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This exercise exposes students to the accounting for stock option modifications and option service and performance conditions, requiring research in the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Accounting Standards Codification and the use of the Black-Scholes option pricing model.

Students identify and apply accounting standards to account for stock option plans, stock option modifications, acquired stock option plans, and service and performance conditions that relate to stock option plans. Indirect student feedback suggests that students view the exercise as valuable. Comments include that the exercise reinforces and expands their knowledge of real-world stock compensation plans. Direct assessment data using grading rubrics finds that most students meet instructor expectations.

The exercise enhances critical thinking skills, increases professional research practice, and improves written skills. It introduces students to common real-world events and reinforces their learning related to stock compensation.

Internal Revenue Code section 162(m) limits tax deductibility of executive compensation to $1 million per covered executive, with an exception for performance-based compensation. Both stock options and annual bonuses can qualify as performance-based, but they vary in the difficulty of qualification and the degree of additional compensation risk that qualification imposes on the executive. Most stock-option grants easily qualify with little change in risk, but qualification increases the risk associated with annual bonus compensation relative to what it was prior. The results of this study show that the propensity to issue stock options has increased for affected executives as a percentage of total compensation. Additional analysis suggests that this increase in stock-option compensation is substituting for lower increases in salary for affected executives, but not for annual cash bonuses. In fact, the results suggest that bonus compensation is also increasing as a percentage of total compensation. In summary, the results indicate that firms and their executives are acting in a way consistent with the incentives provided by section 162(m).

This paper looks at the research to date on the future of broadly granted stock options (options granted to at least half the full-time employees of a company). In the U.S., granting options broadly became popular in the late 1990s, but has lost some of its appeal in the wake of stock market declines, accounting changes, and increased shareholder concerns about dilution. The data indicate a significant minority of companies will change their plans, but a substantial majority will keep them. The data also indicate changes in accounting rules will not affect stock prices and that broadly granted options are better for corporate performance than narrowly granted options.

Executive stock option grants are intended to remove corporate governance problems by aligning the managers’ interests with those of the outside shareholders. Conventional schemes leave several problems in place. Exotic option structures can resolve these. In this paper, such structures are proposed and tested on the Dow Jones constituents over a 10-year period. These alternative schemes increase the financial rewards to the better performing managers, at no extra cost to the company whilst offering a resolution or mitigation of the identified agency problems No one scheme dominates the others and a portfolio of option types is indicated.

This chapter analyses the causes and effects of the financial crisis that commenced in 2008, and it examines the dramatic government rescues and reforms. The outcomes of this, the most severe collapse to befall the United States and the global economy for three-quarters of a century, are still unfolding. Banks, homeowners and industries stood to benefit from government intervention, particularly the huge infusion of taxpayer funds, but their future is uncertain. Instead of extending vital credit, banks simply kept the capital to cover other firm needs (including bonuses for executives). Industry in the prevailing slack economy was not actively seeking investment opportunities and credit expansion. The property and job markets languished behind securities market recovery. It all has been disheartening and scary – rage against those in charge fuelled gloom and cynicism. Immense private debt was a precursor, but public debt is the legacy we must resolve in the future.

The topic of volatility measurement and estimation is central to financial and more generally time-series econometrics. In this chapter, we begin by surveying models of volatility, both discrete and continuous, and then we summarize some selected empirical findings from the literature. In particular, in the first sections of this chapter, we discuss important developments in volatility models, with focus on time-varying and stochastic volatility as well as nonparametric volatility estimation. The models discussed share the common feature that volatilities are unobserved and belong to the class of missing variables. We then provide empirical evidence on “small” and “large” jumps from the perspective of their contribution to overall realized variation, using high-frequency price return data on 25 stocks in the DOW 30. Our “small” and “large” jump variations are constructed at three truncation levels, using extant methodology of Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006), Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2007), and Aït-Sahalia and Jacod (2009a, 2009b, 2009c). Evidence of jumps is found in around 22.8% of the days during the 1993–2000 period, much higher than the corresponding figure of 9.4% during the 2001–2008 period. Although the overall role of jumps is lessening, the role of large jumps has not decreased, and indeed, the relative role of large jumps, as a proportion of overall jumps, has actually increased in the 2000s.

This chapter is a case study of the valuation of voting rights in France and Italy. New regulations, France’s “Florange Law” as well as Italian Legislative Decree 91/2014, have created additional voting rights attached to the existing shares of long-term shareholders. The chapter tests whether stock price evolution is consistent with the valuation of voting rights as per existing research.

Results show that stock prices of the float do not factor in the dilution created by loyalty voting rights. The chapter argues that the dilutive effect of the new regulations has a negative impact on stock valuation, but that this is more than offset by taking into account real options. These results address the concern that the new policies would depress stock valuation in France and Italy.