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This study aims to investigate the nature of the relationship between the state and civil society after the 2011 uprising.

The study adopted Mygdal’s approach to analyze the relationship between the state and civil society and identify their ability to control the rules of the political game. The study also draws on the theoretical framework of the hypotheses introduced by a number of scholars on the forms of potential relations between the state and civil society, and the impact of these forms on advancing the process of democratization.

This study argues that despite some important changes in favor of civil society vis-à-vis the state, it is too early to conclude that a dramatic change has occurred in this relationship, due to a discernable unbalanced power in favor of the state. The state revealed after 2011 that these organizations acted against the state’s stability and against its fundamentals.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this research is the first to study the relationship between the state and the civil society in Egypt after 2011 events.

This paper investigates the factors responsible for the emergence of different arrangements of state–society relations. Being concerned with the relations related to the industrial sector, this study focuses more on state–business–labor relations (SBLRs), especially on power dynamics between the main actors in these relations, namely, the state, tycoons, entrepreneurs and labor.

Based on power dynamics, four SBLR modes are identified and differentiated according to state power vis-à-vis non-state actors and tycoon power vis-à-vis the other non-state actors. The balanced mode is characterized by balanced power relations among the four considered actors. In the capture mode, tycoons are more powerful than other actors, including the state, although other nonsocial actors have organizational rights. The crony mode has powerful state, subservient tycoons who enjoy high levels of favoritism and low organizational power for the other social actors. Finally, the state-dominance mode has powerful state, low levels of favoritism to tycoons and low organizational power for all social actors. The paper then explores the factors responsible for the emergence of each of these modes by investigating the factors’ effects on state power and favoritism to tycoons. The investigated factors include historical political–economic, geographical, legal and cultural factors. The hypothesized effects of these factors are then tested using a random-effects probit regression model, investigating how the different factors affect the probability of the existence of the studied SBLR modes.

The results support much of the hypothesized relations and place more emphasis on some of the investigated factors. Earlier development is clearly responsible for the emergence of either the balanced or the state-capture SBLR mode. Geographical conditions favorable for development, such as latitude and metal richness, also lead to the emergence of either mode. The communist heritage, and more accurately the post-communist economic and incomplete political liberalism of the transition stage, contributed to the emergence of the state-capture SBLR mode. The British legal system, with the power it provides to non-state actors through the independence of judges and other measures, contributes to the emergence of the balanced SBLR mode. Cultural factors are largely responsible for the emergence of the crony SBLR mode, especially hierarchical and collectivist cultures, as well as ethnic fractionalization. On the other hand, the culture of Confucians has the strongest influence on the emergence of state dominance, while other cultures play a marginal role in its rise, and ethnic fractionalization marginally defuses the ability of the state to dominate without resorting to favoritism. Finally, access to rich natural resources, by enriching the state independently from social actors’ financial resources (e.g. taxation), marginally increases the probability of the emergence of the state-dominance mode.

There is room for path dependency to explain the emergence of different SBLR modes in many countries. Unfortunately, the introduced regression model and any quantitative empirical work would not be able to effectively investigate such a process. Instead, an approach depending on case studies and a deeper investigation of country-specific historical political development is needed to complement the research done here. Conducting such an additional quest would help in reaching a more comprehensive understanding of why different countries have different SBLR modes. This should ultimately help in answering an equally important question: How to reverse engineer the emergence of favorable SBLR modes?

Although this paper did not investigate the economic merits or mischiefs of each of the studied modes, it is plausible to think of the balanced SBLR as the best mode. This is supported not only by the fact that most of the countries of this mode are developed countries but also by the attractiveness of the power dynamics governing this mode—a more balanced power among different SBLR actors. While some factors are almost impossible to replicate, for example, geographical factors, reform could target the factors that could be changed or mitigated. This is true for legal reform, especially for fostering the independence of judges. Culture is often regarded as a sticky institution. However, this is not always true, even though the change happens in the long run. A sort of dynamism should always be considered when referring to culture through time and space. Institutional reform could be instrumental in the long run in this regard. Conducting such reform with the help of such “exogenous” institutions should always consider the match between these institutions and “endogenous” institutions, such as culture. That is to say, the connection between democratization, fostering accountability and curbing favoritism and cultural values leaning toward these principles should be firmly established. Finally, a point of optimism is that—based on the results of this paper—reaching a high state of development could increase the chances of realizing a more balanced SBLR mode in the long run.

This paper represents a novel contribution to a topic that has hardly been addressed in the literature. The methodology that is used identifies different state–society relation modes and focuses on power relations in SBLRs is another important contribution to the present literature in many fields, such as institutional economics, socioeconomics and political economy.

This paper investigates the effect of state-society relations on the industrially-related growth paths of developed countries.

It introduces a novel theoretical framework, the state-business-labor relations (SBLR) framework, where four main actors are identified: the state, big businesspersons or tycoons, owners and managers of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) or Entrepreneurs and labor. Different SBLR categories or modes are introduced depending on levels of coordination and power relations between the studied actors. The paper then investigates how these SBLR modes, through adopting various policies targeting the industrial sector, lead to different growth paths. Rather than focusing only on economic growth, this research regards a growth path as a matrix of the performance in long-run growth and equality of distribution.

Using regression analysis and statistical data, the results suggest that the Co-Balanced mode, having higher levels of coordination and lower favoritism, leads to the best growth path among the four introduced modes, especially with its emphasis on high levels of venture capital availability and easiness of starting business. while the Lib-Capture mode, characterized by lower coordination and higher favoritism, seems to have the worst growth path and the best implemented policy for this mode is suggested to be high profit taxes that seem to counter the negative impact of the existing high levels of favoritism.

Despite the important findings that this research has reached, this paper is mainly meant to open a further investigation into this topic and open this dimension that the research on VoC and political economy have under-researched. A deeper investigation of SBLR typologies that could only be possible by having richer datasets with more data on coordination for the whole world, rather than only the advanced economies, would further our understanding of the dynamics that shape the growth paths of different countries of the world.

To realize the best industrial growth path, fighting favoritism should be an important objective. The negative impact of favoritism on innovation could not be disregarded in the eve of the fourth industrial revolution, where innovation is increasingly pivotal to future industrial development. Actively engaging societal groups in the policymaking process is important in addressing their concerns and balancing them at the same time. This should lead to the double benefit of formulating better policies that should foster growth as well as provide better distribution of this growth. High levels of coordination should help in realizing this objective. Yet, this could only be possible if societal groups are free to associate and aggregate their power and when there are means of preventing one actor from gaining more favorite treatment and exclusive influence over policymakers. The presence of both powerful and broadly represented business associations and labor unions and the existence of a government interested in coordinating their efforts-rather than letting itself be controlled by one group at the expense of the others-should help in the realization of the best growth path. Thus, institutional reform that empowers societal groups and enables them to defend their interests as well as fights all forms of corruption should lead to the realization of a more prosperous and equitable industrial development, with the “re-industrialization” of the developed world being no exception. The technological and social challenges of intensive automation and digitalization accompanying the fourth industrial revolution make the envisaged institutional reform more urgent.

This paper is introducing a novel theoretical framework for studying the effect of state-society relations, particularly SBLR, on the industrial growth paths of developed countries. It integrates three important bodies of literature in order to build a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of state-society relations and their economic consequences. These are the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC), State-Business Relations (SBR) and Industrial Relations. The SBLR framework differentiates between tycoons and entrepreneurs, an important distinction that often goes unnoticed. Different SBLR categories or modes are introduced, depending on levels of coordination and power relations between the actors. It is proposed in this research that the effect on growth paths goes beyond the simple dichotomy between CMEs and LMEs usually present in the literature of VoC and that power relations provide an essential complementary dimension in explaining this causality.

This paper aims to encapsulate the gendered support and hindering factors along with the role of the state experienced by Delhi-based women entrepreneurs in setting up/operating their enterprises amidst the challenges posed by the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.

The study used mixed methods to explore the challenges faced and recovery mechanisms adopted by women entrepreneurs with special reference to the COVID-19 pandemic. A total of 50 Delhi-based young women entrepreneurs (42 actual entrepreneurs + 8 prospective/struggling entrepreneurs) selected using snowball/purposive sampling were studied through both a semi-structured questionnaire and personal interviews. National Small Industries Corporation (NSIC) and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME) were consulted for the government’s policy documents and data. The SPSS package was used for quantitative data analysis.

Low-budget/very small-scale women entrepreneurs face common as well as gender-based challenges in the context of the market, finance, social capital, family support and awareness in addition to accessing the state’s resources/policies in both their startups and crisis situations, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Although gender sensitization, entrepreneurial family background, and equal access to technology and the Internet has enabled women entrepreneurs to initiate, adapt, and scale their enterprises, male domination within the family, society, market, and state apparatuses is omnipresent and has served as a bottleneck for women-owned startups while hindering the recovery of their enterprises amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.

The study was limited to exploring the challenges and prospects of Delhi-based women entrepreneurs at the beginning of their enterprises and amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. On the other hand, the study had access to data and facts announced by the Indian government. No data were available on the implementation of policies and programs, and therefore specific policy analysis was not attempted. However, the reachability and accessibility of government resources and policies were employed.

The study highlights the complexity of patriarchy, which hampers women entrepreneurs in all family, society, market and state domains. Therefore, policy enactment and implementation and further research on women entrepreneurship are suggested to focus more deeply on the gender dimension.

The data used in this work comprised inputs from government sources as well as insights from fieldwork that have not been used by any other publication.

When a major landslide and floods devastated Freetown, Sierra Leone had just overcome the Ebola crisis, which had left its mark on socio-political relations between different disaster response actors. With international disaster response frameworks increasingly shifting to local ownership, the national government was expected to assume a coordinating role. However, in “post-conflict” settings such as Sierra Leone, intra-state and state–society relations are continuously being renegotiated. This study aimed to uncover the complexities of state-led disaster response in hybrid governance setting at national and community levels in the response to the 2017 landslide and floods.

During the four months of fieldwork in Freetown in 2017, semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with various state, aid and societal actors were conducted.

The findings show that a response to policy building on the idea of a uniform state response did not take into account intra-state power politics or the complexity of Sierra Leone's hybrid governance.

This paper argues for a more nuanced debate in humanitarian governance and practice on the localisation of aid in post-conflict and fragile settings.

The study's findings contribute to the literature on the disaster–conflict nexus, identifying paradoxes of localised disaster response in an environment with strong national–local tensions. The study highlights intra-local state dynamics that are usually overlooked but have a great impact on the legitimacy of different state authorities in disaster response.

Iraqi society has suffered from loss or fragility of human security since 2003. The developmental policies, programs and plans of the successive Iraqi Governments throughout the transitional period have not been able to achieve human security, despite the availability of different resources. They have also not prevented or limited the spread of corruption, according to domestic and international reports. Now the country faces a large phenomenon of corruption and the dilemma of human security loss. This study aims to ascertain the nature of the relationship between the phenomenon of corruption and the dilemma of loss or fragility of human security in Iraq since 2003 to learn about the form of this relationship, how the selected variables contribute to the two phenomena and determine the degree of impact of corruption and its dimensions on human security and its components.

This research uses the social survey methodology of the sample taken from the Iraqi society and benefits from system analysis approach to identify the inputs and outputs of the variables researched. Moreover, the study uses the case study methodology to collect data and information precisely in an in-depth manner to support qualitative and quantitative analysis and clarifies the situation at the macro level of both phenomena.

Findings show the prevalence of corruption structurally in the Iraqi state and society. The contribution of dimensions and selected indicators in the spread of corruption and lack of human security varies. Findings also underline a strong statistical correlation between the two variables and their reverse relationship. In other words, the more the corruption is, the less the opportunities of human security are. There is also a strong impact of corruption and its dimensions on the conditions of human security factors.

The paper provides profitable findings and recommendations, which can be used by the Iraqi relevant institutions to eliminate corruption, achieve human security and benefit from its indicators in research and development.

The new addition of this research can be represented by linking the two phenomena and trying to build national standards with the capacity to describe, interpret and predict.

This paper aims to examine why the alliance formed between non-Islamist forces and state actors to oust Mohamed Morsi from power in 2013 broke down quickly.

This paper makes use of original data set derived from three waves of surveys fielded in 2011, 2014 and 2015 that ask questions about public threat perception. Around 10 elite interviews were also conducted to further test the study’s hypothesis.

On the one hand, non-Islamists, civic forces challenged the status and interests of state actors in a way that made state actors view them with heightened distrust. On the other, many civic forces, in face of high threat perception, prioritized law during and order after Morsi’s removal, driven – at least partly – by shifts in public attitudes.

Many views look at transitions in the Arab world from the angle of how Islamists interact with traditional power holders. Such an approach, however, could be reductionist in many ways because it disregards civic forces. This is a point this paper seeks to address.

The year 2020 is an epochal moment for governance and public administration. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has upset social and economic life, including the delivery of public services, and eroded domestic and international politics. It comes in an era of uncertainty resulting from the end of the New Public Management boom and a looming breakdown of the contemporary US-defined international order. Against such a sea change, we can hardly take business as usual. Change breeds indeterminacy but also induces reimagining. Any renewal and renaissance of public management has to address the ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions of governance in a low-trust and high-risk society. Both the capacity and legitimacy of the state need to be re-empowered, but no longer through the market. The dual failure of democratic politics and bureaucratic excellence in many countries has rendered the Wilsonian politics-administration dichotomy redundant. Amid the rise of East Asia, there are growing contentions over the conceptualization of meritocracy as alternative systems of governance and public service models seem to be delivering effective rivals. Governance performance may not be predetermined by regime types within a poly-polar world. We need to search for new reconnections, new leadership, a new basis for trust and consensus, and a new public service bargain to avoid getting bogged down in old wine in re-labelled bottle, or another singular universalist paradigm.