Search results

We investigate the impact of the creation of a new incentive structure for CEOs resulting from firms introducing equity-based compensation (EBC) as a means of paying top executives on policy decisions. Contrasting a firm’s stock and operating performance in the period the CEO is compensated with EBC (EBC period) and the period when EBC is not a component of the same executive’s pay (No EBC period) leads us to conclude that awarding stock options and restricted shares to executives is not associated with improved firm performance. However, firms initiate EBC after superior performance suggesting that CEOs are awarded compensation in this form as a reward for past performance. Firms have higher unsystematic and total risk levels in the EBC period suggesting EBC influences CEOs’ risk-taking behavior and reduces agency costs arising from managerial risk aversion. While there is no change in R&D expenses and cash ratios there is a decrease in capital expenditures in the EBC period, which is consistent with reduced overinvestment agency costs. Finally, leverage and payout ratios are similar in both periods implying that firms’ financing policy is not influenced by changes in CEOs’ compensation structure.

The purpose of this study is to conduct a comparative analysis of the economic determinants of the compensation for chief executive officers (CEOs) between the pre- and post-financial crisis periods. To conduct the comparative analysis, the authors consider five years before and five years after the financial crisis of 2008. The authors use the data from the US financial service institutions and run separate regressions for the pre- and post-crisis periods to check if there is any significant difference in the economic determinants of executive compensation before and after the financial crisis. The authors find that total compensation and its incentive components decreased significantly in the post-crisis period. In the pre-crisis period, total compensation was determined by stock performance, accounting profit, growth, and leverage, whereas in the post-crisis period stock returns and leverage are the major factors influencing total compensation. The authors also find that firms’ leverage negatively influences the sensitivity of the pay for performance, but the influence of leverage on pay for performance is weaker in the post-crisis period. Our research is significant in the context of the US economy, the regulatory reforms of financial institutions, and the perspectives of the executive compensations. This is the first study that compares the relationship between compensation and firm performance over the pre- and post-crisis periods. It is an explicit attempt to develop a theoretical understanding of the compensation/performance relationship for the financial industry, which is blamed for the financial crisis and is affected by the Dodd–Frank regulation after the crisis.

For the last two decades economics literature and debates have increasingly referred to institutions as the answers to the long-lasting queries regarding how stock market performance rises and what policies can be implement to encourage best outcomes in terms of stock market performances in Malaysia so that the analysis of the institutional basis under which any stock market functions has now converted an essential issue of investigation. This study attempts to capture the relationship between stock market movements and institutional quality (IQ) using autoregressive distributed lag bounds testing approach, over 33 years during the period of 1984–2016. The finding suggests that IQ positively and significantly affects stock market performance. Moreover, it is also showing that there is, in fact, a causal relationship between institutions and stock market performance. The findings are robust to changes in specification and a host of transparency measures.

The M&A literature lacks coherence and consistency when explaining the role of CEO power in influencing post-acquisition firm performance in both theoretical and empirical terms. This study uses meta-analytic techniques to quantitatively synthesize and evaluate the impact of 11 CEO power constructs (CEO duality; compensation; ownership; founder CEO; acquisition experience; functional area experience; outside directorship; elite education; CEO celebrity; age; and tenure) on acquiring firms’ post-acquisition performance. Results of 85 independent studies show that CEO ownership, functional area experience, and tenure are significantly positive predictors for better acquisition performance. At the same time, CEO duality and CEO elite education are significantly negative predictors of different measures of acquisition performance. These findings indicate the importance of integrating different theories to enhance our understanding of the nature of strategic leadership in acquisition performance.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate sustainability have gained prominence in the major capital markets. In Brazil, the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BM&FBovespa) has created the Corporate Sustainability Index (ISE) and the Carbon Efficient Index (ICO2), responsible for indicating the performance of sustainable companies. Therefore, this study proposes to examine and compare the stock returns of the sustainability index member companies with the returns of companies out of these indexes. In this methodology we selected the two principal negotiability indexes of that market (IBOV and IBrX50), which are indexes that meet the most traded stocks of BM&FBovespa, and calculated the average daily returns of the four indexes in order to make performance comparisons over the period 2005–2014, based on nonparametric statistical tests. Our findings indicate that the average returns of sustainability indexes were higher, but these differences were not statistically significant, confirming previous evidence. Additionally, by means of a cointegration test, we found that the indexes are cointegrated in the long term. These findings are limited to the analyzed emerging market and are also subject to the limitations of the estimated models. Thus, we can infer that presence in the sustainability indexes does not indicate statistically significant higher returns, which means that companies with sustainable practices in Brazil are not only concerned with economic performance, but also with social, cultural, and environmental issues. The main findings are aligned with the concept of triple bottom line, even in the case of an emerging market.

This paper looks at the research to date on the future of broadly granted stock options (options granted to at least half the full-time employees of a company). In the U.S., granting options broadly became popular in the late 1990s, but has lost some of its appeal in the wake of stock market declines, accounting changes, and increased shareholder concerns about dilution. The data indicate a significant minority of companies will change their plans, but a substantial majority will keep them. The data also indicate changes in accounting rules will not affect stock prices and that broadly granted options are better for corporate performance than narrowly granted options.

The information of pledging stocks for liquidity by controlling shareholders of publicly traded firms in Taiwan has been required to disclose since 1998. A common perception by market practitioners in Taiwan is that stock pledging by controlling shareholders is an indication of expropriation of firms. This study first examines the determinants of the tendency that controlling shareholders of firms in Taiwan pledge their stocks to financial institutions for liquidity and then evaluates how stock pledging by controlling shareholders affects their firms' accounting and financial performances. Determinants of firm attributes, market conditions, and corporate governance are identified. The tendency of stock pledging by controlling shareholders has a negative effect on accounting and financial performances. The negative effect on firm performance is reduced when the firm has a higher level of working capital. These findings indicate that stock pledging by controlling shareholders is an indication of weak corporate governance when the firm has lower liquidity. These findings may provide insights to the equity markets of the other countries in which public firms have more concentrated ownerships.

Many argue that the design of compensation contracts for public company chief executive officers (CEOs) is often not guided by a goal of value maximization. Yet, there is limited direct empirical evidence on the negative consequences of the proposed inefficient contracting between shareholders and CEOs. Using data on CEO bonus contracts of the S&P 500 firms, we investigate potential firm performance implications of the use of qualitative criteria such as leadership and mentoring in those contracts. We maintain that unlike quantitative criteria, qualitative criteria are difficult to define and measure on an objective basis, possibly resulting in an inefficient and biased incentive structure. Twenty-five percent of the sample observations have CEO bonus contracts that include a qualitative criterion for bonus payment determination. Our results show that employee productivity, asset productivity, capital expenditures, and future abnormal stock returns are lower for firms that use a qualitative criterion in CEO bonus contracts than those that do not. Further, contrary to the argument in prior literature that earnings management decreases with the use of subjective performance indicators in incentive contracts, we find that income-increasing accruals are actually higher when the CEO bonus contract includes a qualitative criterion. We recommend that compensation committees set concrete, measurable performance goals for CEOs, providing CEOs with better guidance and helping improve their corporate decision making.

We compare the financial stock performance of companies that participate in the Carbon Efficient Index (ICO2) and those that participate only in market-wide indices of the BM&FBovespa (the IBOV, IBrX50, and IBrX100). The data includes the daily quotations of the shares from these four indices for September 2010 to December 2014. We exclude companies from market-wide indices that also participated in the ICO2. We use the stock market and average volume liquidity indices in order to analyze liquidity. We employ financial indicators to analyze the performance of the indices. Returns of companies participating in the ICO2 exceed those of all other companies except those participating in the IBrX50. The returns of all indices are statistically similar. There is a proven long-term equilibrium relationship between the indices’ returns. The ICO2 does not present obvious superiority in terms of the Sharpe and Jensen indices, although the results surpass those of the market-wide indices. Although the financial performance of sustainable companies does not surpass that of other companies, the economic benefits are similar. Thus, even though the financial result presents no significant difference, it is crucial to acknowledge that investing in sustainable stocks does not result in financial loss; rather, it has a positive environmental impact. The literature connecting the performance of the shares of the ICO2 and broad indices is scarce. Our study improves understanding of how company stocks can generate economic benefits to both society and companies.

Purpose – This research presents empirical evidence on which performance measures are perceived as short-term oriented and long-term oriented by company executives, and on whether any perceived performance measure-related time orientation affects the time orientation of these executives. In addition, the study explores which measures impact executive time orientation, regardless of how these measures are perceived.

Methodology/approach – A survey was used to collect the perceptions of chief financial officers (CFOs) in 109 companies listed in the Nasdaq OMX, the Nordic Stock Exchange. Performance measures include: stock price, earnings, returns, cash flow, success of development programs, EVA™, sales, and balanced scorecard, and the method employed was multiple regression.

Findings – First, the CFOs perceived returns, sales, EPS, and stock price to have long time orientation. Second, the use of returns, stock price, and success of development programs as major performance measures encourage the CFOs toward long-term behavior, whereas the use of cash flow encourages short-term behavior. Third, stock price, earnings, and EPS are measures whose perceived time orientation affects the time orientation of executives. It is most likely due to this influence, that they have received major attention in public debates on the short time orientation of executives at the expense of other, more “silent” measures that also impact executive time orientation. Contextual factors strongly affect the results.

Practical implications – The study assists in designing executive performance measurement systems that encourage desired time orientation.

Originality/value – This study contributes to the fields of performance measurement and time orientation by recognizing the multidimensionality of the construct of time orientation and by showing how performance measures and their perceived time orientation influence executive time orientation.