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We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible “stewards” rather than “agents” of the state.

We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerated not for maximizing equity value but for increasing the value of state-owned assets.

Managerial compensation depends on political connections and prestige, and on the firms’ contribution to political goals. These effects were attenuated since the market-oriented governance reform.

Economic reform without reforming the human resources policies at the executive level enables the autocratic state to exert political power on corporate decision making, so as to ensure that firms’ business activities fulfill the state’s political objectives.

As a powerful social elite, the state-steward managers in China have the same interests as the state (the government), namely extracting rents that should adhere to the nation (which stands for the society at large or the collective private citizens).

As China has been a communist country with a single ruling party for decades, the ideas of socialism still have a strong impact on how companies are run. The legitimacy of the elite’s privileged rights over private sectors is central to our question.

Chinese executive compensation stimulates not only the maximization of shareholder value but also the preservation of the state’s interests.

This research seeks to understand the drivers of outward foreign direct investments (FDIs) by state-owned emerging economy firms, the characteristics of their overseas FDI projects and investment locations, and the effects of home and host institutions on the market entry strategies, taking into account the legitimacy of state ownership.

The discussion is based on a comprehensive review of conceptual and empirical literature, as well as case studies available from recognized journals in the field.

State-owned emerging economy firms pursue outward FDIs to respond to policy incentives of the home government and to reduce its political influence over the firm. FDI projects are often large and risky and have low business values. They often enter countries where state ownership is perceived as more legitimate while engaging in legitimacy-building activities in these countries. When their home country has a high level of institutional restrictions, they are less likely to use acquisitions or hold high levels of equity control in foreign subsidiaries. To strengthen local legitimacy, they often use greenfield investments or share equity control with local firms in foreign subsidiaries, particularly when the host country is endowed with strategic assets or when it has a high level of institutional restrictions. However, when having high levels of state ownership or strong political connections, they often commit a high level of resources and hold a high level of equity control in foreign subsidiaries.

The literature mostly investigates the FDI of firms that are structurally separate from the institutions. When the institutions are endogenous as presented in this research, their strategic choices are substantially influenced by noncommercial political motives and perception on their political image.

Using 3,994 observations of Chinese listed firms from 1995 to 2001, we find a significantly positive correlation between state ownership and cash dividend payment, and a significantly positive relation between private ownership and stock dividend payment. In particular, we find that the relation between dividend payment level and ownership structure is nonlinear. The higher the proportion of state ownership, the higher the cash dividend rate. The higher the proportion of private ownership, the higher the stock dividend rate. We conclude that the managers of Chinese listed companies are likely to cater for the preference of different shareholders.

In this chapter, we provide the first empirical study of the effects of differing types of majority ownership, including employee ownership, on executive compensation. By investigating the case of Estonia, we also extend the range of geographical coverage of studies of the determinants of executive compensations to the case of Estonia.

Although previous research finds that the type of ownership affects CEO pay, our new panel data, and the exceptional configurations of ownership that prevailed in Estonia during early transition, enable us to construct unusual measures of majority ownership.

Findings indicate that an economically significant determinant of CEO pay is ownership both in state versus privatized firms and in different types of private firms. In firms with majority ownership by employees, pay is about 15% less than in state-owned firms, other things equal. CEO pay is also positively related to size and seldom related to performance although size elasticities are much smaller than those estimated in other studies, mainly for advanced western countries.

Findings provide more general support than previously for the varying importance of principal–agency relationships across firm types and the views that privatization and employee ownership have imposed strong discipline on the level of CEO compensation.

In the mid-1970s, China's economy had only two forms of public ownership: state ownership and collective ownership. In the agricultural sector, virtually all production was organized into collectively owned Production Brigades (villages) and People's Communes (townships or groups). In industry, SOEs accounted for 80% of total industrial output, with the remaining 20% shared by urban and rural collectives. By the late 1990s, SOEs and collectives accounted for less than 50% of GDP (International Finance Corporation, 2000; p. 18). Transformation of the ownership of production has undoubtedly been one of the key components of China's successful reform program. This has been achieved through combined efforts: privatization of agricultural production on collectively owned land; new entry of collectively owned industrial enterprises, especially township and village enterprises (TVEs), and their subsequent privatization; new entry of foreign-invested and domestic private enterprises; and ownership transformation of existing SOEs (Mako & Zhang, 2003).

The goal of this paper is to investigate the relationship between government control and firm value in China.

Government might extract social or political benefits from a state-controlled firm, thus decreases firm value. However, government’s monitoring on firm management reduces managers’ agency problem, which increases firm value. We first build a game-theoretic model to prove the existence of optimal government control given these two roles of government, and we then employ the OLS regression method to test the theory predictions using the length of intermediate ownership chains connecting the listed state-owned enterprises to their ultimate controllers as the measure of government control.

We find that firm values first increase then decrease as government control weakens. Moreover, we find that government usually retains a stronger control over state-owned enterprises than the optimal level. In addition, we show that government control can be further weakened in firms with good corporate governance mechanisms, which serve as a substitution of government monitoring.

Our results demonstrate that government control in China is still a necessary but costly mechanism to mitigate agency costs, especially when corporate governance system is underdeveloped.

We identify the substitution effect between government control and corporate governance using a unique measure of government control.

Innovation is critical to organizational survival, competitive advantage, and economic development. Yet the process by which innovative strategic behavior occurs is not well understood. This paper takes advantage of rapidly changing corporate governance structures and environmental conditions during China's economic transition to explore the role of corporate ownership in shaping firm innovation. We argue that managers draw on internal strengths within external constraints to develop strategies and that the nature of corporate ownership determines the degree to which internal or external factors are salient. We capitalize on differences between Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and collective enterprises and other non-state firms (CNFs) in the adoption of firm strategies during transition. Analyzing data from 1994 to 1999 on 800 Chinese firms, we study the effect of ownership type on the adoption of four key organizational innovations and identify major strategic groups that developed during reform. The findings provide important insight into the role of corporate governance in influencing strategy formation and adaptation, outcomes that are increasingly important in all economies.

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of China's 2005 shareholding reform and investigate the relationship of the changes of state-owned shareholdings and the largest shareholdings with corporate performance.

Methodology/approach – This study uses a sample of 470 listed firms that were subject to China's 2005 shareholding reform with data from 2004 and 2006. First, we examine whether the reform has reduced state-owned shareholdings measured by ownership concentration and the largest shareholdings through comparing shareholder structures of the reformed listed companies prior to and after the reform. Second, regression analysis was used to explore the relationship between the change of ownership concentration and largest shareholdings and corporate performance of Chinese listed firms.

Findings – This study reveals the effectiveness of the shareholding reform as both ownership concentration and largest shareholdings decrease. This study presents evidence suggesting a positive impact of China's 2005 shareholding reform on corporate performance and endorsing the notion that state-owned shareholdings are detrimental to corporate performance.

Research limitations – ROE is used as a measure of corporate performance, which is influenced by the rules of accounting standards and corporate behavior.

Originality/value – This study provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of China's shareholding reform and shows a positive relation between the reduction of ownership concentration and corporate performance. This is the first study to examine this relation using the cases of Chinese listed companies. The findings have implications to regulatory bodies, public listed firms and investors in China in terms of corporate governance and shareholding configuration.

The currently dominant version of the corporate form – the profit-maximizing corporation – is one of the most influential organizational forms in contemporary society. It is also one of the most criticized organizational forms, especially with respect to questions of purpose, participation, and ownership. The corporation’s strong focus on profit maximization and its non-democratic nature, as it excludes non-shareholding stakeholders from participating in how the corporation is run, have all attracted significant criticism. There are, however, several debates over alternative ways of organizing besides the corporation. In this chapter, we review the most influential of these: co-operatives, state-owned enterprises, democratically organized firms, social enterprises, stakeholder firms, and firms based on the sharing economy business model. We first analyze how these alternative ways of organizing do things differently with respect to questions of purpose, participation, and ownership and then we discuss how these different approaches can inspire efforts to reform the corporation.

All that we know about the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) labour market in China comes from the studies of public listed companies and State-owned Enterprises (SOEs). This is the first attempt to examine the operation of the CEO labour market across all industrial sectors of the Chinese economy. We find that the influence of the State extends beyond SOEs into many privately owned firms. Government is often involved in CEO appointments in domestic firms and, when this is the case, the CEO has less job autonomy and is less likely to have pay linked to firm performance. Nevertheless, we find that incentive schemes are commonplace and include contracts linking CEO pay directly to firm performance, annual bonus schemes, the posting of performance bonds, and holding company stock. The elasticity of pay with respect to company performance is one or more in two-fifths of the cases where CEOs have performance contracts, suggesting many face high-powered incentives. We also show that State-owned and domestic privately owned firms are more likely than foreign-owned firms to use incentive contracts.