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Organizational cultures that facilitate collaboration are valuable, but little is known about how to create them. The authors investigate the microfoundations of this problem using computational models of dyadic coupled learning. The authors find that merely altering initial beliefs about the consequence of actions (without altering the consequences themselves) can under some conditions create cultures that promote collaboration. The results of this study show why the right initial “framing” of a situation – established for instance through persuasive rhetoric, an inspiring vision, or careful recruitment choices – may under the right conditions be self-reinforcing, instead of becoming empty symbolism.

Explores the prospects for constructing a feminist contractarian moral theory. Argues that the social contractarianism championed by John Rawls and feminized by Susan Okin is unlikely to succeed in offering feminists an alternative theory of justice which can compete with utilitarianism. However, an appropriately modified economic contractarianism, such as that championed by David Gauthier, offers more promise for producing a successful liberal feminist theory of justice. Holds that a feminist ethic of care based on an economic contractarian model must move from an exclusive concern with game‐theoretic bargaining to solve prisoners’ dilemma problems to a bargaining game which also deals with the assurance problem. Offers speculation of how such a theory could be rigorously developed.

Models of speed of internationalization have been built on narrowly defined resources, emphasizing the intangibles at the cost of tangibles and relying on controlled resources while overlooking nonterritorial ones. We build an integrative model for both established and unestablished firms, using three determinants of speed – global value chain experiences, resource adjusted expected return from internationalization and existence of e-commerce platforms. The first is under firms’ control while the last two are partially controlled or totally uncontrolled. Five strategies of internationalization are identified – internationalization through accelerated marketization, delayed internationalization, opportunistic (or on/off) internationalization, IB internationalization, and alliance internationalization, each associates with a different speed of internationalization.

WE are confident that our readers will approve our use of the amount of space we have given this month to the memory of Dr. Arundell Esdaile, whose death we announced briefly in July. As Mr. Berwick Sayers writes, there must be many of his old Students who revere his memory, and many others who have directly or indirectly benefited from his work for our profession.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether education and training affect pro‐social behavior. Economics students are often accused of being less pro‐social. The explanations given are that less pro‐social people choose to study economics or that economics studies indoctrinate students to selfish behavior. The paper experimentally tests these postulations.

The paper uses the prisoner's dilemma game and stag hunt game to study cooperation across different groups of students.

The experiment supports neither of the postulations: economics students would be indoctrinated or less pro‐social people choose to study economics. However, the study shows that police cadets, who go through an education where teamwork and cooperation is promoted, become more cooperative and pro‐social after their completed education.

In contrast to earlier studies, this paper does not simply study economics students, but also examines if students in educational programs that promote loyalty and cooperation and encourage teamwork are more pro‐social than other students.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective on one of the key complexities of collaboration and co-operative working in the public service within the UK.

The paper focuses the attention on the difficulty of partnership working at a time when leading collaboration is a necessity for all leaders in the public sector. It explores one area of this complexity, namely game theory in order to offer an explanation why departments or organisations find it difficult to co-operate as they should.

The paper allows leaders to understand the complexities of co-operation and the reason why there is often a tendency for individuals to act in a selfish manner on behalf of their organisation. Being aware of this behaviour will provide leaders with a greater ability to build trust and develop joint strategies which will provide positive outcomes.

The paper will highlight how greater understanding of game theory including the prisoner dilemma and the stag hunt can help improve leadership, relationships and outcomes within partnerships.

Individual rationality sometimes leads to collectively irrational outcomes, a fundamental problem in the social and life sciences that has attracted sustained attention from experimentalists in sociology, psychology, biology, and economics. But what is it about individual rationality that sometimes gets us into trouble? Is the problem the egoistic pursuit of individual self-interest? Or does the problem with individual rationality lie elsewhere? To find an answer, this chapter closely examines the theoretical and experimental literature on social dilemmas, to see how researchers identify the source of the problem. The review suggests that the prevailing theory wrongly points to egoism as the problem. Failing to do what is best for everyone can also happen among rational altruists, and sometimes egoism is needed to prevent it. The chapter concludes by pointing to what we believe is the fundamental problem – a tension not between individual self-interest and collective welfare, but between individual autonomy and collective interdependence.

This article aims to provide an exposition of evolutionary game theory which can be used for pedagogical purposes.

The exposition is presented as a mathematical model in order to cover the formal underpinnings of evolutionary game theory. The paper aims to illustrate the theory using some simple examples.

The paper discusses population games and describes the notion of revision protocols that agents use to change strategies. As an example of an evolutionary dynamic, the paper discusses the replicator dynamic in detail. It shows convergence of this dynamic to Nash equilibrium in simple 2 strategy games. The paper then applies this dynamic to a particular class of 3 strategy games to establish the possibility on cyclical behavior around a Nash equilibrium.

The paper can serve as an educational briefing for students and researchers who are new to the field of evolutionary game theory.