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One of the common law duties owed by the employer is his duty to take reasonable care for the safety of his employee. This common law duty is an implied term in the contract of employment and is therefore contractual in nature. Because of the difficulties which may arise in bringing an action in contract for breach of the employer's duty of care, the employee who has sustained injuries during the course of his employment (although he may sue either in contract of tort will normally bring a tort action.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

Proposes to treat social law contracts by covering the two most important aspects of the contract of employment, and also the collective agreement. Covers the contract of employment in full with all the integral laws explained as required, including its characteristics, written particulars, sources or regulations, with regard to employers, are also covered. Lengthy coverage of the collective agreement is also included, showing legal as well as moral (!) requirements, also included are cases in law that are covered in depth.

In an earlier contribution to this journal, the author sought to analyse the legal implications of the recent decision by the liquidators of the Bank of Commerce and Credit International (BCCI), Touche Ross, to issue writs against the Bank of England claiming damages on behalf of a small, representative number of depositors. This paper will seek to complement that analysis by examining the legal implications of a parallel decision by the liquidators of BCCI to issue writs against the auditors of BCCI, Price Waterhouse and Ernst & Young, the joint auditors of BCCI until 1987. These writs allege that the audited accounts would have indicated that BCCI was in trouble and that, as a result, a duty of care was owed to existing depositors and to potential investors. An examination of the case law on the range of duties owed by auditors in carrying out their statutory functions will conclude that the potential actions against Price Waterhouse and Ernst & Young are unlikely to succeed.

The expectations of users of financial statements have risen in recent years and this phenomenon has impacted directly on auditors who are now becoming increasingly prone to third party action. The duty of care expected of an auditor has been established for some time and has been refined by a number of judgments over the years. In respect of possible third party liability, the concepts of special relationship, proximity and reasonable foreseeability have been examined by the courts through various cases. Despite the principles established in the widely reported British Caparo case, recent legal developments in Australia have cast doubt on its significance in protecting auditors from third party action. The potential for third party liability is an issue that will remain a continuing concern for auditors in the foreseeable future.

This article summarises and provides commentary upon the case of Peters v East Midlands Strategic Health Authority [2009] EWCA Civ 71 and considers its likely effect on claims for future care in personal injury litigation. In future, there should be less impetus on case managers and deputies to pursue applications for state funding of care packages on behalf of injured claimants, where those claimants intend to claim the future costs of such packages from defendants. A state‐funded package is likely to be regarded as an interim measure pending the Court's final award of damages.

This paper is based on a talk given by Philip Ryley and John Virgo to the Association of Pension Lawyers at their annual conference in Bournemouth in November 1998. In it the authors provide an outline of some of the key legal issues that have arisen out of the pensions mis‐selling litigation.

Adopting the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act has provided impetus to reforming corporate accounting and corporate governance. Implementation of this legislation is so broad as to move from mere statutory compliance, to provide authority for changes in the professions of accountants and corporate officers and corporate counsel. This paper describes effects of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (Public Law No. 107‐204, Sec. 1‐1107) on the principal management and control functions of the business environment.

The paper aims to examine the circumstances in which directors who fail to perform their duties and responsibilities with due diligence can be sanctioned and to evaluate whether the recent changes for reform both in the UK and European Union (EU) are adequate to deter directors from misfeasance or to cure defects in the law. The purpose of this paper is to articulate regulatory regimes for disqualification of corporate directors and the proposed changes to tighten loose ends in this area of commercial law. This paper articulates the duties and responsibilities of Corporate Officer and the varied context in which they are manifested in the UK. Owing to the onerous nature of corporate directorship, directors cannot passively sit in boardrooms or on their committees, but they need to demonstrate that they are hands on to get things done as expected. The first part of the paper articulates the current regimes on director’s disqualification so that it is used as a basis to examine the efficacy of the proposed changes for reform both on this area in the UK and Europe. The second part of the paper examines the proposed reform for change both in UK and in Europe and their efficacy to plug in law and practice. This area of corporate law is increasingly regulated by a number of agencies to ensure that directors perform their duties and responsibilities with due diligence.

The paper is structured in two parts whereby the first part examines the framework for disqualification of corporate directors and related issues in the UK. The second part articulates recent changes in the law on director’s disqualification with a view to evaluate whether these changes are robust enough to enhance the position of shareholders to ensure the company is well-managed for their interests or whether overregulation is inimical to the company by hindering directors from executing their corporate responsibilities with a measure of discretion.

The findings reflect that regulatory reforms should be evolved and implemented to strike a balance in ensuring that regulatory regimes are implemented not to penalise corporate directors unnecessarily but also to ensure that rules are respected. The paper urges caution because overregulation can inhibit corporate director from taking necessary risks (to be more guarded) to secure their positions.

The paper was written on the basis of secondary and primary data sources often also alluding to empirical cases studies. It would have been better to carry out structured interviews to corroborate some of the findings of the paper.

Corporate governance is an onerous task, and thus, it requires corporate officers to exercise due diligence in execution of their duties and responsibilities. Getting the issue of corporate governance wrong often has ramifications for the company and respective corporate officers. These ramifications include not least penalising individual directors by disqualification from holding corporate directorship or the company being wound up altogether.

Corporation plays an important role in the society such as creating employment opportunities, markets for goods and services, generating revenues to governments and the list goes on. Therefore, the way they are managed has important implications for societies and governments.

Even though the paper was written on the basis of primary and secondary data sources, it was done in a distinctive manner to foster the objective for writing it.