Search results

This study aims to analyze the effects of economic inequalities on state capture in Latin America. Economic inequalities are the defining issues of our time. While the effect of economic inequality has been explored before on its impact on state capture in Latin America, it has often been done in a qualitative manner. Moreover, most quantitative research to date uses poor proxy variables to assess the impact of inequalities on corruption and or state capture, such as the Gini coefficient, which suffers from a lot of missing data.

A random effects regression model is used to enable the exploitation of between level variation to greater generalize the results across the Latin American region while minimizing bias to the coefficient estimates.

The results demonstrate that the top 1% wealth inequality is highly statistically significant and positive in explaining the variation in state capture. The greater the share of wealth the 1% hold, the more state capture we should expect.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper presents the first empirical study using a novel variable, the top 1% share wealth inequality derived from the World Inequality Database that directly measures the top 1%’s share of wealth overall. The study examines the empirical effect of the top 1%’s share of wealth inequality in contributing to state capture. Nineteen Latin American countries are analyzed across the temporal period 1996–2021.

This paper aims to investigate the prevalence of corruption in Ghana to understand how and why it has turned public procurement into a mere money-making scheme instead of a means to provide needed public goods and services.

The study focuses on Ghana as a case study and mobilizes the monetization of politics lenses. Data are collected via interviews with key officials across the procurement sector (including the government, donors and civil society), documents, documentaries and news articles.

The findings suggest that the increasing costs of elections and political financing coupled with the costs of vote-buying, which has become informally institutionalized, intensify corruption practices and, consequently, turns public procurement into a mere source of cash for political ends. Political appointments and legalized loopholes facilitate this by helping to nullify the safeguard accounting and other control institutions are designed to provide. Likewise, enduring poverty and rising inequality “force” citizens into a vote-buying culture which distorts democratic premises that may drive out unscrupulous politicians; thus, perpetuating capture schemes. Civil society's efforts to remedy these have had little success, and corruption and inequality remain rife.

The main practical implication of the study lies in the need for a gradual demonetization of elections, and the consideration of the fundamental function of public procurement as a policy instrument embedded in economic, social, cultural and environmental plans. Additionally, given the connectedness of the various corruption issues raised, a comprehensive system-based approach in dealing with them would be more effective than a piecemeal approach targeting each issue/problem in isolation.

While extant literature has examined the issue of endemic corruption in developing countries using state capture, few have attempted to explain why it remains enduring, particularly in public procurement. This study, therefore, contributes to the literature on corruption and state capture theoretically and empirically by drawing on monetization of politics from political science to explain why corruption and state capture endure in certain contexts (with Ghana as an illustrative example) which reduce public procurement to a cash-milking scheme.

This paper investigates the factors responsible for the emergence of different arrangements of state–society relations. Being concerned with the relations related to the industrial sector, this study focuses more on state–business–labor relations (SBLRs), especially on power dynamics between the main actors in these relations, namely, the state, tycoons, entrepreneurs and labor.

Based on power dynamics, four SBLR modes are identified and differentiated according to state power vis-à-vis non-state actors and tycoon power vis-à-vis the other non-state actors. The balanced mode is characterized by balanced power relations among the four considered actors. In the capture mode, tycoons are more powerful than other actors, including the state, although other nonsocial actors have organizational rights. The crony mode has powerful state, subservient tycoons who enjoy high levels of favoritism and low organizational power for the other social actors. Finally, the state-dominance mode has powerful state, low levels of favoritism to tycoons and low organizational power for all social actors. The paper then explores the factors responsible for the emergence of each of these modes by investigating the factors’ effects on state power and favoritism to tycoons. The investigated factors include historical political–economic, geographical, legal and cultural factors. The hypothesized effects of these factors are then tested using a random-effects probit regression model, investigating how the different factors affect the probability of the existence of the studied SBLR modes.

The results support much of the hypothesized relations and place more emphasis on some of the investigated factors. Earlier development is clearly responsible for the emergence of either the balanced or the state-capture SBLR mode. Geographical conditions favorable for development, such as latitude and metal richness, also lead to the emergence of either mode. The communist heritage, and more accurately the post-communist economic and incomplete political liberalism of the transition stage, contributed to the emergence of the state-capture SBLR mode. The British legal system, with the power it provides to non-state actors through the independence of judges and other measures, contributes to the emergence of the balanced SBLR mode. Cultural factors are largely responsible for the emergence of the crony SBLR mode, especially hierarchical and collectivist cultures, as well as ethnic fractionalization. On the other hand, the culture of Confucians has the strongest influence on the emergence of state dominance, while other cultures play a marginal role in its rise, and ethnic fractionalization marginally defuses the ability of the state to dominate without resorting to favoritism. Finally, access to rich natural resources, by enriching the state independently from social actors’ financial resources (e.g. taxation), marginally increases the probability of the emergence of the state-dominance mode.

There is room for path dependency to explain the emergence of different SBLR modes in many countries. Unfortunately, the introduced regression model and any quantitative empirical work would not be able to effectively investigate such a process. Instead, an approach depending on case studies and a deeper investigation of country-specific historical political development is needed to complement the research done here. Conducting such an additional quest would help in reaching a more comprehensive understanding of why different countries have different SBLR modes. This should ultimately help in answering an equally important question: How to reverse engineer the emergence of favorable SBLR modes?

Although this paper did not investigate the economic merits or mischiefs of each of the studied modes, it is plausible to think of the balanced SBLR as the best mode. This is supported not only by the fact that most of the countries of this mode are developed countries but also by the attractiveness of the power dynamics governing this mode—a more balanced power among different SBLR actors. While some factors are almost impossible to replicate, for example, geographical factors, reform could target the factors that could be changed or mitigated. This is true for legal reform, especially for fostering the independence of judges. Culture is often regarded as a sticky institution. However, this is not always true, even though the change happens in the long run. A sort of dynamism should always be considered when referring to culture through time and space. Institutional reform could be instrumental in the long run in this regard. Conducting such reform with the help of such “exogenous” institutions should always consider the match between these institutions and “endogenous” institutions, such as culture. That is to say, the connection between democratization, fostering accountability and curbing favoritism and cultural values leaning toward these principles should be firmly established. Finally, a point of optimism is that—based on the results of this paper—reaching a high state of development could increase the chances of realizing a more balanced SBLR mode in the long run.

This paper represents a novel contribution to a topic that has hardly been addressed in the literature. The methodology that is used identifies different state–society relation modes and focuses on power relations in SBLRs is another important contribution to the present literature in many fields, such as institutional economics, socioeconomics and political economy.

Aims to examine the issue of industrial strategy (IS), paying particular attention to the case of Britain. Sets out to assess the possibility and nature of an industrial strategy for Britain, in Europe, and within the global scene, taking into account the world we live in as we see it. Accordingly, the perspective is driven and shaped by a quest for a realistic, feasible and sustainable industrial strategy. In order to achieve these objectives, first examines the theoretical arguments behind much of British, and more generally, Western industrial policies. Following this, outlines and assesses British industrial policy post‐Second World War then compares and contrasts British industrial policy with that of Europe, the USA, Japan and the newly industrialized countries. Then examines recent developments in economics and management which may explain the “Far Eastern” miracle, and points to the possibility of a successful, narrowly self‐interested, IS for Europe and Britain, based on the lessons from (new) theory and international experience. To assess what is possible, develops a theoretical framework linking firms in their roles as consumers and/or electors. This hints at the possibilities and limits of feasible policies. All these ignore desirability which, in the author′s view, should be seen in terms of distributional considerations, themselves contributors to sustainability. Accordingly, discusses a desirable industrial strategy for Britain in Europe which accounts for distributional considerations, and goes on to examine its implications for the issue of North‐South convergence. Concludes by pointing to the limitations of the analysis and to directions for developments.

Goal 16 of the SDGs concerns ‘Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions’. Specifically, Goal 16 states ‘Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’. Among the targets of this goal (Target 16.5) is to ‘Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms’. Undoubtedly, the recognition and inclusion of corruption and bribery among other relevant governance aspects is laudable and necessary. This chapter examines and analyses the relationship between corruption and sustainable development, assesses regional performance through the indicators for achieving Target 16.5 of the Sustainable Development Goals and proposes other indicators and policy frameworks for improved performance toward substantially reducing corruption and bribery in all their forms.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight both the ways in which transnational organized crime has developed and will develop, and also some problems in relation to financing economic organized crime networks. These are related to the problem of state capture problem in emerging democracies.

The literature and other sources have been reviewed to analyse trends relating to transnational crime organisations.

It was found that criminal organisations have moved in the last few years to strengthen their economic power, putting pressure on to states' politics through their networks. In some cases (such as tycoons in transitional countries) it seems that they have already entered a third phase – movement into politics. This form of elite organized crime could be characterised as a fifth branch of state authority, because it is influences, through the means of a great amount of money, corruption, networking and extortion, both the state economy and policy.

The analyses and conclusions help us to understand the transformation of organized crime and its influence on modern society, especially in emerging democracies. This may allow politicians and others to predict how economic organized crime will act in the future and how to avoid the current pressure being exerted by these groups.