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The purpose of this paper is to examine how executive pay schemes influence managerial efficiency, which the authors measure as the risk-adjusted firm performance.

The authors utilized hierarchical regression to test the hypotheses.

The authors find that as options constitute a higher percentage of total compensation packages, subsequent firm risk-adjusted performance declines. The authors also find an inverse relationship between TMT stock ownership and risk-adjusted performance.

The findings suggest that the firm stakeholders should reconsider the likely influence of option-based incentives and equity holdings on the risk-adjusted performance.

Most executive compensation research focuses on either the pay-to-performance or pay-to-risk links. However, in this paper, the authors combine both the performance and risk dimensions simultaneously.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the motivations for and variations in terms of stock option modifications under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 123(R). Stock options are used to motivate and retain employees. Unfortunately, when stock prices decline, existing options lose their incentive value. In response, firms look for ways to re-incentivize their employees. Their choices include issuing additional options and/or modifying existing grants.

We investigate the economic determinants of stock option modification post SFAS 123(R), such as financial reporting cost, shareholder/political cost and employee incentive and retention. Our analysis is based on 67 sample firms that modify their stock option plans from 2005 to 2008 and 67 control firms constructed based on size, industry, year and stock price performance for the prior five years.

The results show that loss firms are more likely to modify their options, which supports the argument that financial reporting costs influence the decision to modify. We find support for the shareholder/political costs hypothesis, as the overhang ratio is positively associated with the decision to modify. However, we find no evidence that modifications substitute for additional option grants. We find that politically sensitive larger firms are more likely to incorporate more shareholder friendly measures such as excluding executives from modification or providing shareholders the opportunity to vote on modification.

This is the first paper examining the economic determinants of stock option modification under SFAS 123(R). Our findings provide some insights regarding economic determinants of SFAS 123(R) for accounting policy-makers and investors.

The purpose of this paper is to show that director turnover varies in predictable and intuitive ways with director incentives.

The paper uses a sample of 51,388 observations pertaining to 13,084 directors who served 1,065 firms during the period 1997‐2004. The data are obtained from RiskMetrics, Compustat, Execu‐Comp, CRSP, IBES, and the Corporate Library databases. Portfolio analysis, logit, and GLIMMIX regression analysis are used for the tests.

The paper provides evidence that directors are more likely to leave when firm performance deteriorates and the firm becomes riskier. While turnover increasing as firm performance deteriorates is consistent with involuntary turnover, directors are also more likely to leave in advance of deteriorating performance. The latter is consistent with directors having inside information and acting on that information to protect their wealth and reputation. When inside and outside director turnover is contrasted, the association between turnover and performance is stronger for inside directors.

Since data are obtained from multiple databases, the sample may be biased in favor of larger firms. The results may, therefore, not be applicable to smaller firms. To the extent that the story is unable to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary director turnover, the results should be interpreted with caution.

Even though extant research has looked extensively at the determinants of CEO turnover, little has been written on director turnover. Director turnover is an important topic to study, since directors, especially outside directors, possess a significant oversight role in the corporation.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the Enron scandal, Arthur Andersen's demise and the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act on audit fees.

The paper uses empirical methodology (univariate and multivariate).

Audit fees and the Big‐4 premium increased in 2002. Increase was larger for bigger and riskier clients. Evidence is also consistent with a competitive market for former Andersen clients.

Data requirements might bias the sample towards larger sized firms. Data availability limits the number of observations.

The research findings on audit fees in post‐Enron and Arthur Andersen period reported in this paper are important for policy makers.

It is found that the premium charged by Big 4 over non‐Big 4 has increased in 2002, and that the ability of an auditor to charge a premium is adversely affected when its reputation is tarnished. It is also reported that the frequency of voluntary switches within the Big 4 is lowest in 19 years. The audit fee model was also refined by adding two ownership variables to control for agency aspect of client firms; inside and institutional ownership.

The objective of this research is to examine the effect of a broad‐based option program on voluntary employee turnover.

The paper examines the effect of a broad‐based stock option program in a Fortune 100 company during the 1990s and uses logistical analysis.

Employee turnover is an issue due to the costs involved in recruiting and training replacements. Voluntary turnover can be reduced if a cost can be imposed on the departing employee. This cost need not be an explicit cost, but can take the form of a benefit forgone when the employee departs. Along these lines, stock option grants to employees, if properly structured, have the ability to reduce voluntary employee turnover. The paper finds that voluntary turnover is lower during the periods in which the option cannot be exercised, i.e. the vesting period. This effect is strongest for employees approaching retirement, but also holds for employees leaving the company for other reasons.

The finding that unvested options reduce or delay voluntary turnover, which while intuitive, has not to the author's knowledge been shown previously, and is important for those involved in the compensation plan design process.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between bargain purchase gains (BPGs) booked by the acquirer and smoothing of acquirers’ earning performance across time.

The authors use a sample of 122 bargain purchase acquisitions in non-financial industries from 2009 to 2012 and a pair-match control group of 122 goodwill acquisitions.

The authors find that BPGs, and in particular, the Level-3 fair value estimates of intangible assets acquired, have consistently been used to smooth earnings but that such smoothing activities are not associated with long-term market returns.

This study is the first one to investigate bargain purchase acquisitions in a broad range of non-financial industries and suggests that managers are using the valuation of intangibles to avoid unfavorable earnings even though these valuations are not credible to investors.

This paper examines the role of professional associations, governmental agencies, and international accounting and auditing bodies in promulgating standards to deter and detect fraud, domestically and abroad. Specifically, it focuses on the role played by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA), the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), the US Government Accounting Office (GAO), and other national and foreign professional associations, in promulgating auditing standards and procedures to prevent fraud in financial statements and other white‐collar crimes. It also examines several fraud cases and the impact of management and employee fraud on the various business sectors such as insurance, banking, health care, and manufacturing, as well as the role of management, the boards of directors, the audit committees, auditors, and fraud examiners and their liability in the fraud prevention and investigation.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the economic determinants of compensation committee quality.

Sample firms were selected from the IRRC Directors' database. Compensation committee quality is measured as the factor score from a principal component analysis of six compensation committee characteristics. Regression analyses are conducted to test the hypotheses.

It was found that firms with lower CEO influence, less institutional shareholders, fewer growth opportunities, and that are smaller in size are more likely to have high quality compensation committees.

The results imply that even in the presence of a requirement to have only independent directors on the compensation committee, the quality of compensation committees can vary cross‐sectionally depending on the firm's economic circumstances. Thus, a one‐size fits all solution for compensation committee quality might not be optimal as different firms have different incentives in composing their compensation committees.

This paper adds to the limited literature on compensation committees by using a new measure of compensation committee quality to examine the economic factors that affect the governance quality of independent compensation committees. This paper also complements the board and audit committee research by examining whether the same factors that affect board and audit committee quality might also affect compensation committee quality.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate two audit committee characteristics – independence and expertise of the audit committee – and the property‐liability insurers' financial reporting quality, which is proxied by loss reserve error.

The authors' hypotheses are tested using multivariate analysis where the loss reserve error is the dependent variable, and audit committee independence, and four types of audit committee financial expertise (accounting, finance, supervisory, and insurance expertise) are the testing variables.

It is found that accounting, finance, and insurance financial expertise are associated with more accurate loss reserve estimate. In contrast, a supervisory financial expertise and an independence audit committee are not found to be associated with better loss reserve quality.

The sample includes publicly‐held property‐liability insurers. Although the results from publicly‐held insurers could provide a good laboratory for such investigation in all insurers, they might be limited due to different organization structures of public vs private insurers.

The implications of the study are important for the SEC and NAIC. The results suggest that the requirements on the audit committee financial expertise would be necessary, even in highly regulated industry, such as property‐casualty insurance.

The paper contributes to the extant literature by studying audit committee characteristics in the insurance industry. It also contributes to the extant literature on audit committee effectiveness by decomposing the financial expertise into four types of financial expertise (accounting, finance, supervisory, or insurance expertise) and investigates which (if any) of these four types of expertise really drives the improvement of loss reserve quality.