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This study seeks to examine whether CEO duality further exacerbates CEOs' motivation of self‐interest to engage in mergers and acquisitions to increase their compensation.

Regression tests using CEO compensation as the dependent variable, and CEO duality, firm size and firm performance as independent test and control variables. The regression tests are used for various sub‐samples of the firms, those that merge and those that have CEO duality.

The results indicate that for merging firms CEO compensation is positively associated with firm size. However, this association is unaffected by CEO duality. For non‐merging firms, the results indicate that CEO compensation is positively associated with firm size and firm performance. CEO duality moderates the positive association between CEO compensation and firm performance.

This study is limited to the extent that it does not observe the deliberations of compensation committees in their setting of CEO compensation, but only examines the outcomes of those deliberations. A future area of research is to examine compensation schemes of merger/acquisition CEOs in the context of other government structures, such as board independence and composition.

Shareholders who desire to keep CEO compensation levels positively associated with firm performance may consider supporting the separation of the positions of CEO and Chairperson of the Board.

This study contributes to the literature by concluding that governance structure influences CEO compensation schemes and CEOs of merging firms command higher compensation in spite of governance structure and firm performance.

Reforms set forth in Sarbanes‐Oxley and the NYSE, AMEX, and NASD are designed to prevent the reoccurrence of corporate collapses at companies such as Enron Corp., WorldCom Inc., and Global Crossing Ltd. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the possible impact the reforms may or may not have had in controlling the abuses uncovered in recent corporate failures.

This paper examines the reforms to corporate governance and the rationale behind the reforms, and examines how the actual governance structures of Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing during the years of their accounting scandals compared to the new requirements. It also offers a discussion as to whether the new reforms would have been helpful in preventing management's manipulation of earnings.

Global Crossing's governance structure would have satisfied a majority of the reforms. Enron's and WorldCom's governance structures would have satisfied less than half of the reforms.

This paper highlights the need for management and shareholders alike to focus on the substance of the reforms and not merely the form of the reforms in order to make meaningful improvements to corporate governance.

This paper should serve as a warning to the investing public. The reforms in and of themselves should not be relied on to prevent future corporate scandals. The reforms, however, do focus the spotlight directly on corporate boardrooms where shareholders can now insist that directors' interests be separate from those of the CEO and upper management.

The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act has celebrated its fifth anniversary. This paper aims to discuss the effectiveness and usefulness to the accounting profession and the investing community of the reforms set forth in the Act.

Various components of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 are explored in detail, predominantly those dealing with corporate governance and internal controls. Discussions with practicing certified public accountants along with opinions from other professionals in the investing community are used to gain insight into the Act's effects on those who work its provisions on a daily basis.

Differing opinions exist as to the effects of the reforms on the accounting profession, financial reporting, capital markets, and ultimately, investor confidence. Some experts feel the reforms are helping to restore investor confidence in issuer's financial statements while others feel the cost of compliance with the Act's reforms exceed the benefits.

Implementation of the Act's reforms are not without controversy. This paper highlights the need for investors to understand the nature and issues surrounding the reforms to help increase investor confidence in the financial markets.

This paper reviews the origins of the Act's reforms and their intended purpose. A better understanding of the reforms and discussions with experts in the business community allows investors to determine the effectiveness and usefulness of the Act.

This paper aims to examine whether there is an association between the level of performance‐based incentives offered to CEOs and the composition of firms' boards of directors and the compensation committee.

Univariate tests are used to test the relation between the level of performance‐based incentives and corporate governance structures. A logistic regression analysis is used to predict the probability of CEOs receiving low performance‐based incentives when various characteristics of firms' boards of directors and compensation committees exist.

The authors find the presence of CEO duality reduces the likelihood of lower levels of performance‐based incentives offered to CEOs. Additionally, the authors find CEOs are more likely to receive lower levels of performance‐based incentives when the majority of the compensation committee members serve on less than three other boards, and when the size of the board is less than or equal to nine members.

This study is limited by the fact that the sample may not be representative of the general population of companies in the US.

Shareholders who desire to keep CEO compensation levels low may consider supporting the separation of the positions of CEO and Chairperson of the Board, as well as supporting limiting the number of other boards directors may serve, and reducing or keeping the size of the board to a maximum of nine members.

The authors have documented an association between board structure and CEO compensation. It appears that company boards are able to monitor and control the compensation level offered to CEOs.

Recent changes in corporate governance require firms to maintain boards with a majority of outside independent directors. The belief seems to be that outside independent directors will strengthen corporate boards by monitoring the actions of management and ensuring that management decisions are made in the best interests of the stockholders. This belief, however, may be founded on an assumption that has its roots in public perception and not in fact. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether or not outside independent directors strengthen corporate boards.

Five areas within corporate boards of directors, including board composition, CEO duality, audit committees, compensation committees and nominating committees, are examined. The results of studies aimed at discerning the effects that outside independent directors have on increased firm performance and shareholder wealth through strong corporate governance are discussed.

The conclusion reached is that outside independent directors do appear to strengthen corporate boards; however, more needs to be done to reestablish the market's confidence in corporate America's ability to effectively govern itself.

Best practices are discussed that can assist corporate boards in fulfilling their responsibilities to shareholders in monitoring and controlling the actions of management.

This paper is of value to management of firms, corporate directors, and investors. It demonstrates that the presence of outside independent directors alone will not solve the deficiencies exposed in corporate boardrooms. It also highlights the fact that more needs to be done to change the environment in which corporate boards operate in order to better protect shareholder interests.

This study sets out to examine whether CEOs who hold the dual position of chairperson of the board exert increased influence over the board, resulting in compensation contracts more favorable to the CEO than to the firm.

Correlation analysis is used to test the association between the dependent variable and the independent variables. Logistic regression is used to predict the probability of permitting Section 83(b) election in the context of CEO duality, CEO tenure, tax‐paying status and size of the firm.

The results show that the presence of CEO duality does not influence the likelihood of permitting a Section 83(b) election. However, the tenure of the CEO significantly increases the likelihood of permitting a Section 83(b) election.

This study is limited in the sense that it only examines the year 2004 and the results may be unique to that year. An extension of this study to include additional years of observations is warranted.

Shareholder concerns about CEO duality appear to be unfounded. However, shareholders may consider limiting CEO tenure to lessen the likelihood of CEOs acting in their own best interest at the expense of the firm.

This study contributes to the literature by finding that attributes of the CEO may influence the form of equity compensation that is awarded to the CEO. These attributes may serve the self‐interest of the CEO and not enhance firm value to the shareholder.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.