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As the wave of liberalization and deregulation have accelerated to relieve rigid controls over airline routes, capacity, and fare setting regimes, Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) have emerged especially in local aviation markets since the 1970s.

This paper has studied the effects of LCC's entry into the domestic aviation market which was pre-occupied by two major carriers, Korean Air (KAL) and Asiana Airlines. Through a simple model describing two situations, prior and post to LCC's entry, we analyzed changes and trends of each airline's output and profit based on the Cournot and two-stage Stackelberg game equilibrium.

In summary, our conclusion consists of five points: (1) Even though JIN Air's entry reduced KAL's respective output and profit, the more JIN Air produces, the higher the joint-profit of KAL and JIN Air is, (2) From the joint-profit aspect, increasing KAL's output to a level than JIN Air's is more profitable on the Gimpo-Jeju route, on the other hand, increasing JIN Air's output higher than KAL's is more profitable on the Jeju-Busan route, (3) Even though JIN Air's entry increase Asiana Airline's output, the more JIN Air produces, the less Asiana Airlines's profit is, (4) Total output in markets as well as total profits of firms will increase under certain conditions, (5) KAL and JIN Air tend to get caught in an unresolved conflict on level of LCC cost.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a numerical algorithm able to describe the Stackelberg strategy for a multi level hierarchical three-person game via genetic algorithm (GA) evolution process. There is only one player for each hierarchical level: there is an upper level leader (player L0), an intermediate level leader (player L1) who acts as a follower for L0 and as a leader for the lower level player (player F) that is the sole actual follower of this situation.

The paper presents a computational result via GA approach. The idea of the Stackelberg-GA is to bring together GAs and Stackelberg strategy in order to process a GA to build the Stackelberg strategy. Any player acting as a follower makes his decision at each step of the evolutionary process, playing a simple optimization problem whose solution is supposed to be unique.

A GA procedure to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium of the three-level hierarchical problem is given. An application to a Authority-Provider-User (APU) model in the context of wireless networks is discussed. The algorithm convergence is illustrated by means of some test cases.

The solution to each level of hierarchy is supposed to be unique.

The paper demonstrates the possibility of using computational procedures based on GAs in hierarchical three level decision problems extending previous results obtained in the classical two level case.

It is necessary to implement green supply chains. But green development needs to be gradual and coexist with ordinary products in the market. This paper aims to study the green and ordinary product pricing and green decision-making under chain-to-chain competition.

This paper considers consumers' multiple preferences and takes two competitive supply chains with asymmetric channels as the research object. Through the construction of the game models involving different competitive situations, this paper studies the pricing, green decision-making and the supply chains' profits, and discusses the impact of consumer green preference, channel preference, green investment and competition on the decision-making and performance. Finally, this paper further studies the impact of the decision structure on the environmental and economic benefits of supply chains.

The results show that consumer green preference has an incentive effect on the green supply chain and also provides an opportunity for the regular supply chain to increase revenue. Specifically, consumers' preference for green online channels improves the product greenness, but its impact on the green retailer and regular supply chain depends on the green investment cost. Moreover, competition not only fosters product sustainability, but also improves supply chain performance. This paper also points out that the decentralization of the regular supply chain is conducive to the environmental attributes of the green product, while the environment-friendly structure of the green supply chain is different under different conditions. In addition, the profit of a supply chain under centralized decision is not always higher than that under decentralized decision.

The novelty of this paper is that it investigates the pricing of two heterogeneous alternative products and green decision-making for the green product under the competition between two supply chains with asymmetric channels, in which the green supply chain adopts dual channels and the regular supply chain adopts a single retail channel.

Integrated decision of pricing and inventory control for a deteriorating product is known as a good practice in revenue management discipline. The purpose of this paper is to formulate the problem of joint pricing and inventory decision in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain with deteriorating items and backlogging. Furthermore, the other purpose is to develop an efficient algorithm to obtain the equilibrium solution.

In this study, a manufacturer–retailer supply chain of a deteriorating product is considered. The retailer aims to maximize his profit, for which he jointly determines the retail price and replenishment cycle. In addition, the manufacturer should decide on the wholesale price to maximize her profit. Considering the problem as a manufacturer-Stackelberg game, the equilibrium solution is formulated and analyzed for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Moreover, two different procedures are developed to obtain the equilibrium solution. The first procedure is an exact procedure for the Taylor-approximated model and the second is a simulated annealing (SA)-embedded algorithm for the actual model.

It is found that Taylor-approximated procedure is more accurate than SA-embedded procedure. However, the latter is more time-efficient. Moreover, it is observed that the obtained solution is highly sensitive to demand parameters, while it is not the case for the cost parameters.

The paper models a real industrial problem, and its results could be used in analyzing any manufacturer–retailer supply chain with deteriorating items. Among others, the fruit and vegetable supply chains are more likely to have a similar setting, and this study’s results are applicable for such chains in food industry.

The liquefied natural gas (LNG) business comprises a number of economic activities with inherent risks. The purpose of this paper is to propose an integrated modelling approach, as part of the investment decision‐making process, for optimising economic returns from LNG whilst taking into account uncertainty in various key input parameters.

Inter‐linked cash flow and pricing models of the LNG chain were constructed. Net present value was maximised based on selection of netback pricing variables and level of investment shareholding. Constraints were placed on the minimum acceptable returns. The risk affinity of the decision maker was captured in the form of a chance‐constrained optimisation problem. A genetic algorithm was applied for numerical optimisation, in combination with Monte Carlo simulations to account for the stochastic nature of the problem.

Based on the results of a case study, the deterministic solution, having no consideration to uncertainty, was found to be both sub‐optimal and provided an unsatisfactory risk outcome. The stochastic approach yielded an optimal solution with due consideration to risk. Various scenarios show that the choice of the decision variables significantly impacts the trade‐off between risk and returns along the LNG chain to government and investor.

The suitability of the methodology to the operational phase of the LNG business which incorporates different elements of risk, such as market dynamics and logistics, is as yet untested.

This framework may be useful in the formulation of optimal commercial structure of firms, investment portfolio and gas/LNG pricing arrangements for host governments involved in the LNG business.

With the growing economic impact of e-commerce and the increasing trend of omnichannel mode, more considerate services can be provided to customers. This paper aims to explore the optimal practice of business strategies and enrich the research content of marine tourism omnichannel.

This paper studies the optimal practice of bundling pricing and service effort strategies between two tourism suppliers (TSs) and a travel agent (TA) who distributes complementary products in marine tourism omnichannel considering joint efforts of both sides. This study develops five models by Stackelberg and Nash game and introduces the revenue-sharing contract. All outcomes/results are analyzed and the corresponding numerical and sensitivity analyses are conducted to derive more managerial implications and business insights.

The main findings show that bundling price is directly proportional to inter-channel integration coefficient and service effort level coefficient, and inversely proportional to the price elasticity coefficient. TA tends to provide a higher level of service effort than TSs when TA plays a dominant role. Improving the service effort level unduly leads to a decline in profits. Moreover, TSs and TA can reach a win-win situation under the coordination mechanism and the marine tourism omnichannel can achieve the best performance.

A novel and useful approach towards joint equilibrium decisions of bundle pricing and service efforts in marine tourism omnichannel with complementary tourism products under different operational strategies is proposed.

This study aims to investigate whether the contract manufacturer (CM) should take the first-mover advantage in the end-product without supplying core components to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) immediately, or should fully squeeze the benefit of the learning effect through an amplified production quantity by letting the OEM enter the end-product market early.

The authors propose a two-period model for a supply chain consisting of a CM and an OEM where the CM has four alternative entry strategies concerning it competition to the OEM in the end-product market. For each strategy, the authors derive the equilibrium solutions of the two firms using a backward approach. Comparison leads to the CM’s final choices among the four strategies.

For both CM and OEM, the monopoly and the first-entry strategies will be dominated by either the post-entry or the simultaneous-entry strategy, and thus, their preferred strategy is chosen from the latter two. Regarding the two firms choices between the post- and simultaneous-entry strategy, the CM prefers the post-entry strategy when the OEMs brand premium is at a moderate level, whereas the OEM prefers the post-entry strategy when its brand premium is low, and the learning effect can amplify the interval for the CMs adopting the post-entry strategy as well as changes the interval for the OEMs preference related to the two strategies.

This paper is the first one to explore the optimal strategy for a CM to maximize its profit in a co-opetitive supply chain situation with a CM and an OEM. The authors believe that our paper contributes to both literature and the market.

This paper aims to generate novel insights in supply chain management by reviewing studies related to counterfeiting and piracy issues with a particular emphasis on theoretical works.

A systematic literature review of more than 100 peer-reviewed academic papers is conducted. The authors first introduce the social acceptance of counterfeiting and piracy to explain the existence of these illegal products. After that, they focus on the negative effect of counterfeiting and piracy on supply chain management and society while mentioning their positive and normative effects carefully under certain circumstances.

People have been attempting to reveal the impacts of counterfeiting and piracy on customers, licit firms, industry sectors, governments and the society as a whole. The negative impacts of counterfeiting and piracy on legal firms and licit supply chains is examined thoroughly in the literature; however, benefits from counterfeiting and piracy are also pointed out. Additionally, researchers are interested in firms’ reactions toward this phenomenon. Based on heuristics from the above analysis, it is fruitful to conduct this research in a theme of supply chain management.

Most studies on counterfeiting and piracy are not from a supply chain management perspective and mainly focus on their effect on consumers or a single firm. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is one of few studies that incorporate the key aspects of counterfeiting and piracy into supply chain management and also highlight several important directions for future research in the sense of supply chain.

Supply chain network is complicated to manage due to the involvement of a number of agents. Formation of virtual organization using Industry 4.0 (I4.0) is an approach to improve the efficiency and effectiveness and to overcome the complexities of the channel. However, the task of managing the channel further becomes complicated after incorporating sustainability into the supply chain. To fill this gap, this paper focuses on designing of mechanism and demonstration of I4.0-based virtual organization to coordinate sustainable supply chain.

In this paper, we model and compare I4.0-based virtual organization models using four other traditional contracts with centralized supply chain. The non-cooperative game theoretic approach has been used for the analysis of models.

Our game-theoretic analysis shows that investment in I4.0 and sustainable innovation are beneficial for the overall supply chain. Our results show that linear two-part tariff contract and I4.0-based virtual organization model can perfectly coordinated with the supply chain.

This study consider deterministic model settings with full information game. Therefore researchers are encouraged to study I4.0-based coordination models under information asymmetry and uncertain situations.

The paper includes implications for the development of I4.0-based coordination model to tackle the problems of channel coordination.

This study proposes I4.0-based game-theoretic model for the sustainable supply chain coordination.