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Based on 1,798 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2013, using publicly available disclosure data for Korean listed firms, this study aims to examine whether statutory internal auditors influence firm-level stock price crash risk.

Based on the bad news hoarding theory of crash risk, the authors investigate the association between the quality of statutory internal auditors and one-year-ahead stock price crash risk. The quality of statutory internal auditors is measured as the compensation of statutory internal auditors and the financial expertise of statutory internal auditors. Stock price crash risk is measured as an indicator variable whether a firm experiences one or more crash weeks during the fiscal year period.

The authors find that higher quality of statutory internal auditors – measured through greater compensation and greater financial expertise – is associated with lower possibilities of future stock price crash risk. These results indicate that high-quality statutory internal auditors mitigate bad news hoarding of managers because of their greater capability and stronger incentive to lower litigation risk and preserve their reputation. The results are mostly robust to different measures for stock price crash risk and the quality of statutory internal auditors.

The findings of this study regarding stock price crash risk are important for investors because such risk can significantly affect investor welfare. The results indicate that statutory internal auditors play an important role in controlling future stock price crash risk and maintaining stability in the equity market.

This study adds to the extant literature on the determinants of stock price crash risk and is the first to examine the impact of internal auditors on stock price crash risk. Moreover, this study also contributes to the existing literature on internal auditor quality by showing that high-quality statutory internal auditors reduce risks in financial markets.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the characteristics of statutory internal auditors on operating efficiency.

This study investigates three characteristics pertaining to statutory internal auditors, namely, compensation, activity and expertise, based on 1,340 firm observations from 2009 to 2010 using publicly available disclosure data for Korean listed firms.

The authors find no evidence that statutory internal auditors’ compensation is positively associated with operating efficiency. This implies that compensation data on statutory internal auditors in Korea may not directly reflect their competence and ability to enhance operating efficiency. On the other hand, the authors find evidence for a positive association between full-time status for statutory internal auditors and operating efficiency and a positive association between the attendance at board meetings for statutory internal auditors and operating efficiency. The results also show a decrease in operating efficiency when statutory internal auditors are newly appointed. Finally, expertise of statutory internal auditors in financial or legal matters provides no advantage in terms of operating efficiency.

This study contributes to the extant literature on internal audit by examining the advisory role of statutory internal auditors and its effect on operating efficiency, which is one of the objectives established by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission.

While most prior research on internal audit depends on survey data from statutory internal auditors or experimental data based on a limited sample of firms, this study is based on a large sample of publicly available data of the Korean market.

Based on 3,775 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2013 using publicly available disclosure data for Korean listed firms, this study examines whether and how firm-level governance characteristics are associated with investment in internal auditing proxied by compensation and the number of statutory internal auditors.

The authors investigate the association between governance characteristics and investment in internal auditing proxied by compensation and the number of statutory internal auditors.

The authors find that firms with greater ownership of the largest shareholders and with a higher proportion of outside directors invest more in internal auditing. These results indicate that firms with higher incentive and demand for monitoring are more likely to invest more in internal auditing. The authors further find that the positive effect of the largest shareholder ownership (board independence) on investment in internal auditing is attenuated in firms with greater board independence (ownership of the largest shareholders) suggesting that the complementary effect of the two governance mechanisms associated with internal auditing weakens as they function simultaneously.

The results provide regulators and investors with a clear picture of the governance characteristics of firms associated with investment in internal auditing. The results imply that both the largest shareholders and the outside board of directors play a significant role in resource allocation in internal auditing within a firm. The effect of allocation, however, can be attenuated contingent upon the combined characteristics of governance mechanisms.

Using large amounts of public archival data, this study adds to the extant literature on firm characteristics associated with investment in internal auditing. This study also contributes to the literature by expanding the scope of research on executive compensation to the locus of statutory internal auditors.

This paper aims to investigate auditor choice in those Italian non-listed firms adopting the “traditional” model of corporate governance. In Italy, non-listed firms can choose between two types of auditor: the Board of Statutory Auditors (BSA), that is the statutory auditors, or an “external” auditor. At the same time, a BSA conducts the administrative auditing for all companies with equity exceeding €120,000.

The paper estimates a logistic regression model of firm auditor choice between an external auditor and the BSA, which incorporates variables proxying for both agency conflict and organizational complexity effects.

The results show that of the potential agency factors, only board independence drives auditor choice, whereas organizational complexity and risk factors including firm size, investment in inventories, subsidiary status and complexity drive auditor choice. These results may be explained in the administrative audit role of the BSA, which monitors both day-by-day firm operations and the financial statements preparation “project”. Stakeholders as a result are reassured that, in general, their interests are protected. Finally, it was found that legal form and voluntary International Financial Reporting Standards compliance exert an impact on auditor choice.

The paper provides support for an internal yet independent auditing body such as the Italian BSA as a wider model for corporate governance in European non-listed firms (OECD, 2004 and 2015). The BSA as an administrative and financial auditing body made up solely of independent highly qualified professionals can work within the firm on an operational basis, and in so doing can increase stakeholder protection.

This paper aims to present the views of internal auditors in Greece on the relation between the internal audit function (IAF) and corporate governance (CG) after several years of European market integration and in the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis.

Data are collected using semi-structured interviews with 15 internal auditors working in firms with different size and in different sectors of activity. Interviewees have diverse experience and hold various positions in the firm.

Respondents perceive a strong relation between the IAF and CG. They view the IAF as a preventive tool that provides monitoring and advisory services to firms. They stress the inadequate monitoring role of the board in the IAF, and they support a proactive intervention in the strategic audit planning process. They see a small role for shareholders in CG. They stress the need to focus more on the efficiency and effectiveness considerations in carrying out the IAF. They perceive CG-related information as important for meeting formal compliance needs rather than contributing to decision-making or audit process planning. They believe that audit committees (AC) are weak in implementing effective monitoring, due to inadequate knowledge and expertise of their members. They would like to see a two-way interaction between auditors, AC and management. They would like to enjoy more independence through the implementation of international standards of auditing and statutory regulation.

The sample covers 15 auditors from an equivalent number of firms and few sectors of activity. Accessing potential interviewees was difficult due to the perceived conflict between their work requirements and public statement of their views.

The proposed method adds to the qualitative analysis literature with regard to measuring and evaluating the personal views of auditors on CG. The study provides empirical evidence of the need to use extensive qualitative research to assess the auditors’ views on the role of CG for their work.

The role of internal audit in CG effectiveness is a key policy concern, especially in countries with diverse market environments. Greece is such an environment for it has undergone a major institutional change within a short period and suffered greatly from its sovereign debt crisis. Further, few studies have sought and evaluated the views of internal auditors by using semi-structured interviews. The latter provide details, which other methods cannot capture. The results of this study are especially useful to the competent regulators, for they reflect market perceptions on the importance and effectiveness of CG practices. They are also useful to practitioners to identify potential root causes of audit deficiencies.

Professional accounting associations in various countries and governmental and other quasi‐official bodies have played an important role not only in the evolution of internal control reporting on a global scale, but also in educating management, investors, financial institutions, accountants, auditors, and other interested parties highlighting the pervasiveness of the effects of a sound internal control structure in corporate reporting as well as other aspects of an organization′s success. These associations include the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Cadbury Committee, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW), the Scottish Institute of Chartered Accountants (SICA), the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), and others. Business failures, management fraud, corporate misconduct, international bribery, and notorious business scandals in all sectors of business have prompted the US government to take drastic action on internal control reporting to safeguard public interest. Several professional and government committees were formed to study this precarious situation: the Treadway Commission, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway Commission, the Packard Commission, the Cohen Commission, the Adams Commission in Canada, the Cadbury Committee in the UK, and others. The principal motivation for the changing dynamics has been growing public pressure for greater corporate accountability. The government′s pressure on the accounting profession and management of public corporations has been pivotal in spearheading internal control reporting. Examines the role of professional associations, governmental agencies, and others in promulgating standards for internal control reporting, and the impact of legislation on this aspect of internal auditing in the USA and worldwide.

Historically, as a former British colony, Malta has had its accounting and auditing practices highly influenced by UK regulation. However, in the last decade, departures have steadily been occurring from a UK‐based regulatory framework to one increasingly influenced both by international standards and European Union requirements. One such departure relates to the retention of the statutory audit requirement for all Maltese companies, despite its earlier abolishment for small companies in the UK. This study evaluates the relevance of a mandatory annual statutory audit requirement for owner‐managed companies as perceived by two interest groups: the owner‐manager and the auditor. It also considers possible alternatives to such a requirement. Results indicate that for Maltese owner‐managed companies, the statutory audit fulfils two important roles: it bears relevance to outside third parties, and it has a positive effect on the owner‐manager and staff.

The preferences of major stakeholders in the Fijian public sector reporting process as to who should set government accounting standards and monitor their application are investigated by comparing the preferences of Parliamentarians, internal and external users, and preparers. There is support from all groups for the introduction of accounting standards but perceptions of the relativity of benefits exhibit diversity. There is disparity in choices of auditors for different types of entities, but there is strong support for the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) as the monitor for departments and for private sector auditors to compete for audits of statutory bodies.