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The purpose of this paper is to discuss how executive stock options help in reducing agency costs in the firm and to address problems experienced by the firm when stock options are used as incentives.

The paper initially discusses types of agency problems caused by company managers and then explains why stock options can reduce the problem of excessive risk aversion displayed by some managers. It then addresses the problems that may occur with the introduction of executive stock options by the firm and finally offers methods to reduce these problems.

The paper explains the methods available to reduce the problems caused by executive stock options such as indexing the stock options to the S&P 500 index and structuring the Board of Directors in a manner that helps ensure the stock options are used appropriately.

This paper is valuable to firms using executive stock options as incentives to managers. It outlines the problems stock options can help solve and the problems which may occur by their use. In addition, the ways to reduce the problems produced by executive stock options in the firm are discussed.

Stock options, once exclusive to executives, are now becoming more broad based to include middle management and non‐management employees. In 2000 an estimated 10 million workers’ compensation packages contained stock options. In today’s competitive environment, firms are looking for ways to attract and retain workers, reward outstanding performance, and return value to shareholders while minimising costs. Stock options provide such a vehicle. The paradox is that while stock options are intended to tie pay to performance, many employees lack the knowledge of how the options actually work. Employees need to be educated as to the different types of plans and how it affects their total compensation. A contentious debate exists over whether firms actually benefit from stock options plans and the reasons why some prosper while others fail. Researchers and experts agree that the success of a stock option plan lies largely in how effective firms are at managing the plan and communicating it to its employees.

This exercise exposes students to the accounting for stock option modifications and option service and performance conditions, requiring research in the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Accounting Standards Codification and the use of the Black-Scholes option pricing model.

Students identify and apply accounting standards to account for stock option plans, stock option modifications, acquired stock option plans, and service and performance conditions that relate to stock option plans. Indirect student feedback suggests that students view the exercise as valuable. Comments include that the exercise reinforces and expands their knowledge of real-world stock compensation plans. Direct assessment data using grading rubrics finds that most students meet instructor expectations.

The exercise enhances critical thinking skills, increases professional research practice, and improves written skills. It introduces students to common real-world events and reinforces their learning related to stock compensation.

This study aims to elaborate on how firms manage research and development (R&D) activities by examining the relationship between ownership concentration and corporate R&D investment, as well as the moderating role of stock options in this relationship.

The study sample comprised 354 Chinese listed firms from 2011 to 2019, and the Tobit model and the system GMM test are used to check robustness.

The results reveal that ownership concentration and R&D investment have an inverted U-shaped relationship. In the presence of stock options, this inverted U-shaped relationship is significantly weaker.

The results have important managerial implications for firms that aim to grant stock options and improve the impact of ownership concentration on R&D investment strategies.

The purpose of this study is to examine the nonlinear relationship between financial constraints and the chief executive officer (CEO) stock options compensation and to analyze whether the impact of financial constraints on the CEO stock options compensation changes at certain level of financial constraints or not.

This study is based on a sample of 90 French firms for the period extending from 2008 to 2019. To deal with the non-linearity, the authors use a panel threshold method.

Using different measures of financial constraints [KZ index (Baker et al., 2003), SA index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) and FCP index (Schauer et al., 2019)], the results reveal that the impact of the financial constraints (SA index and FCP index) is positive below the threshold value and it becomes negative above.

The non-linearity between financial constraints and CEO stock options shows that the level of financial constraints can be a major determinant of the CEO compensation structure. More specifically, this study sheds light on the key role played by the level of financial constraints and how this latter influence management decisions.

This paper is the first to the best of the authors' knowledge to examine the nonlinear relationship between financial constraints and the CEO stock options compensation using a panel threshold model.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the factors affecting the relationships between CEO stock option compensation and earnings management.Design/methodology/approach – Regression of CEO stock option compensation and other factors on measures of discretionary accruals.Findings – A positive relationship between CEO stock option compensation and discretionary accruals was found, implying that earnings management is more likely where stock options are a larger part of CEO compensation. Earnings management is found to be moderated in large firms with stock option compensation and the relationship between stock options and earnings management has intensified in recent years. It was also found that stock options exacerbate earnings management in firms with growth opportunities.Research limitations/implications – Beyond the scope of this paper, these findings raise the following questions: What does the evidence of a size effect mean? Does it reflect information asymmetry, governance, external monitoring, or political risk? Why has the stock option effect on earnings management become more pronounced in recent years? Is it possible to mitigate the negative effects of option compensation on earnings management through the presence of stronger governance structures? Is it possible to mitigate the negative effects of option compensation on earnings management through the presence stronger governance structures? There are implications for compensation policies for corporate executives.Originality/value – This paper extends prior research on the relationship between CEO stock option compensation and earnings management. It provides new insight into the factors affecting this relationship.

One of the most complex and controversial issues confronting the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) over the last several years has been the accounting and financial reporting of stock options. In December 2004, the FASB issued Statement 123R, Share‐Based Payment, in the hope that the long process of revising the accounting and financial reporting for stock options will be put to rest. FASB Statement 123R requires the fair‐value‐based method of accounting for share‐based payments. In order to offset the dilutive effects of generous stock option compensation packages for employees, companies are seemingly participating in stock repurchase plans. In the past, stock buyback programs were viewed as a means of distributing excess cash flow to investors; however, it appears now that many companies are financing stock repurchases through the issuance of debt, which can significantly impact the financial flexibility of a company. So, why do companies engage in this behavior? One possible reason for stock buybacks is to reduce the dilutive effect of stock option plans. Companies have, however, disputed that there is a direct relationship between exercised stock options and stock buyback transactions. Nevertheless, several articles and studies have found that there is a relationship and the FASB seems to believe that there is an association between stock buybacks and stock options, as Statement 123R requires that companies disclose the relationship between stock buybacks and stock payment programs. Using a sample of technology firms, we find evidence of an association between exercised stock options and repurchase of stock.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the contrasting moderating effect of a firm’s exploration on the relationship between the two types of long-term incentives (stock options/stock ownership) for the chief executive officers and a firm’s long-term performance. Even though the two types of incentives are designed to improve long-term performance, the degrees of impact on long-term performance differ. Based on behavioral agency theory, this study theoretically and empirically examines the role of a firm’s exploration on the above relationship.

This study used three archival sources to obtain data on stock options, stock ownership, patents and exploration, financial measures, and others. Based on a sample of 1,963 firms in various industries from 1995 to 2006, this study tested the moderating effect of a firm’s exploration on the relationship between stock options/ownership and a firm’s performance.

This study reveals the contrasting moderating effect of a firm’s exploration on the relationship between stock options/ownership and a firm’s long-term performance: a positive moderating effect on the relationship between stock options and performance and a negative moderating effect on the relationship between stock ownership and performance. In addition, empirical evidence was added on the inverted U-shaped relationship between stock ownership and a firm’s long-term performance.

There is little research on a firm’s internal characteristics that strengthen or weaken the effects of stock options and stock ownership on firm performance. This study demonstrates the differential moderating effects of exploration on the relationship between stock options/stock ownership and long-term performance. Such effects of exploration come from the different risk features of stock options and stock ownership. The key implication is that stock options could be more effective than stock ownership to enhance a firm’s long-term performance when a firm has a strong exploration orientation.