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1 – 10 of 131Reza Houston and Stephen P. Ferris
In this study, we examine the relationship between political connections of private firms and the initial public offering process. Using registration statement information, we…
Abstract
In this study, we examine the relationship between political connections of private firms and the initial public offering process. Using registration statement information, we create a unique database of politically connected IPO firms. We find that political connections are substitutes to high-quality underwriters and big four auditors. Politically connected firms manage earnings more highly upward than non-connected firms prior to the public offering. Politically connected firms also exhibit less underpricing than non-connected firms. Finally, politically connected IPO firms have superior post-IPO returns relative to non-connected IPO firms.
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Hyung-Suk Choi, Stephen P. Ferris, Narayanan Jayaraman and Sanjiv Sabherwal
To determine what role overconfidence plays in the forced removal of CEOs internationally.
Abstract
Purpose
To determine what role overconfidence plays in the forced removal of CEOs internationally.
Design/Methodology
The study makes use of the Fortune Global 500 list.
Findings
We find that overconfident CEOs face significantly greater hazards of forced turnovers than their non-overconfident peers. Regardless of important differences in culture, law, and corporate governance across countries, overconfidence has a separate and distinct effect on CEO turnover. Overconfident CEOs appear to be at greater risk of dismissal regardless of where in the world they are located. We also discover that overconfident CEOs are disproportionately succeeded by other overconfident CEOs, regardless of whether they are forcibly removed or voluntarily leave office. Finally, we determine that the dismissal of overconfident CEOs is associated with improved market performance, but only limited enhancement in accounting returns.
Originality/Value
This study is unique with its examination of overconfidence among global CEOs rather than being limited to U.S. chief executives. It also provides insight into how overconfidence is related to national cultures, legal systems and corporate governance mechanisms.
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David Javakhadze, Stephen P. Ferris and Gregory Noronha
Purpose – The question of whether the corporate governance practices of firms in diverse countries are converging to those of U.S. firms, and the extent of convergence or…
Abstract
Purpose – The question of whether the corporate governance practices of firms in diverse countries are converging to those of U.S. firms, and the extent of convergence or divergence, is examined.
Design/methodology/approach – Company level governance measures of board structure and organization, firm audit attributes, antitakeover defenses, and compensation design attributes of international firms are compared with those of U.S. firms.
Findings – We find that the evidence for convergence is more mixed than previously believed, with firms in some nations converging, others essentially static, and a number diverging from U.S. practices. We further determine that country factors such as measures of national economic freedom, increased shareholder rights, and impartial judiciaries help to explain convergence. Greater participation by banks in the national economy is associated with greater divergence from U.S. governance standards. Firm characteristics which are suggestive of a future need for external equity encourage convergence while those which capture the use of leverage or the ability to service additional debt are correlated with greater divergence.
Research limitations/implications – This study suggests that inquiry into whether convergence is occurring might be the wrong question to ask. Rather, our findings suggest that the research focus should be shifted toward an inquiry of what specific areas of governance are converging and in what countries or regions.
Originality/value – This study helps to describe what constitutes effective corporate governance design for firms worldwide. It provides managers with insights on how governance mechanisms can be tailored to reflect local practices and laws.
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