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We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible “stewards” rather than “agents” of the state.

We test this view on China and find that Chinese managers are remunerated not for maximizing equity value but for increasing the value of state-owned assets.

Managerial compensation depends on political connections and prestige, and on the firms’ contribution to political goals. These effects were attenuated since the market-oriented governance reform.

Economic reform without reforming the human resources policies at the executive level enables the autocratic state to exert political power on corporate decision making, so as to ensure that firms’ business activities fulfill the state’s political objectives.

As a powerful social elite, the state-steward managers in China have the same interests as the state (the government), namely extracting rents that should adhere to the nation (which stands for the society at large or the collective private citizens).

As China has been a communist country with a single ruling party for decades, the ideas of socialism still have a strong impact on how companies are run. The legitimacy of the elite’s privileged rights over private sectors is central to our question.

Chinese executive compensation stimulates not only the maximization of shareholder value but also the preservation of the state’s interests.

State ownership has been common especially in industries with restricted competition. In Russia, state-controlled firms represent around 41 percent of the market value of all listed firms (Deloitte, 2015). Yet, there is a significant gap in the literature regarding the effects of various forms of government control in listed firms. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by exploring the impact of the complexity of state ownership and competition on the performance of Russian listed firms.

The sample consists of data for 72 firms (360 firm-years) in the Russian MOEX broad market index during 2011–2015. The complexity of state ownership is captured by studying forms of state control including majority/minority, direct/indirect, federal/regional, mixed structures and golden shares.

The authors find significant differences in performance relating to different forms of state ownership. State control is negatively related to firm valuation and the sales/employees ratio. Performance is weakest when state ownership takes the form minority, regional or direct ownership. State control through golden shares typically outperforms other state-controlled firms. The authors find indications of employment prioritization beyond the economical optimum. In addition, the relation between state ownership and profitability becomes positive in sectors where state firms appear to enjoy lower competition.

While the effects of state ownership have been studied on many markets, there is a lack of studies on the effects of different forms, or the complexity, of state ownership beyond direct and indirect ownership. The authors contribute to the literature on the performance effects of state ownership by studying a multitude of forms of governmental ownership as well as the role of competition in Russia. Especially the profitability of state-controlled firms is significantly affected by industry characteristics. Implications of the results are discussed both from firm and policy maker perspectives.

The paper aims to explore how the undue state control leads to the weak stock market in China. It analyzes how the undue state control is exerted in some key areas in the Chinese stock market. This paper intends to expand the existing literature in the relationships among law, politics, and economy.

This paper mainly adopts the exploratory method to analyze the undue state influences. Under some circumstances, comparative study and historical explanation are also adopted.

The paper suggests that to create a strong stock market and facilitate the development of the listed companies and the whole economy, the state should first release its control on the stock market.

Various fields are contained in a stock market, in most of which the undue state control can be observed. In this paper, only some key ones are explored. Further research on other fields and if possible more first‐hand data are necessary.

This paper not only offers an answer to concerns on the various misconducts in the inefficient Chinese stock market and helps to realize the possible ways out of such dilemma, but also it offers implications for other emerging economies.

The on‐going debate on the role of common‐law versus civil‐law system in the capital market may have ignored the state involvement. This paper indicates that it is the undue state control rather than the legal system that leads to the weak stock market in China.

The purpose of this paper is to link literature on China’s real estate sector and the impact of governance, ownership and political connectedness on firm financial performance. Whether these factors impact listed real estate firms differently to firms in other industry sectors is identified.

The paper uses pooled 2008-2013 data on A-share firms. Tobin’s Q captures firm financial performance. Explanatory variables include corporate governance, ownership, local government political connectedness, accounting data and ultimate control. Two-way interactions are estimated between real estate and ownership, governance, political connectedness and other variables. Three-way interactions are estimated between real estate, ownership, control and political connectedness. Year and industry fixed effects are absorbed.

Industry concentration and proportion of state ownership appear to positively impact performance. Firm size, gearing and greater foreign ownership appear to negatively impact performance. However, differences are identified for real estate firms, in which state control and gearing positively impact performance. Greater state and foreign ownership as well as supervisory board size negatively impact performance. Finally, state control in the presence of local government connections negatively impacts performance, while greater state ownership in the presence of local government connections positively impacts performance.

A lack of empirical evidence on the impact of corporate governance, ownership structures and political connectedness on firm performance in China’s real estate sector is addressed. Importantly, relationships among these factors and the financial performance of China’s listed real estate firms differ to those of firms in other industries.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the demand for conditional accounting conservatism from equity shareholders in state-controlled firms.

This study presents empirical investigation of firms listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1997 to 2013.

The first finding is the extent of conditional conservatism in state-controlled firms increases when the leverage ratio decreases. It is also found that the high control rights held by the government in state-controlled firms are associated with high conditional conservatism. In addition, further analyses document the an offsetting effect between high control rights and firm leverage; a reinforcing effect between high control rights and year of incorporation after 1992; and a substituting effect between high control rights and dividend payments.

These findings suggest that the demand from equity shareholders, in addition to the debt demand, can be an important determinant of conditional conservatism and examination of these differing sources of demand can enhance the understanding on accounting conservatism in state-controlled firms.

This chapter provides a cross-cultural look at the intersection of religion and the state with a focus on social control, social movements, political authority, and legitimacy. To better understand the complexities of governance, this chapter examines state social control of religion with a specific focus on the effects of that control on society. State leaders often seek to control and use the power of religion to gain legitimacy, authority, and control over citizens. Conversely, religious leaders sometimes seek to engage and even control the power of the state. This chapter highlights some of what happens when religious leaders directly engage in politics and challenge the social control mechanisms of political authority.

At times religious majorities seek not only to participate in the public square, to make policy, but also to exercise complete control of political and cultural institutions. In many nations, from Christians in the United States to Buddhists in Myanmar, some religious and government leaders share the goal of complete religious control over their societies. What happens to the religions and to the society when these religious and government leaders are successful? What happens to the religion when a state controls, supports, and promotes that religion? This chapter uses the case histories of the repression of the Muslim minority by the Buddhists nationalists in Myanmar and the desires of the United States Christian Dominionists goals to illustrate and highlight the way that the twin powers of the state and religion serve as direct agents of social control by transmitting values of each institution through law, policy, and by punishing those who deviate.

This paper is ambitious. Its central purpose is to examine how a number of developed economies, plus the largest developing economy, vary in terms of corporate governance: USA, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, South Korea, Taiwan, Sweden, Switzerland and mainland China. We understand corporate governance in a very broad sense, descriptive not prescriptive: as who controls and influences firms, and how. We are thus dealing very much with varieties of capitalism. In a sense, we shall be seeking to characterise national systems of corporate governance, but we must stress that our concern is always with the situation of the individual firm. We shall find it convenient most of the time to give one label to a country's whole economy, but this will always be an approximation, which conceals variations among that country's firms. At other points, we shall distinguish types of firm and indicate the rough proportions of each type in a particular economy.

This paper examines the impact of state control on stock price crash risk given whether and how ownership structure affects stock price crash risk is relatively underexplored.

The sample includes 2,285 Chinese firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Panel data is used for conducting the analysis and endogeneity is addressed with instrumental variable estimation and by testing how stock price crash risk is affected when the ultimate controller changes from a private-owned company to a state-owned enterprise.

The authors find that state control is negatively associated with future stock price crash risk. The mechanism analysis shows that state control reduces stock price crash risk through the implementation of conservative corporate policies. Furthermore, the impact of state control is more pronounced with more intensive state involvement, e.g. in strategic industries and when a company's ultimate controller is a non-corporate government agency or the central government.

This paper enriches the literature on the controversy of the role of state control and the results of this study highlight the importance of the conservatism of state control on reducing stock return tail risk. The authors also add to the literature on the importance of the policy-risk sharing effect of state ownership.

The purpose of this paper is to test the political costs hypothesis in emerging economies characterized by interventionist governments and weak protection of property rights. The paper uses executives’ political connection and state control to measure firms’ political costs.

Based on a sample of Tunisian firms, univariate and multivariate analyses are used to test whether firms’ political costs have any impact on earnings management.

The empirical analysis indicates that the executives’ political connection is not directly related to earnings management. However, the interaction between executives’ political connection and the state control affects the firm’s sensitivity to political pressure and its earnings management practices. More specifically, this study provides evidence that non-connected firms and state-controlled firms attempt to use accounting policies to decrease their earnings especially during periods of the former government when they had to face high political costs. This finding is robust to comparing means of political cost indicators between different groups. Indeed, private firms with political connection enjoy a significantly lower insurance right, tax and donations and grants compared to other firms.

This study provides empirical evidence for the specific application of accounting theory in emerging economies.

Political influence may be an important criterion that will be used by auditors and investors to appreciate and detect specific manipulations of accounting earnings. Similarly, regulators should be aware of the political factors effect on discretionary behavior of managers to provide appropriate rules and standards.

The study is a pioneer in proving that a firm’s size is not always a suitable measure of its political cost. It extends the accounting literature on the role of political economy in the application of the political costs hypothesis. This hypothesis is confirmed in emerging economies by providing new and significantly measure of firms’ political costs