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The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence on the additional costs of dealing with staff fraud, beyond the initial fraud loss, based on 45 cases of staff fraud.

The research began with a “brainstorming” session with counter fraud professionals to map all potential costs in a staff fraud. It then utilised a twin-track approach of a survey and interviews. A survey was distributed using a number of methods yielding 28 usable cases. Interviews were also sought with organisations willing to discuss staff fraud, which secured a further 17 cases. Both the survey and interview used the same questionnaire, although the latter enabled a deeper questioning of participants.

This study examined 45 cases of staff fraud from a wide range of sectors drawn predominantly from larger organisations. From each of these cases detailed, estimates of the costs of dealing with the fraud were identified. Major additional costs included the costs of investigation, staff suspensions, internal disciplinary costs, external sanctions, permanent staff replacement, miscellaneous costs as well as intangible costs. The findings identified significant costs which are significantly above the initial value of the fraud, particularly on initial frauds under £25,000.

Staff fraud is a very sensitive subject with many organisations unwilling to reveal what happens when it occurs. The approach was therefore to secure as much data as possible and as such this might not be representative of the broader economy.

The paper highlights the need for greater investment in prevention given the substantial costs of staff fraud to deal with.

This is the first attempt to gauge the full costs of staff fraud to an organisation.

There is increasing guidance for public bodies on the appropriate counter fraud strategies to pursue. One area covered is anti‐fraud culture strategies. Building upon the work of the UK Government's HM Treasury, the purpose of this paper is to assess the extent and quality of anti‐fraud culture strategies in UK central government bodies.

Based upon analysis of HM Treasury survey data as well as a survey undertaken by the authors.

The paper shows that the quantitative data from HM Treasury surveys when compared to the qualitative data also drawn from the authors survey highlights significant numbers of central public bodies with limited anti‐fraud culture strategies.

Some of the responses on screening strategies used by central government bodies varied in the detail offered in response to the authors' survey.

Provides much greater depth to the strategies utilised by central government bodies to develop an anti‐fraud culture.

The purpose of this paper is to present a comparative appraisal of structures, fraud loss and performance data in London local authorities (LAs) with that of the National Health Service (NHS) and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) in order to test the Fraud Review's contention that LAs are “less well equipped” to deal with fraud than central government departments.

Primary research was undertaken through questionnaires to all London boroughs and interviews with key personnel in two comparator organisations.

London boroughs are no less competent or effective in investigating fraud. Each has a specialist anti‐fraud response and has similar levels of performance as comparator organisations. Whilst London boroughs outperform in some areas such as sanctions per officer against the NHS and detection levels in benefit fraud against the DWP, there are concerns over higher per unit staffing cost, principally caused by the autonomous and diverse nature of local government. Further that some authorities are unaware of, or unwilling to deal with, certain fraud typologies.

The research was limited to London local government and further work is needed outside the capital.

Recommendations are made for the introduction of an explicit statutory requirement for LAs to have an anti‐fraud resource, standardisation of definitions and consideration of borough‐based multi‐agency fraud teams.

There has been no previous research of this type and it may be useful to government when considering how to deal with fraud, LAs and those with an interest in public sector fraud.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the antecedents and consequences of employee fraud, focusing on the banking industry in Ghana.

A major bank was selected for the case study analysis. The researchers employed qualitative data analysis for the study. Content analysis of investigation reports and interviews of employees from different functional areas were used as the main data collection tools.

This study found that loans contracted by bank employees with huge repayment amounts put financial pressure on them to commit fraud. The study also found that inadequate controls in some areas of the bank can fuel the commission of fraud. In addition, aggrieved employees have highly chances of committing fraud. Huge punitive consequences were noted to exist for the employee who perpetrates the fraud and shareholders are also affected by the fraudulent behaviour of employees.

Findings shown in the study confirm the hypotheses of the fraud triangle theory on the causes of fraud in spite of its criticisms. The findings are also consistent with extant studies on the antecedents and consequences of fraud. The use of one bank for the case study analysis as well as the three-year analysis period imposes a limitation on the study. Future studies can explore fraud using other different theoretical lenses. Gathering data from more than one bank and for a longer period of analysis may provide more accurate results.

This study provides some recommendations for fraud prevention in the banking industry in Ghana. The major one is the need for the central bank to collaborate with financial institutions to set up an effective credit worthiness system that will aid the monitoring of activities of the banks. Banks should also ensure that systems of controls are reviewed regularly to identify and deal with fraud.

This study is original, as it focuses on an industry that is highly susceptible to fraud because of issues of confidentiality with data and with the scanty literature on fraud.

Reports on measures taken by the Benefits Agency to fight benefit fraud during 1993‐94. Categorizes fraud activity and reports on recent investigations. Describes the organization and specifies three ways of dealing with fraud: prevention, detection and deterrence. Outlines current and future plans.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the antecedents and consequences of employee fraud, focusing on the banking industry in Ghana.

A major bank was selected for the case study analysis. The researchers used qualitative data analysis for the study. Content analysis of investigation reports and interviews of employees from different functional areas were used as the main data collection tools.

This study found that loans contracted by bank employees with huge repayment amounts put financial pressure on them to commit fraud. The study also found that inadequate controls in some areas of the bank can fuel the commission of fraud. In addition, aggrieved employees have a high propensity of committing fraud. Huge punitive consequences were noted to exist for employees who perpetrate fraud, and shareholders are also affected by the fraudulent behaviour of employees.

Findings shown in the study confirm the hypotheses of the fraud triangle theory on the causes of fraud despite its criticisms. The findings are also consistent with extant studies on the antecedents and consequences of fraud. The use of one bank for the case study analysis as well as the three-year analysis period impose a limitation on the study. Future studies can explore fraud using other different theoretical lenses. Gathering data from more than one bank and for a longer period of analysis may provide more accurate results.

This study provides some recommendations for fraud prevention in the banking industry in Ghana. The major one is the need for the central bank to collaborate with financial institutions to set up an effective creditworthiness system that will aid the monitoring of activities of the banks. Banks should also ensure that systems of controls are reviewed regularly to identify and deal with fraud.

This study is original, as it focuses on an industry that is highly susceptible to fraud due to issues of confidentiality with data and with scanty literature on fraud.

This paper aims to examine the nature of frauds and insider involvement in the perpetration of frauds in Nigeria’s banking ecosystem. It probes the payment platforms mostly vulnerable to fraud attacks since the role-out of cashless policy in Nigeria in 2014.

Using secondary data on frauds and forgeries in Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation annual report of 2019, the study engaged the data on frauds and forgeries to unpack the complex dynamics in relation to bank frauds in Nigeria.

Findings show that fraud attacks on deposit money banks increased year in year out although the actual monetary loss dropped in 2019 as against 2018. Technology mediated transactions such as the use of automated teller machine and internet-based transactions experienced the most fraud. In relation to the role of insiders, all cadres of staff were involved in the fraud but majority of those involved were temporary staff.

Arising from this, it is suggested that banks should continue to strengthen security system and governance structures. Employing temporary staff should be phased out while online and offline vigilance should be mounted.

The study contributes to knowledge by examining the nature of frauds and unveiling the insider dimensions of fraud and the possible factors increasing the vulnerability of casual staff to perpetrate fraud.

Employee theft is a significant part of retail losses from shrinkage, yet has been comparatively underexplored compared with shoplifting. The purpose of this paper is to assess the impacts of different forms of staff theft and fraud upon retail crime losses and analyse the characteristics of offenders.

The approach is based on a statistical analysis of the details (from retail records) of all staff offenders apprehended for theft by four major UK retailers over a two‐year period. The results are then compared with shrinkage losses for these retailers to discuss the implications of the findings.

Retailer concentration upon customer theft is difficult to explain given the significance of perceived staff theft on losses from crime. Only a small percentage of staff offenders were caught by retailers, but estimation problems were caused by the fact it was difficult to value the exact amount stolen over time by serial offenders. The majority of people apprehended were young and were believed to have stolen comparatively small amounts of cash or goods. In contrast, a small number of large‐scale offenders were responsible for 47 per cent of total known staff theft. Only a relatively small proportion of known staff crime involved collusion, the major losses were caused by theft of cash, major fraud losses, merchandise and refund fraud.

The implications of this study are significant for retailers. They suggest that retailers may concentrate on smaller‐scale wrongdoers rather than major frauds and that retailers may benefit from switching part of their loss‐prevention resources from shoplifting and minor staff offending to more considerable in‐house frauds.

The paper presents original data based on the characteristics of actual apprehended thieves rather than a discussion based primarily on shrinkage estimates). It presents new information for the academic community concerning the impact of different types of theft and fraud and challenges part at least of retailing conventional wisdom about “Who steals?” and “How?” It is valuable both to the academic community and to retail practitioners.

The purpose of this study is to explore how a large UK police force – Greater Manchester Police (GMP) – sought during a period of continuing budget reductions to take a cost-effective approach to certain types of fraud through the establishment of a central Volume Fraud Team (VFT), which in turn would also have wider operational resource benefits across the force. It then explores the decision to merge that team with its existing serious and complex fraud team.

The research was undertaken over a period of two years by interview and desk review to explain the internal processes which underpinned the approach and the initial outcomes. It discusses why the approach was short lived as a consequence of other factors.

The paper sets out briefly the context of changes to the policing of fraud since 1979 and describes the GMP decision-making processes that established a centralised response to volume fraud and major (serious and complex) fraud. The paper assesses the available data on the approach and whether the changes facilitated a more effective means of addressing fraud and other internal policing priorities. It then discusses the decision in 2014 to merge the staff resources for volume and major frauds in response to identified policy trends in fraud investigations and changes in fraud reporting.

The single case study is limited in terms of focus and in applicability to the wider law enforcement response to fraud.

The research discusses practitioner issues arising from the complexities of balancing resources and priorities against changing trends and patterns of criminal activity in a specific area of policing.

The research is an original study into the internal and external change agendas, and there are, therefore, wider lessons for the policing of fraud in the UK.

First-party fraud in which retail consumers commit fraud against retailers is a growing problem. However, to date studies on retail crime have focused almost entirely on fraudulent consumer behaviours in physical stores. With the growth of e-commerce, the losses to retailers from this fraud are growing so there is strong need to research this problem from multiple perspectives. The paper aims to discuss this issue.

The authors conducted three case studies and a total of 24 semi-structured interviews with retail managers, and evaluated their existing prevention-related documentation. Fraud management lifecycle theory was used to organise and discuss the findings.

The authors found that many retailers are treating this problem as just a cost of doing business online and have no detailed plans for dealing with this problem or any reporting to law enforcement agencies. However, they have begun working with delivery companies for delivery accuracy. Use of convenience stores as collection points is also showing early improvements.

The small number of cases and interviews used is a limitation of this study. However, the authors believe that the findings are useful for advancing knowledge in this emerging research area.

This study provides insight into existing management practices in this domain, and makes recommendations on how to improve the management of first-party fraud. The study also makes a case for increased managerial interest and involvement in reducing first-party fraud. The study also helps bridge a glaring gap in existing literature and provides useful leads for further research.

To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to evaluate the existing practices employed to manage first-party fraud in e-retail.