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This paper examines the role of professional associations, governmental agencies, and international accounting and auditing bodies in promulgating standards to deter and detect fraud, domestically and abroad. Specifically, it focuses on the role played by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA), the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), the US Government Accounting Office (GAO), and other national and foreign professional associations, in promulgating auditing standards and procedures to prevent fraud in financial statements and other white‐collar crimes. It also examines several fraud cases and the impact of management and employee fraud on the various business sectors such as insurance, banking, health care, and manufacturing, as well as the role of management, the boards of directors, the audit committees, auditors, and fraud examiners and their liability in the fraud prevention and investigation.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the economic determinants of compensation committee quality.

Sample firms were selected from the IRRC Directors' database. Compensation committee quality is measured as the factor score from a principal component analysis of six compensation committee characteristics. Regression analyses are conducted to test the hypotheses.

It was found that firms with lower CEO influence, less institutional shareholders, fewer growth opportunities, and that are smaller in size are more likely to have high quality compensation committees.

The results imply that even in the presence of a requirement to have only independent directors on the compensation committee, the quality of compensation committees can vary cross‐sectionally depending on the firm's economic circumstances. Thus, a one‐size fits all solution for compensation committee quality might not be optimal as different firms have different incentives in composing their compensation committees.

This paper adds to the limited literature on compensation committees by using a new measure of compensation committee quality to examine the economic factors that affect the governance quality of independent compensation committees. This paper also complements the board and audit committee research by examining whether the same factors that affect board and audit committee quality might also affect compensation committee quality.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate two audit committee characteristics – independence and expertise of the audit committee – and the property‐liability insurers' financial reporting quality, which is proxied by loss reserve error.

The authors' hypotheses are tested using multivariate analysis where the loss reserve error is the dependent variable, and audit committee independence, and four types of audit committee financial expertise (accounting, finance, supervisory, and insurance expertise) are the testing variables.

It is found that accounting, finance, and insurance financial expertise are associated with more accurate loss reserve estimate. In contrast, a supervisory financial expertise and an independence audit committee are not found to be associated with better loss reserve quality.

The sample includes publicly‐held property‐liability insurers. Although the results from publicly‐held insurers could provide a good laboratory for such investigation in all insurers, they might be limited due to different organization structures of public vs private insurers.

The implications of the study are important for the SEC and NAIC. The results suggest that the requirements on the audit committee financial expertise would be necessary, even in highly regulated industry, such as property‐casualty insurance.

The paper contributes to the extant literature by studying audit committee characteristics in the insurance industry. It also contributes to the extant literature on audit committee effectiveness by decomposing the financial expertise into four types of financial expertise (accounting, finance, supervisory, or insurance expertise) and investigates which (if any) of these four types of expertise really drives the improvement of loss reserve quality.

Using a sample of US nonprofit organizations, where the identity of the auditor in charge of the audit is revealed, I investigate whether individual auditor characteristics (gender, engagement size and tenure) are associated with audit quality.

To investigate how individual audit partner characteristics affect audit quality, I follow Petrovits et al. (2011) and Fitzgerald et al. (2018) who investigate client characteristics and partner tenure as determinants of ICDs in nonprofits. I add three characteristics of the auditor in charge – gender, engagement size and tenure – to their models. In additional analyses, I use subsamples partitioned by client risk and audit firm size, and find that individual auditor characteristics generally play a more significant role in the issuance of ICDs and QAOs for riskier clients than for less risky clients.

My results show that female auditors are more likely to report internal control deficiencies and issue qualified audit opinions (QAOs) to nonprofits. I also find that auditors with more Single Audit engagements within the same year are less likely to report ICDs. In addition, auditor tenure is negatively associated with the likelihood of issuing an ICD report, suggesting that auditors become complacent as the length of the auditor–client relationship lengthens or, alternatively, that they are better able to assist their clients in correcting ICDs and in maintaining stronger internal control environments as they gain client-specific knowledge over time. Additional analysis suggests tenure and engagement load results are sensitive to the sample specification employed.

One caveat of this study is that self-selection bias may be present when a client chooses an audit firm, the audit firm selects a client, and the audit firm assigns a partner to the engagement. Future study with more advanced econometric models is needed to mitigate self-selection bias. Another limitation is that my sample consists of nonprofit organizations and may not be generalizable to for-profit firms. Another caveat of this study is that the tenure variable is truncated compared to prior literature (e.g. Fitzgerald et al., 2018). Also given the rarity of audit quality measures in the nonprofit setting, internal control deficiencies and qualified opinions are used as proxies for audit quality because they reflect both the quality of audit work and the quality of organizations' internal control and financial reporting. Future studies with data including additional audit quality measures could shed more light on the topic.

This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this study offers a more comprehensive examination on the impact that a broader set of individual auditor characteristics on audit quality in the nonprofit setting, compared to Fitzgerald et al.'s (2018) study. Second, the findings should be of interest to policymakers who recently mandated engagement partner disclosures from US audit firms (PCAOB, 2015b). Finally, another distinctive feature of this study is that I examine the impact of individual auditor characteristics on audit quality in a setting where Big 4 audit firms are not dominant.

The Italian sociological scientific community has shown a limited interest in issues related to bisexuality. The purpose of this paper is to fill the knowledge gap on the subject, showing data of an empirical research conducted online on the Italian bisexual community.

The article is based on a mixed methods online survey on Italian bisexual people, which included 218 interviews. The questionnaire was made up of closed and open-ended questions, to investigate their behaviours, habits and lifestyles.

Social pressure and lack of understanding by others sometimes make difficult for bisexual people to show themselves openly for what they are, especially in some contexts, such as the word of work. From a sociological point of view, one can argue that one of the tools when bisexual people face the stigma related to bisexuality is to control, often in an obsessive way, the information they provide about themselves, carefully evaluating the contexts in which they can free themselves and the time when they must expose themselves in line with the expectations of the heteronormative society.

The non-probabilistic sample limits the external validity of the findings. There are also critical elements that characterise social research when transposed online: first, the profiles of the respondents not always are verifiable; second, the digital divide excludes some groups that cannot access the web or involves an over-representation of those who are more familiar with technologies.

The work presented is the first Italian sociological study aimed at deepening the “invisible B” phenomenon of the LGBT acronym in a systematic way. Nowadays bisexuality remains under-researched in social sciences and overall in sociology. Putting “bisexuality” at the centre of the sociological attention appears important to provide serious and scientifically valid data and information useful both to develop the knowledge on this identity category and to contain forms of discrimination and prejudice.

The purpose of the paper is to examine the association between the corporate ownership characteristics and the timely remediation of internal control weaknesses over financial reporting under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002.

The paper employs both ordered and binary logistic regression models for a sample of 695 US firms who reported internal control weaknesses for the first time, pursuant to SOX Section 404, and evaluates the impact of the stock ownership characteristics on the timeliness in remediation of their control weaknesses.

The test results show that the corporate ownership characteristics, as a part of governance mechanism, play an incrementally critical role to influence firms' decisions to promptly remediate their internal control problems and improve the reliability of financial information. In addition, it was also found that a corporate board independent of its CEO is effective in monitoring timely remediation of control problems. Sub‐sample analyses for the company‐level and account‐specific internal control weaknesses produce similar results in support of the effect of corporate stock ownership characteristics on the timely remediation of internal control weaknesses.

First, the paper adds to the literature by demonstrating the incremental effect of the stock ownership characteristics on a firm's timeliness in remediation of control weaknesses, even after controlling the effect of audit committee and board characteristics in the analysis. Second, the paper shows that even in the post‐SOX years with enhanced regulatory oversight in corporate affairs, the effect of corporate ownership attributes as a part of governance is incrementally observable in a situation that calls for prompt managerial action to ensure the reliability of financial information. Third, for the first time, the study makes a separate detailed analysis on the association between the stock ownership attributes and the remediation of company‐level and account‐specific control weaknesses. The results provide valuable insights into the ownership governance effect on the remediation of the two types of control weaknesses that have different rigor, auditability (more or less auditable), and effects (pervasive or non‐pervasive) on financial reporting quality. Fourth, the study further enhances one's understanding of several important governance factors that help achieve a sound financial reporting system and restore investors' confidence in the system.