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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the contrasting moderating effect of a firm’s exploration on the relationship between the two types of long-term incentives (stock options/stock ownership) for the chief executive officers and a firm’s long-term performance. Even though the two types of incentives are designed to improve long-term performance, the degrees of impact on long-term performance differ. Based on behavioral agency theory, this study theoretically and empirically examines the role of a firm’s exploration on the above relationship.

This study used three archival sources to obtain data on stock options, stock ownership, patents and exploration, financial measures, and others. Based on a sample of 1,963 firms in various industries from 1995 to 2006, this study tested the moderating effect of a firm’s exploration on the relationship between stock options/ownership and a firm’s performance.

This study reveals the contrasting moderating effect of a firm’s exploration on the relationship between stock options/ownership and a firm’s long-term performance: a positive moderating effect on the relationship between stock options and performance and a negative moderating effect on the relationship between stock ownership and performance. In addition, empirical evidence was added on the inverted U-shaped relationship between stock ownership and a firm’s long-term performance.

There is little research on a firm’s internal characteristics that strengthen or weaken the effects of stock options and stock ownership on firm performance. This study demonstrates the differential moderating effects of exploration on the relationship between stock options/stock ownership and long-term performance. Such effects of exploration come from the different risk features of stock options and stock ownership. The key implication is that stock options could be more effective than stock ownership to enhance a firm’s long-term performance when a firm has a strong exploration orientation.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of short-sale restrictions (SSR) with particular emphasis on their impact on the liquidity and informed trading in the stock and option markets.

Using a panel regression with controls for volatility, VIX and matched stocks, this study examines the effect of the short-sale ban (SSB) on stock and option liquidity, expressed in terms of spread and volume. In addition, the PIN and option information share (OIS) measures have been used to analyze its impact on informed trading in those related markets.

The results suggest that the SSB leads to a significant reduction in the liquidity of the affected stocks and their options. However, no significant change in the trader composition can be detected. This result is consistent to the short-prohibition effect predicted by Diamond and Verrecchia (1987).

Due to the sizeable data required to estimate the PIN and OIS measures, only a select sample of optionable stocks has been examined.

This study offers both academics and policy makers some useful insights into the effect of SSR on trading activities in both stock and option markets. From a policy perspective, it clearly demonstrates that regulatory changes targeting a specific market also affect other related markets via the arbitrage link between them.

Informed traders may prefer the options market to the stock market for reasons including the leverage effect, transaction costs, restrictions on short sale. Many studies try to predict future returns of stocks using informed traders' behavior in the options market. In this study, we examine whether the trading volume ratios of single stock options have the predictive power for future returns of the underlying stock. By analyzing the stock price responses to the “preliminary announcement of performance” of 36 underlying stocks on the Korea Exchange from November 2014 to March 2021 and the trading volume of options written on those stocks, we investigate the relation between the option ratios, which are the call option volume to put option volume ratio (C/P ratio) and the option volume to stock volume ratio (O/S ratio), and the future returns of the underlying stock. We also examine which ratio is better in predicting the future returns. The authors found that both option ratios showed the statistically significant predictability about future returns of the underlying stock and that the return predictability of the O/S ratio is more robust than that of the C/P ratio. This study shows that indicators generated in the options market can be used to predict future underlying stock returns. Further, the findings of this study contributed to a dearth of literature pertaining to single stock options. The results suggest that the single stock options market is efficient and influences the price discovery in the stock market.

The authors study stock and option grants around abrupt performance declines for continuing CEOs and find that firms facing abrupt financial declines grant more options than stock, while firms facing operational decline grant more stock than options. Firms making these adjustments just prior to performance declines outperform those that do not for three years following the decline and are less likely to engage in asset restructuring. To establish causality, the authors exploit compensation changes instigated by FAS 123R accounting regulation in 2005 that mandated stock option expensing. The result is robust to numerous tests, including rebalancing of incentives and CEO turnover. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

To establish causality, the authors exploit compensation changes instigated by FAS 123R accounting regulation in 2005 that mandated stock option expensing.

Firms making these adjustments just prior to performance declines outperform those that do not for three years following the decline and are less likely to engage in asset restructuring. The result is robust to numerous tests, including rebalancing of incentives and CEO turnover.

Several studies examine the relationship between poor performance and compensation of newly appointed CEOs. But firms regularly employ retention or incentive plans when experiencing distress to prevent critical employees from leaving when they are most needed (Goyal and Wang, 2017). Employee turnover results in a loss of continuity coupled with high search and training costs for replacement personnel. Beneish et al. (2017) find that 57 percent of CEOs associated with intentional misreporting retain their jobs, implying the costs of removing CEOs is high, especially if the incumbent CEO has a strong track record relative to industry peers prior to the period before the misreporting begins. The board fires the CEO if future firm value under the CEO is expected to be lower than under the best alternative CEO less adjustment costs (e.g. search costs, severance pay).

This paper aims to analyze the valuation of stock options from the perspective of an employee exhibiting preferences as described by cumulative prospect theory (CPT). In addition, it elaborates on their incentives effect and some implications in terms of design aspects.

The paper draws on the CPT framework to derive a continuous time model of the stock option subjective value using the certainty equivalence principle. Numerical simulations are used in order to analyze the subjective value sensitivity with respect to preferences‐related parameters and to investigate the incentives effect.

Consistent with a growing body of empirical and experimental studies, the model predicts that the employee may overestimate the value of his options in‐excess of their risk‐neutral value. Moreover, for typical setting of preferences parameters around the experimental estimates, and assuming the company is allowed to adjust existing compensation when making new stock option grants, the model predicts that incentives are maximized for strike prices set around the stock price at inception. This finding is consistent with companies’ actual compensation practices. Finally, the model predicts that an executive who is subject to probability weighting may be more prompted than a risk‐neutral executive to act in order to increase the firm's assets volatility.

This research proposes an alternative theoretical framework for the analysis of pay‐to‐performance sensitivity of equity‐based compensation that takes into account a number of prominent patterns of employee behavior that expected utility theory cannot explain. It contributes to recent empirical and theoretical researches that have advanced CPT framework as a promising candidate for the analysis of equity‐based compensation contracts.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between stock options compensation and firm strategic risk-taking, employing a quantile regression (QR) model. This study aims to analyze whether the impact of stock options on firm strategic risk-taking changes across various quantiles and investigates the moderating role of firm performance.

This study is based on a sample of 90 French firms for the period extending from 2008 to 2019. To deal with the non-uniform association, the authors use a panel quantile method.

The results reveal that the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) stock options on firm strategic risk-taking varies across risk-taking quantiles. More specifically, the study’s results show a positive association at low quantile levels of strategic risk-taking, measured by research and development (R&D) and a negative linkage at high levels. The authors also find that firm performance moderates the impact of CEO stock options on strategic risk-taking.

The non-uniform relationship between CEO stock options and firm strategic risk-taking shows that the weight of CEO stock options in the total compensation can be a major determinant of the firm's strategic risk-taking attitude.

This study extends existing research on executive compensation and strategic risk-taking. Thus, this study has the potential to help stakeholders, board of directors and regulators, who are attempting to understand how the compensation contract – in particular, stock option pay – is related to the risk behavior of the agents and guide them to structure the executive compensation in an optimal way.

This paper aims to investigate informational efficiency of stock, options and credit default swap (CDS) markets. Previous research suggests that informed traders prefer equity option and CDS markets over stock markets to exploit their informational advantage. As a result, equity and credit derivative markets contribute more to price discovery compared to stock markets.

In this study, the authors investigate the dynamics behind informed investors’ trading decisions in European stock, options and CDS markets. This allows to identify the predictive explanatory power of the unique information contained in each market with respect to future stock, CDS and option market movements.

A lead-lag relation is found between the CDS market and the other markets, in which changes in CDS spreads are able to consistently forecast changes in stock prices and equity options’ implied volatilities, indicating how the fast-growing CDS market seems to play a special role in the price discovery process. Moreover, in contrast to results of US studies, the stock market is found to forecast changes in the other two markets, suggesting that investors also prefer stock market involvement to exploit their information advantages before moving to CDS and option markets. Interestingly, these patterns have only emerged during the recent financial crisis, while before the crisis, the option market was found to be of major importance in the price discovery process.

The authors are the first to study the lead-lag relationship among European stock, option and CDS markets for a large sample period covering the financial crisis.

This paper aims to test the effects that different compensation policies have on managerial discretion with regard to stock options.

Hand-collected data from Securities and Exchange Commission registration statements are used to analyze the effects of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation policies on managerial discretion used in valuing stock options.

This paper provides evidence that during the height of the initial public offering (IPO) bubble, CEO pay was associated with the undervaluation of stock options by IPO firms. The discretion varies with the relative mix of cash vs stock-based compensation. Firms with higher cash compensation tend to undervalue the unobservable market price of pre-IPO shares, leading to lower option values and a lower likelihood of reporting in-the-money options. Firms with greater stock-based compensation understate stock volatility, resulting in lower measures of the time-value component of options.

The results provide evidence that firms attempted to disguise the true value of CEO pay when making IPOs. By disguising the value of options granted to the CEO, outsiders were not aware of the actual cost incurred and the true value of the company.

This paper is the first to document that IPO firms understate the non-observable market price of pre-IPO shares to manipulate the value of stock options. It also documents the effect of discretion in estimates of volatility on stock options and the link between this discretion and CEO compensation.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship of CEO compensation plans and the risk of managerial equity portfolios with the extent of strategic investments in advertising, capital expenditures and research and development (R&D). The elements of compensation are salary, bonuses, options and restricted stock grants. The authors proxy the design of CEO equity portfolios by the price performance sensitivity of the holdings and the portfolio deltas.

The authors use the components of executive compensation and portfolio risk as the dependent variables, regressing these against measures for the level of strategic investment. The authors test for non-linear relationships between the components of CEO compensation and strategic investments. The sample is a broad cross-section from 1992 to 2016.

The authors find strong support for non-linear relationships of capital expenditures and R&D with CEO bonuses, option grants and restricted stock grants. There are very complex relationships between the components of executive compensation and R&D expenditures, but little evidence of a relationship with advertising expenditures. The authors also find strong complex relationships in the design of CEO equity portfolios with advertising and R&D.

Little earlier research has considered advertising, capital expenditures and R&D in a unified framework. Also, testing for non-linear associations provides much greater insight into the relationship between the components of executive compensation and strategic investment. The findings represent a valuable incremental contribution to the executive compensation literature. The results also have normative policy implications for compensation committees’ design of optimal annual CEO compensation packages to incentivize or discourage particular strategic investment behavior.

China has formally implemented equity incentive for more than 10 years; thus, a considerable number of equity incentive programs has entered the exercise period. This means that it is time to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the incentive effects of equity incentive throughout the whole implementation phase. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between equity incentive, enterprise’s risk taking and risk decisions in China.

Using sensitivity of executives’ wealth and stock price (Delta) to measure the alignment effect and using sensitivity of executives’ wealth and stock return volatility (Vega) to measure the risk-taking effect, this paper aims to empirically test the relation of equity incentive and enterprise’s risk taking and risk decisions.

The authors find that Vega is positively related to risk taking; however, this improvement was mainly reflected in the private enterprises rather than state-owned enterprises. In terms of corporate policy choice, the authors find that Vega is positively related to firm focus and leverage. But, they have not found that Vega can promote R&D investment.

Existing studies have mostly concerned about the executives’ opportunistic behavior; however, analyses of the positive effect of equity incentive are limited. The authors use a combination of risk-taking incentives and alignment incentives to test the relationship between equity incentive and risk taking.