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In this article, we consider the evolution of the US stock market from the 1770s through the early 20th century. Adopting an institutional lens, we conceive of the stock market as an institutional field constituted by socially constructed cultural logics and myths. We focus on the role of the US government as an actor embedded in the stock market field and sharing in the prevailing field logics. Tracking the dominant logics of the stock market field at different historical periods, we examine how these logics impacted government regulatory action upon the stock market, and how those government regulations affected the subsequent logics of the stock market field. Our research included both quantitative content analysis of articles in historical newspapers and qualitative historical analysis of multiple primary and secondary accounts of stock market problems and solutions across more than 150 years. We document how government regulatory action both reflects and shapes the logics of the stock market field.

Analyzing how the post-Soviet transition interacts with the crisis of market finance exhibits a new “greed-based economic system” in the making. Asset grabbing is at its core and hinders capital accumulation. All the various privatization schemes have triggered off asset grabbing, asset stripping, and asset tunneling. A global contagion of such behavior has spread the power and cohesion of managers/shareholders (oligarchs) worldwide. Financial asset grabbing is less straightforward, though much widespread, and operates in financial markets through new financial products, securitization, firms buying their own shares, hedge funds, stock price manipulation, short selling, and the distribution of stock options.Shadow banking, and more generally a global informal economy, results from grabbing strategies in financial markets that breach the formal rules of capitalism. In alleviating and circumventing the rules, the oligarchy paves the way for economic malpractices and crime, calling capitalist laws into question.In such context, systemic greed underlies unconstrained maximization of relative wealth, for which asset grabbing is a rational means, in a winner-take-all economy. At the present stage of our research, a greed-based economy cannot yet be theoretically defined as a transition either to a new phase of capitalism or to another different system.

Behavioral finance literature has long claimed that internet stock message boards can move markets. In this chapter, the authors study more than 2,000 internet board messages posted across finance message boards in India (Chittorgarh, etc.) for 110 companies that went for initial public offering (IPO) in the last one year. This study has multi-fold objectives. First, the authors try to identify the factors which lead to a discussion on an IPO stock in the message board. Second, the authors identify the factors which differentiate a widely discussed stock from the less discussed one. Next, the authors apply advanced machine learning technique to identify the topics which are discussed in the message board through automatic topic modeling. The methodology used includes a logistic regression model for identifying firm characteristics which leads to a probability of getting stakeholders’ attention and hence more discussion. The authors also use advanced topic modeling techniques to identify topics of discussion on the message boards through machine learning. The authors find that larger sized firms, younger firms, firms with low leverage, and non-manufacturing firms get discussed more and the topics of discussion relate to their financial statements, trading strategies, stock behavior, and performance.

We describe some recent contingent capital securities (CoCos) and explore the issues that confront their development. We take the view that bank CoCos should be designed to maintain confidence in a bank before a crisis begins because once a crisis commences it is difficult to see how a bank can assure the capital market without the support of state aid. With this overriding objective in mind we find that, in at least some respects, existing examples of bank CoCos have got the ‘right’ design. Existing bank CoCos are unfunded as they should be as there is no need to structure these securities to provide additional liquidity. If funding turns out to be necessary then a liquidity crisis is already underway and the CoCo has already failed in its attempt to maintain confidence in the bank. Moreover, existing CoCos use the simpler single trigger that we favour rather than dual trigger structure recommended by some.