day stock prices of the firms listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) where the tax rate is higher on dividends than on capital gains. The results help to explain what impact taxes have on the ex-day stock prices behavior in an emerging market.

To examine the tax effect on the ex-day stock prices behavior, this study considers after-tax dividends and computes the raw price ratio, market-adjusted price ratio, raw price drop, market-adjusted price drop. The market-adjusted ex-dividend day abnormal returns and relative trading volume are also examined to determine the direction of investor trading around the ex-day.

The main hypotheses examine whether the mean (median) differs from its theoretical value by using a t-test and nonparametric sign-rank test. The findings suggest that the drop of stock prices on the ex-day on the DSE is not due to taxes or transaction costs but to valuation assumptions made by investors in determining the equilibrium stock price.

Findings of this study will be useful for investors and traders in their valuation assumption to trade around the ex-dividend day.

Market participant’s preference of dividends, and exempted tax and its ultimate contribution to the equity value explain the ex-day stock prices behavior in the Dhaka Stock Exchange.

This paper examines the Random Walk Hypothesis (RWH) for aggregate New Zealand share market returns, as well as the CRSP NYSE‐AMEX (USA) index during the 1980‐2001 period. Using several indices, we rely on the variance‐ratio test and find evidence to support the rejection of the RWH with some evidence of a momentum effect. However, we find evidence to suggest the behaviour of share prices to be time‐dependent in New Zealand. For example, we find the indices tested were closer to random after the 1987 share market crash. Further analysis showed even stronger results for periods subsequent to the passage of the Companies Act 1993 and the Financial Reporting Act 1993. We also find evidence that indices based on large capitalisation stocks are more likely to follow a random walk compared to those based on smaller stocks. For the USA index, we find stronger evidence of random behaviour in our sample period compared to the earlier period examined by Lo and Mackinlay (1988)

The fact that stocks going ex‐dividend decline in price by less than the dividend amount is theoretically attributed to the differential taxation of dividend and capital gains or the differential taxation of investor groups. NYSE, Amex and Toronto Stock Exchange listed stocks, and stocks interlisted on these three exchanges, are examined to infer the tax jurisdiction of the marginal investor. The stock price changes relative to the dividends are consistent with a tax clientele effect. Further, the stock price changes are plausible given the tax rates. Ex‐dividend day behavior is different for non‐interlisted stocks on all three exchanges, suggesting each exchange has a different tax clientele. Canadian firms interlisted on US exchanges exhibit ex‐dividend day behavior consistent with the appropriate US exchange’s non‐interlisted stocks, suggesting that the marginal investors in these stocks are American.

The purpose of this study is to examine herd behaviour under different market conditions, examine the potential impact of the firm size and stock characteristics on this relationship, and explore how herding affects market prices in the German market.

The authors apply a method that does not rely on theoretical models, thus eliminating the biases inherent in their application. This technique is based on the assumption that macro herding manifests itself in the synchronicity (comovement) of stock returns.

The study’s findings show that herding is more pronounced in down markets and is more pronounced when market returns reach extreme levels. Additionally, the authors have found that there is stronger herding among large companies compared to small companies, and that stock characteristics considered have no effect on the degree of macro herding. Results also suggest that the contemporaneous market-wide information drives macro herding and that macro herding facilitates the incorporation of market-wide information into prices.

The study’s results strongly support the idea of directional asymmetry, which holds that stocks react quickly to negative macroeconomic news while small stocks react slowly to positive macroeconomic news. Additionally, the study’s results suggest that the contemporaneous market-wide information drives macro herding and that macro herding facilitates the rapid incorporation of market-wide information into prices.

To the best of the researchers’ knowledge, this is the first study that examines macro herding for a major financial market using a herding measure based on the co-movement of returns that does not rely on theoretical models.

As a financial policy, dividend policy significantly affects firm value. This chapter analyzes how stock prices react to dividend decisions. First, a dividend payment is an extraction of value; therefore, stock price theoretically drops by the dividend amount on the ex-dividend day. In practice, the price drop and the dividend magnitude are not equal because of tax clientele, short-term trading, and market microstructure. Investors are indifferent in trading stocks before and after stocks go ex-dividend if they obtain equal marginal benefits from the two trading times. The difference in tax rates on dividends and capital gains leads to the gap between the price drop and the dividend amount. Moreover, if transaction costs are considerable, investors have high incentives to short-sell stocks until they cannot obtain more profits. The final outcome of this short-term trading is the difference between the price drop and the dividend amount. Furthermore, market microstructure factors such as limit orders, bid-ask spread, and price discreteness also create this gap. Second, dividend announcements convey valuable information to outsiders. When firms announce increases (decreases) in dividends, their stock prices tend to increase (decrease). Third, dividend policy is negatively related to stock price volatility. This negative relationship is explained by duration effect, rate of return effect, arbitrage realization effect, and information effect. Empirical evidence for this relationship is found in many countries. Finally, dividend smoothing is also considered as a signal about firms' future earnings. Consequently, firms with stable dividends have higher market value. In other words, dividend stability has a positive effect on stock prices.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of executives’ self-interested behaviors induced by the pay bandwagon on stock price crash risk in Chinese listed firms and attempt to shed light on the influencing channels of this effect.

The empirical analysis is based on the panel data set which contains information on the executives and stock price of 11,710 firm-year observations over the period 2007–2015. The multiple linear regression models are implemented to examine whether the executive pay bandwagon affects corporate future stock price crash risk. Then, earnings management, tax avoidance and overinvestment are applied as the behavior choice of executive pay bandwagon to analyze the potential influencing channels.

Results indicate that the lower the executives’ pay is than the median pay level of executives in firms of similar size and industry, incentives of pay bandwagon are stronger, leading to a higher future stock price crash risk. Moreover, evidence shows that the positive relationship between executive pay bandwagon and crash risk is attenuated when firms have strong external monitoring mechanisms such as Big Four auditors, cross-listing in the Hong Kong stock exchange, high marketization process and high institutional ownership. Then, some weak evidence supports that internal governance such as internal control plays the same moderating role. In addition, based on the path test, the stock price crash effect of the executive pay bandwagon has a complete tax avoidance intermediary effect and a partial earnings management intermediary effect.

This study contributes to the executive compensation literature from a psychological perspective on the economic consequences research brought about by the pay bandwagon for China’s listed firms. Moreover, this paper provides a supplement to the literature on factors which is completely different from previous studies that affect the future stock price crash risk.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of national culture on herding behavior across international financial markets.

The relation between national culture and investor behavior, and how it impacts overall market volatility is studied by examining synchronized stock price movements and stock market volatility in 47 countries around the world over the period of January 2003–May 2012.

The author finds that nations with lower values of individualistic culture are more likely to have a higher number of synchronized stock price movements. Further, the correlation between stock price movements apparently increases stock market volatility. Nations with high individualistic culture have a lower number of synchronized stock price movements and, thus, have lower levels of stock market volatility. The positive relationship between synchronized stock price movements and stock market volatility is stronger for emerging markets during the financial crisis from June 2007 to December 2008.

The empirical results in this paper indicate that a portion of the difference in market level volatility is attributed to the investor bias of different cultures. Investor behavior bias creates excess volatility that drives stock prices away from fundamentals. This impact is strong in nations with lower individualistic culture. The result from this research could also have a wide implication in the investment industry.